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Abstract 
Religious Conversion and Da‘wa Secularism:  





This dissertation focuses on the different ways that religion and secularism are 
understood and articulated through the practices of Lebanese citizens. Situated at the 
intersections of legal anthropology, theories of secularism and religion, and interdisciplinary 
studies of the state and gendered citizenship, my research invites us to rethink theories of 
liberalism, feminism, and secular modernity by demonstrating how they manifest in non-Western 
contexts. My project thus challenges us to think more critically about the supposed universality 
of Euro American articulations of secularism, liberalism, and feminism and asks us to reexamine 
how these categories are circulated and regulated internationally. I study two practices of 
Lebanese citizenship; religious conversion as an act that moves between different personal status 
laws, and advocacy for a secular personal status and/or civil marriage law. This advocacy is a 
crucial part of what I am calling “da‘wa secularism,” a term that brings into relief the 
pedagogical aspect of an activism that aims to saturate the public sphere with a “culture of 
secularism.” Both conversion and da'wa secularism are practices that are predicated on and 
directed towards the Lebanese legal system. Acts of conversion rely on the laws currently in 
place; advocacy for a secular personal status seeks to reform them. Despite this divergence 
between these two practices of Lebanese citizenship, both are couched in and discursively 
reproduce important aspects of the ideological framework of the Lebanese state. These aspects 
include the secularity of the state, the role the state is supposed to play in ensuring the protection 
of Lebanon’s pluralism, and the state’s mandate to buffer citizens from the overreaching of 
religious personal status institutions.  However, conversion reproduces the state’s secularity as 
the universal space which allows a citizen to change religions freely, while activists suggest that 
this form of secularism is deficient, dangerous, and “not truly” secular. Similarly, acts of 
conversion reproduce the citizen as a category of practice that is refracted through the registers 
of personal status and civil/secular laws and within which the latter has ultimate jurisdiction over 
the former, while advocacy for a secular personal status seeks to produce Lebanese citizens that 
are only, and entirely, under the jurisdiction of the civil and secular state. At stake are contending 
views of secularism, religion, and citizenship. 
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Introduction 
 
In the 1960s (a precise date is not given) a Lebanese Greek Orthodox man married a 
Greek Orthodox woman. The couple had three children before he met another woman, who was 
Maronite, and fell in love with her. He converted to Sunni Islam and the couple received and 
registered a Muslim marriage contract with the civil authorities. In 1979 he divorced his first 
wife in the Greek Orthodox Court of First Instance. He then petitioned the Maronite church to 
“return” to that community, stating that he was only Greek Orthodox because he was still a 
minor when his father, originally a Maronite, had become a Greek Orthodox in order to divorce 
his mother and remarry. The Maronite Church accepted his petition, and he was issued a 
certificate of conversion to Maronite Christianity.  He and his second wife had a Maronite church 
wedding and received a Maronite wedding certificate. The man filed neither his conversion nor 
his Maronite marriage certificate with the civil authorities in the census registry. He and his 
second wife had four children before he left her (he did not divorce her) to live with another 
woman whom he married in the Sunni Court of First Instance in Tripoli. He registered the 
Muslim marriage contract with the civil authorities. He had four children with his third wife. 
In 1988 the second, Maronite, wife filed a case with the Maronite court demanding that 
her husband return to the marriage home. She demanded to be recognized as an abandoned 
woman and thus be entitled to alimony and child support. The Maronite court issued a ruling in 
her favor, after which the man petitioned the Sunni court system. The Sunni courts provided 
proof that the marriage between him and his second wife was a Muslim marriage because that 
was the one registered with the state. Therefore the Maronite Church had no jurisdiction and no 
grounds to issue rulings related to the marriage and its break up. In response, the Maronite Court 
of Appeals issued a second ruling giving the woman a more generous alimony package. In 1994 
the husband petitioned the Public Council at the Court of Cassation (henceforth the Council), 
asking them to nullify the Maronite Court rulings over a lack of jurisdiction. Both the Maronite 
and Greek Orthodox court systems supported the second wife in her case against her husband, 
who was in turn supported by the Sunni court system, at the Council.   
In their legal briefs to the court, lawyers for the female defendant alleged that the man 
had made a mockery of the Islamic religion, manipulating both Islam and Christianity in order to 
satisfy his sexual cravings. They argued that the man had never truly become a Muslim in faith 
or in practice, but only embraced that faith as a legal strategy to marry and remarry at will—
leaving three mistreated women and eleven under-cared for children in his wake. The wife’s 
lawyers argued that her husband never told her that he hadn’t registered his conversion to 
Maronite Christianity or their Maronite marriage certificate and that she believed he had done 
both. They presented the Council with authorized copies of the family’s identification papers, 
which list the man and his three different marriages, his conversion, and his children and the 
personal status that applies to them (their madhhabs). Using these census registry documents, 
they demonstrated that several of the man’s children had converted back to Maronite 
Catholicism upon reaching eighteen years of age, the legal age of majority in Lebanon. The wife 
argued that this was because despite whatever state records may have shows, both mother and 
father raised the children as practicing Christians. She and her lawyers suggested that the cynical 
use and abuse of Lebanon’s religious pluralism was a danger to the public good, particularly at a 
time when the country was just recovering from a sectarian civil war. 
In what was surely meant to be the deathblow to the man’s credibility, the wife’s lawyers 
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presented a photocopy of a news article published on March 9, 1995—while the case was still 
being arbitrated—to the Council. The article identified the man as a father of eleven children 
who had been displaced by the Lebanese civil war and was squatting in the building that housed 
Radio Orient. The man was quoted as saying that the ten thousand dollars that the Ministry of the 
Displaced had allocated towards finding a permanent solution to his displacement was not 
enough to support eleven children (he stated that this amount would not even cover one year’s 
worth of school fees) and that due to the destruction of the civil war there was nowhere to which 
to “return”. Through her lawyers’ brief, the wife told the Council that her husband was “trying to 
cheat the civil government just as he has cheated the Christian and Muslim religions” –crying 
“crocodile tears to the Ministry of the Displaced as freely as he had before Muslim, Christian, 
and civil personal status representatives.” She alleged that in fact none of his eleven children 
lived with him and that he was not squatting at the building with his family, but with a young 
woman whom he intended to make his fourth wife. Put your citation here 
Cases heard at the Public Council at the Court of Cassation often concern plaintiffs and 
defendants accused of violating religious precepts and the public good by converting for the 
express purpose of manipulating different personal status laws.  Such cases demonstrate the work 
of the Lebanese legal system and its bureaucracy. They also show the imbricated and citational 
nature and practices of personal status and civil laws, as well as their attendant institutions. 
Together these laws form the legal architecture of the Lebanese state and its citizens. Through 
the repetition of bureaucratic and legal practices associated with the state—even at historical 
moments when the state was absent, besieged, or ineffectual due to civil war— a view of 
Lebanese governance emerges (Feldman 2008).  Importantly, cases heard at the Council for 
arbitration between different personal status courts performs the unity of the legal system and 
mark the civil and secular spaces of the state as sovereign over their religious and personal status 
counterparts.1  
 
This case, and others like it that have been heard at The Public Council at the Court of 
Cassation, demonstrates the ways that discourses and practices of secularism, citizenship, and 
gender interrupt and co-produce each other in the Lebanese legal system. The Council, 
composed of the high judges who preside in the different chambers of the Court of Cassation, is 
the most authoritative source for establishing legal precedent. The Council enjoys limited 
jurisdiction over all personal status courts and civil courts. It hears cases concerning the legality 
                                                
1 The Council of General Oversight at the Court of Cassation has the jurisdiction to arbitrate 
between different personal status courts of different sects and/or religions, different personal 
status courts of the same sect (for example, cases where Greek Orthodox personal status courts 
from Beirut and the municipality of the mountain suburb of Brummana both claim jurisdiction) 
and between personal status and civil courts.
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of a citizen's religious conversion, usually when that conversion results in two different courts 
competing for jurisdiction over that citizen’s personal status affairs. As such, citizens, religious 
institutions, and personal status courts from around the country often appeal to the Council, 
situated in Beirut. The Council’s work reproduces the state as the arbiter of religious and 
sectarian difference. This difference is made most explicit through the multiple matrices of 
sexual regulation within sect-based personal status law. Through Council decisions such as the 
one that opens this article, which are final and cannot be appealed, the state produces itself as 
both secular and sovereign through its mandate to regulate and arbitrate between personal status 
laws and interests.i  When the state—through the Council—intervenes into decisions made by 
personal status courts, it is always to protect the rights of the citizen from abuses that are said to 
have occurred at personal status courts. These “abuses,” however, are almost never substantive 
or jurisprudential and instead are most always procedural: bureaucratic procedures, illegal 
discrimination or bribery, false or competing jurisdictions, and/or improper courtroom 
procedures.  The state does not intervene into the ways that sexual and sectarian difference are 
regulated via personal status law except in cases where the civil rights of that citizen are being 
violated, for example if a divorce is granted in a Muslim courtroom without a representative of 
the attorney general present. In fact, whenever plaintiffs ask the Council to comment on 
gendered differentiation in personal status law, the Council claims to protect the right to that 
differentiation in the name of pluralism, tolerance, and the freedom of religion, the same 
discourse it uses when defending the right of the citizen to change his or her religion.  
The practice of Lebanese citizenship, and of Lebanese secularism, is marked and defined 
by these gendered and sectarian differences. These are markings that activists for a secular 
personal status law hope will eventually disappear once the state becomes, in their eyes, “fully 
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secular” and once what they term a culture of secularism—a culture defined by equality and 
tolerance—is pervasive in Lebanon. The majority of activists with whom I conducted fieldwork 
are in their twenties and come from middle class backgrounds.  These activists are multilingual, 
mainly Beirut-based, and diverse in terms of their educational, religious and sectarian 
backgrounds, as well as their gender. All of these activists, however, have faith in secularism and 
in the promise of peace and progress they see it entails. They believe that secularism can and will 
deliver gender equality, an end to civil wars, and new possibilities for the individual and family 
to flourish. In order to achieve their goals of both passing a civil marriage law and saturating the 
public with the culture of secularism, secular activists organize protests, draft laws, stage public 
performances of inter-religious and inter-sectarian civil marriages, and hold press conferences.  
They hope that once Lebanon has a secular personal status law citizens who “choose” to 
continue under religious personal status law will do so out of true faith and belief in a particular 
religion—and the possibility of ambiguity regarding a citizen’s sect, religion, and personal 
status, will be collapsed. Practices of religious conversion that are open to the charge of 
insincerity, such as those illustrated in the court case above, will end once all citizens have 
access to a secular personal status.  Missing in this analysis is the fact that the Lebanese state 
already is secular, and that this secularism is articulated through, and dependent on, the 
management of both sexual and sectarian difference. The draft civil marriage and/or secular 
personal status laws written by activists thus far regulate sexual and gendered difference, as do 
the fifteen other sectarian personal status laws already in place.ii  However, the regulation of 
sexual difference is not limited to the arena of personal status, but rather is the constitutive knot 
at the center of civil, criminal, and procedural law in Lebanon.iii  
The weaving together of discourses on state failure, sectarianism, secularism and gender 
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is most clear in activism directed at reforming personal status law. Following Yael Navaro-
Yashin, I study both these activists and the courts, laws and actors which they want to reform 
“not as an opposition, but as the same domain”—they are both spaces within which the (often 
contradictory) workings of the Lebanese state, and the practices of Lebanese citizens, become 
visible.iv How might studying these practices of citizenship and “faces of the state” help us 
revisit what we think we know about Lebanon? How might studying the knotting together of 
secularism, sectarianism, and gender in Lebanon help us think more about critically about the 
ways that the modern subject is constituted? What might such a study teach us about the ways 
that people live the state? How does the modern subject live the impasses and intersections 
between secularism as a theoretical and epistemic space and secularity as an embodied way of 
life?  
 This dissertation explores intersections and impasses between law and citizenship in 
Lebanon. In particular, I study two practices of Lebanese citizenship: religious conversion—a 
practice that changes the legal position of a citizen; and advocacy for a secular personal status 
and/or civil marriage law. The second practice, activism for a secular personal status, is an 
important part of what I am calling “da‘wa secularism.” I introduce the term “da‘wa” in order to 
bring into relief the pedagogical aspect of an activism that aims to saturate the public sphere with 
a culture of secularism in so that political transformation can take place organically, and safely, 
for Lebanon's religious and sectarian minorities.  
Both religious conversion and da‘wa secularism are practices that are predicated on and 
directed towards the Lebanese legal system. Acts of conversion rely on the laws currently in 
place; advocacy for a secular personal status seeks to reform them. Despite this divergence, both 
practices are couched in and discursively reproduce important aspects of the ideological 
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framework of the Lebanese state. These aspects include a) the secularity of the state, b) the role 
the state is plays in ensuring the protection of Lebanon’s pluralism, and c) the state’s mandate to 
buffer citizens from the overreaching of (religious) personal status institutions, one of the 
articulations of political sectarianism in Lebanon. However, the practice of religious conversion 
reproduces the state as a universally secular space which allows a citizen to change religions 
freely and without “proof” of sincerity, while activists suggest that this form of secularism is 
deficient, dangerous, and “not truly” secular. Acts of conversion reproduce citizenship as a 
category of practice that is refracted through the registers of personal status and civil/secular 
laws and within which the latter has ultimate jurisdiction over the former. Conversely, advocacy 
for a secular personal status seeks to produce Lebanese citizens that are entirely, and solely, 
under the jurisdiction of the civil and secular state. Finally, the state does not require would-be 
converts to prove the sincerity of their religious beliefs to any state or religious institution, and 
the Council protects the potential incoherence and non-alignment between a citizen’s personal 
status, their sect, and their religion—consistently arguing that a citizen’s right to privacy and the 
freedom of religion supersede the rights of the state to interrogate their “true” beliefs. Da‘wa 
secularists, on the other hand, work towards aligning one’s personal status and their religious 
beliefs, arguing that citizens should follow the personal status of the religion they actually 
believe in, and that one’s relationship to religious conversion (and nationalism) should be one of 
sincerity. At stake are contending views of secularism, religion, and citizenship in Lebanon: 
divergent visions of what the Lebanese state was meant to be and how to ensure the fulfillment 
of its secular and democratic destiny. 
The case of the man with three wives, outlined at the start of this chapter, is well known 
in Lebanese legal circles. The Council’s decision has been included in volumes highlighting its 
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jurisprudence, it is taught in law schools, and it was often referenced over two years of fieldwork 
and interviews with lawyers, judges, and activists in Lebanon. The case demonstrates the ways in 
which Lebanese citizens are produced at the intersections and impasses of personal status, sect, 
religion and gender. The man in question could only have two spouses because of his gender, his 
maleness being the reason why converting to Islam would allow him to practice polygamy. 
Similarly, the alleged harm he has done to his minor children by his duplicitous conversion to 
Islam is gendered. Because he is a man, his minor children’s personal status changes with his at 
the moment when the conversion becomes legally binding. Interestingly, the man had earlier 
made a similar case to the Maronite Courts, stating that he wanted to “return” to his original 
community following his father’s conversion to Greek Orthodoxy (which would have happened 
prior to 1959, the year that the man would have reached legal majority) in order to obtain a 
divorce. The case also demonstrates the ways in which both Lebanese citizens and the Lebanese 
state are shaped through institutional and every-day discourses and practices of secularity and 
religion. 
In briefs filed to the Council, the second wife, who is the defendant in this case, claims 
that her husband is not “truly” a Muslim because he is not a believer. In response, the Council 
suggests that the personal status of a citizen may not correspond to the religion of the citizen. 
Regardless, they argue, the state does not have the right to question the beliefs of any of its 
citizens. It must instead rely on the bureaucratic practices and procedures that give religious 
conversion legal felicity, by which they mean the point at which a different personal status is to 
be applied to adjudicate that citizen’s personal status issues. Thus the Council rules in 1995 that 
because the man’s conversion to Maronite Catholicism was never registered with the civil 
authorities, it has no legal force. According to the Lebanese state the man was once a Greek 
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Orthodox but has been a Sunni Muslim since the 1970s. The conversion to Maronite Christianity, 
even though it is religiously sound, is legally irrelevant. The Council rules in favor of the man, 
and all Maronite Court rulings concerning this case are nullified.  
Historical Terrains 
Lebanon has often been characterized as the “Switzerland of the Middle East.” This 
cliché highlights how Lebanon, a country inhabited by four million citizens, four hundred 
thousand Palestinian refugees, about a million Syrian refugees, and more than one million 
foreign migrant laborers, has been considered an exception in the Arab world because of its 
multiconfessional “consociational” democracy whereby minorities share political power in a 
country with no majority.v The differences in the ways that secularism is articulated in Lebanese 
and in Egypt, for example, are instructive; in Lebanon there is no already assumed Islamic nature 
of the society or the state, and the constitution makes no mention of any particular religion other 
than promising to protect and promote Lebanese religious diversity.vi In fact, the stated rationale 
of the system of political sectarianism, according to the Lebanese Constitution, is to ensure that 
no one religious or sectarian group takes precedence over the other, despite the fact that it has 
historically advantaged Lebanese Christians in terms of political representation. The over 
representation of Christians in the Lebanese state is not framed as a threat to other religious 
communities and the general freedom of religion in public and academic discourse in Lebanon. It 
does not inspire fears and anxieties about forced conversions or the oppression of Muslims as 
Muslims or about the possibility of a Christian religious state. The reverse is not true. The idea 
that Muslim political leaders may seek the end of political sectarianism or seek to tweak it in 
accordance with new demographic information does inspire fears of Christian oppression and the 
rise of an Islamic state. Many da‘wa secularists partake in this logic, arguing that the end of 
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political sectarianism will mean the domination of Islam in the public and political sphere. They 
argue that the end of political sectarianism should only occur once Lebanese citizens are secular 
enough to trust themselves and each other. 
 Thus while Lebanon is often regarded as more “secular” in the conventional sense than 
many other Arab states, Lebanese secularism is different from its North Atlantic counterpart: it is 
riddled with religious identity structures, legal subsystems, and sociopolitical classifications. To 
be a Lebanese citizen one must be a member of one of eighteen legally recognized religious 
sects, the minorities (officially only minorities exist) that form the basis of power sharing in the 
Lebanese state.vii Inheriting the jurisdiction of fifteen sets of personal status laws (three sects do 
not have “their own” personal status laws), with nearly as many court systems, and marriage 
registries, affects the life course of citizens in terms of their personal status affairs and in terms 
of their political possibilities. In the domain of politics, for instance, only a member of the Sunni 
community can be prime minister, and only a Maronite Christian can be the president of the 
republic or commander in chief of the army, as mandated by the 1989 Ta’if Accord that 
purportedly ended the Lebanese civil war. At the level of personal status, the religious/sectarian 
laws differently adjudicate marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.viii Thus, to 
characterize Lebanon as being more or less secular than other Middle Eastern nations is to miss 
the complexity of the relationship between the Lebanese state and its religion(s).  
In the minds of many early Lebanese nationalists, Lebanon was supposed to be created as 
a Christian state. In the decades leading up to and immediately preceding World War I, the 
Ottoman Empire was being torn apart by internal strife and European wars, and in the resulting 
fragmented map of the Middle East there was an opportunity to create an independent state 
where Christians would constitute the majority—though barely. To the advocates of this project, 
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Christians would have one place in the Middle East where they would be secure and sovereign.ix 
This project never came to be, and ultimately the borders of greater Lebanon were drawn in 1920 
to embrace a demography that made the idea of a Christian Lebanon all but impossible. In 
Mandate Syria, the French set up what they determined to be ethnically differentiated “mini-
states” such as the Alawi state, the Druze state, and the state of Aleppo. The aim of this policy 
was to weaken the ability of resistance movements to centralize, unite, and rebel against French 
rule.x The French experiment failed in what became the nation-state of Syria, and it inspired 
much resistance in what became the nation-state of Lebanon.xi 
In Lebanon, however, French imperialists saw political sectarianism as a win-win 
situation; it would make a widespread revolt less likely given the institutionalization and 
politicization of sectarian difference, and it would benefit their “historic allies,” the Maronite 
Catholic Christians, the largest community of Christians—who claimed a slight demographic 
majority in the territory of Lebanon. Christians were a bare fifty-four percent majority in the 
1932 census and Maronites, at twenty-nine percent of the total in that census, were the largest 
single “minority.” This slight “majority” and overall demographic competitiveness was essential 
to making two claims: (1) that Lebanon is a country of minorities, and (2) that as the largest 
minority, the Maronites should be the political community in the Lebanese state with the greatest 
representation in the government.xii This sectarian demography was produced through a census 
undertaken in 1932, under French mandate. The information gathered during this census project 
identified three major religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) and eighteen different sectarian 
communities, enumerated them, and established them as patrilineally inherited legal categories 
of identification in the state census registry. Power sharing among these communities supposedly 
mirrored the demographic facts revealed or created by the census. As Rania Maktabi suggests, 
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the census was one technology among many used to “buttress Christian supremacy.” Moreover, 
there had been no census since 1932 because the subject of Lebanon’s sectarian demography 
was, and is, considered too controversial and because a new census would have revealed changes 
in the proportions that would have threatened the status quo.xiii 
Beginning with the mandate-era 1926 Lebanese constitution and the independence-era 
“national pact” between the country’s Sunni Muslim and Maronite Christian elite, the state has 
been organized through the logic of sectarian power sharing. The Ta’if Accord, which ended the 
Lebanese civil war of 1975–90, merely rearranged the power-sharing agreement. In doing so it 
further entrenched political sectarianism as the only “solution” to the presence of multiple 
confessional communities.xiv Sectarianism has occupied a hegemonic position in Lebanese 
political discourse and in political discourse about Lebanon. Widely recognized to be a 
“problem” that stands in the way of national unity, political sectarianism has also been 
considered to be the only way to maintain Lebanon’s diversity. Thus, words such as tolerance, 
plurality, and coexistence—always deployed in relation to sect—saturate both the language of 
political power and the language of political opposition in Lebanon.xv Sectarianism is understood 
as something that is innate, primordial, and something that must be overcome if Lebanon is to 
achieve modernity and what people talk about as “true” citizenship. In this logic, only when 
sectarianism no longer exists can political sectarianism be removed in a responsible and peaceful 
manner. Many da‘wa secularists agree with this point: arguing that the immediate removal of 
political sectarianism would lead to a tyranny of the (Muslim) majority at the expense of 
Lebanon’s Christians. As one activist said, “A government made up of one color [i.e. religion] is 
not safe.”2 In fact, this has been the ideological basis of the Lebanese state itself, which claims 
                                                
2 Interview with informant, 2011 
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that “political sectarianism” is only a temporary system and that it is the state’s job to prepare 
citizens for “true democracy” by weaning them away from primordial attachments and toward 
national ones. Thus the modernity of sectarianism is elided, as is the state’s role in producing 
difference as a mode of politics, thus producing its own legitimacy as a state that “arbitrates 
difference.”xvi  
To summarize, the Lebanese state has a short but dense history. French imperialists and 
their local allies formed its legal and institutional skeleton in 1920, in part building on earlier 
Ottoman bureaucracies and institutions.  The state and its institutions were strengthened 
throughout the next twenty-six years until a Lebanese independence movement and its 
international and regional allies drove out the French imperial government. The First Republic 
was, as postcolonial states tend to be, the heir to the colonial state, its institutions, and its 
ideological practices of free market economics and political sectarianism as a secular mode of 
political pluralism.xvii Since independence, the Lebanese state has been the site of violent power 
struggles. Three of those struggles became civil conflicts. In fact, after gaining independence in 
1943 the Lebanese state was either embroiled in a civil war or at war with Israel for thirty-seven 
years. Throughout these wars Lebanese territory was, time and time again, a battlefield.  
In 1948, the nascent Lebanese army fought—mostly symbolically— in the Arab–Israeli 
War. The resulting Palestinian Nakba—the catastrophe of ethnic cleansing during which Arab 
residents were expelled from their homes, lands, and communities in historic Palestine—changed 
Lebanon irrevocably, as Palestinians fled north into Lebanon. In the second decade of the next 
century more than four hundred thousand Palestinian refugees (the vast majority of them Sunni 
Muslims) still live in camps spread throughout the country. Their presence—and their 
politicization—had a radicalizing effect on Lebanese political factions of all persuasions. It also 
  13 
created a demographic reality that continued to polarize political discourse in Lebanon. In 1958, 
a civil war was fought between Arab nationalists and the U.S.-allied Lebanese president. 
Ultimately the United States sent marines to enforce stability and ensure Lebanon’s west-leaning 
foreign policy.xviii Beginning in 1975, for fifteen years the Lebanese civil war pitted Israelis and 
their Lebanese allies against Palestinians and their Lebanese allies—capitalists against 
communists, conservatives struggling to preserve the status quo against Arab revolutionaries, 
Islamists against secular Muslim militias, Syrian-allied parties split against each other, and, 
finally, overtly religious and sectarian militias pitted against the other. At least 150,000 Lebanese 
citizens died during this war, more than 300,000 emigrated, and more than one million people 
were internally displaced. Massacres were perpetrated in refugee camps and in Lebanese 
villages; large swaths of the country were destroyed.xix The Ta’if Accord, by focusing 
exclusively on the sectarian registers of the conflict, was an example of how the inscription of 
the terms of peace could be used to script the politics of conflict retroactively.xx The landscape of 
political identities and state formations that had been the legacies of these wars radically 
circumscribed memories of the past and fears of the possible futures for Lebanon.  
Advocacy for a secular status is informed by fears that Lebanon will be condemned to 
periodic outbreaks of sectarian violence and civil war unless something changes. Da‘wa 
secularists suggest that the addition of a secular personal status will strengthen state institutions 
and allow intersectarian love and families to flourish, thus diminishing the threat of a sectarian 
civil war. The archival record of legal institutions such as the Council, and the life histories of 
citizens who have changed their religion in order to make use of different personal status laws, 
reveals a different narrative of Lebanese history.  An image of Lebanese statecraft emerges 
through the knitting together of different sources related to the state’s legal system; archives, 
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interviews and participation in both courtrooms and clerks’ offices. This image poses challenges 
to the dominant historical narrative of Lebanon in that it emphasizes the daily workings (not 
failings) of the Lebanese state at times of peace and at times of war. By illustrating and 
comparing activism directed towards the state and practices of conversion that rely on the state’s 
secularity and sovereignty, I question how the academic archive on Lebanon has congealed 
around the following categories of analysis: political sectarianism, violence, religion, and state 
failure.  I suggest that this archive is too preoccupied with the alleged? failings of the Lebanese 
state, and has not yet examined the ways this political and legal system has been successful in 
producing a body of citizens that are constituted through, repeat, and appeal to, the institutional 
and discursive registers of the state.  
Secular Theory, Secular Practice 
 For much of the twentieth century, it was a truism of social and political theory that the 
more a society becomes “modern,” the more its religious traditions decline or are, at the very 
least, privatized. Largely still defined as a political doctrine, “secularism” is closely associated 
with the processes of secularization, including the separation of religion from particular forms of 
public life, the disaggregation of religion from secular institutions in government, and the 
privatization of religion. For Talal Asad, “the secular” as an epistemic category conceptually 
predates the political doctrine of “secularism.” Over time, a variety of concepts, practices, and 
sensibilities have come together to form “the secular. In addition, secularism defines itself 
against an “other,” which becomes, in effect, the object of its (often violent) redemptive 
project.xxi For Lebanese da‘wa secularists, the sectarian nature and practices of Lebanese citizens 
must change—and secularity (as a way of life) is what will bring about those changes.  
In Formations of the Secular Asad traces the emergence of “secularism” as a discursive 
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formation in relation to other hegemonic concepts (such as religion, rationality, and nature) 
within the twinned epistemic space of “modernity” and “the secular.” Although Asad concedes 
“we may have abandoned the secularization narrative,” he argues “we have not interrogated the 
grammar and binaries that make up the concept of secularism . . . in my view the secular is 
neither singular in origin nor stable in its historical identity, although it works through a series of 
particular oppositions.”xxii Continuing his critique of liberal theorists such as John Rawls and 
Charles Taylor, he argues that while the philosopher recognizes that secularism emerged out of a 
particular genealogy, he nevertheless asserts, “It is applicable to all societies that have become 
modern.”xxiii Because Asad conceives of secularism as a political medium in which new practices 
of politics and the subject emerge, he writes that using the measure of secularism as a normative 
ideal is inextricably woven into practices and extensions of Western epistemic, political, military 
and economic power. Refusing the liberal model of a rational, autonomous, believing subject, 
Asad asks, “What types of subjectivity are produced through particular configurations of 
religions and religious practice and are inaugurated by modernity?” One aspect of this 
subjectivity, he responds, is the notion of interiority. Modern interiority mandates “that a 
practitioner cannot know how to live religiously without being able to articulate that 
knowledge.”xxiv To demonstrate the modernity of the notion of an “inner,” interior self, he 
contrasts the believing and sincere subject with the Christian subject of pre-Enlightenment 
Western Europe. Only with modernity does the internal self emerge as something separate that 
may or may not be aligned with the outward self. Importantly, the non-alignment between 
internal and external registers of being is precisely what liberal theorists of recognition consider 
injurious.xxv By large measure, da‘wa secularists would agree with this. A driving logic behind 
their activism is that citizens should only be categorized by the religion and sect they truly 
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believe in (not what they inherit) and that they have the right to choose a secular option.   
 Charles Taylor, perhaps one of the most influential liberal contemporary philosophers, 
also engages in a radical critique of theories of subjectivity, and trains his sights on 
poststructuralist theories of the subject. According to Taylor, post-structuralism approaches the 
self as nothing more than another object of study and reduces questions of morality to those of 
ethics. His argument is that questions of morality deserve analytic attention because to be 
oriented by the good is an intrinsic part of being human. In an earlier essay, “The Politics of 
Recognition,” he conceives of this “good” as respect and obligation to others, an understanding 
and commitment to what makes life a full life, and the importance of recognition of one’s 
individuality (“distinguishing mark”). While Asad argues that the importance placed on 
“meaning” is an effect of a Christian genealogy of religion, its secularization, and the production 
of the rational, believing subject, for Taylor meaning is intrinsic to who we (all) are. He writes 
that “to make a demand for meaning is not an optional stance. It is central to our humanity.”xxvi 
Taylor critiques what he calls the “subtraction” theories of secularism; Secularism 1, 
understanding secularism in terms of public space- spaces that have been emptied of god- 
separation of church and state; and Secularism 2, secularity as the reduction of religious beliefs 
and practices-“religiosity” in the world. Taylor argues that more analytic focus should be placed 
on Secularism 3, which he characterizes as a ‘generative’ theory of secularism. 
 Secularity in this sense consists, among other things, of a move from a society where 
 belief in God is unchallenged and unproblematic to one where it in understood to be one 
 option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace... Secularity in this sense 
 is a matter of the whole context of understanding in which our moral, spiritual or 
 religious experience and search takes place.xxvii  
 
Taylor’s Secular Age is one where a radical form of humanism is practiced, by which he means 
that the final goal and allegiance of humanism is human flourishing in “secular time.”xxviii This 
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“background picture” of a secular age is the field of possibility out of which the “immanent 
frame” emerges. The immanent frame, in turn, articulates  “modern science, the buffered identity, 
with its disciplines, modern individualism, with its reliance on instrumental reason and action in 
secular time.”xxixThus the coming of a secular age, with its attendant immanent frame, entails 
new epistemological domains, political practices, and possibilities of the subject. This emphasis 
on the cultivation of individual authenticity coupled with the radical humanism of the secular age 
leads to a “push towards closure,” a drive that pushes the buffered self to objectify (and thus 
transcend) the world around her. The narrative of modernity demands a hermeneutic of, and 
progress towards, self-authorization.  
 Da‘wa secularists argue that personal status laws serve to insure that the Lebanese 
individual is never self-authorizing, and is legally and socially tied to the family and to the sect. 
They believe that the promulgation of a secular personal status law will allow a new type of 
Lebanese citizen to emerge, one that is self-authorizing and modern. Their aims are to enlighten 
citizens towards nationalism and what they view as “true” secularism. In doing so, they either 
deny the Lebanese state's secularity and/or posit it as somehow deficient and pre-modern. 
However, as an episteme, secularism is what makes territorially articulated nationalism and the 
category of the citizen possible. In fact, if the state is an artifact of this secular episteme, so are 
the citizen and political markers such as “secularist” or “Islamist.”xxx It is impossible to 
disentangle studies of citizenship from those of secularism because secularism is the condition of 
possibility for the nation state and its citizens.xxxi   
 This dissertation engages literature on secularism from within the context of Lebanon and 
to an extent, the modern Middle East. Taking Asad's injunction to write about secularity as it is 
embodied and practiced seriously, it proved impossible to write only one account of secularity in 
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Lebanon.  Hussein Agrama has persuasively suggested that secularism is a problem space within 
which debates on secularity, modernity, and the subject unfold. With Agrama, I suggest that state 
secularism is the framework within which debates on religion, citizenship, and modernity are 
articulated. I depart from his account in two ways; 1) by highlighting the ways that state 
secularism is also the framework within which sexual difference is articulated, regulated, and 
debated; and 2) by suggesting that state secularism is open to interrogation and re-imagination by 
citizens. Here, secularism itself becomes a platform for activism, whereby one can speak in the 
name of “true” secularism against what is understood to be “deficient” secularism. Secularity 
itself is plural, that there are multiple articulations of secularity and secularism as a political 
doctrine in the world.  
Moreover, there can be more than one articulation of secularism and secularity in a 
particular context. In fact, through tracing the practices of religious conversion in the legal 
archive and the practices of da‘wa secularism, two narratives of secularism emerge. The first 
narrative, that of the state, could be termed “classical” liberal secularism; it emphasizes the rights 
and duties of Lebanese citizens and of the Lebanese state. Here, the practice of state secularity is 
the peaceful and impartial management of religious communities and the stymying of religious 
conflict through the transcendence of the state.  This narrative, which I will call Secularism 1 
(per Taylor), also insists on the right of the citizen to remain at a distance from the state. The 
state does not have the right to “know” the interior space of the citizen, and reads consent 
through practices within the bureaucratic and legal infrastructures – and not within the sources of 
the self. Throughout this dissertation I suggest that we examine this practice of secularism 
through the work of the Council, which regularly rules on cases between different religious 
personal status courts and/or between a secular and a religious personal status court. These cases 
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often concern people accused of changing their religion in ways that open to them to charges of 
insincerity by other citizens and/or religious institutions. Importantly, the court states that its role 
is to resolve potential conflict between personal status communities through the transcendental 
nature of state law, state institutions, and the protection of the rights of citizens against the 
overreaching of personal status courts and religious institutions. In court decisions involving 
converts, the Lebanese state produces itself as secular through its jurisprudential insistence on 
the primary of the rights of the citizen, as opposed to the rights of religious institutions. Again 
and again Lebanese jurists argue that the Lebanese state and its legal system are what transcend 
the particularities of different sectarian communities and unite them into one sovereign and 
secular structure.  
 The second narrative of secularism that this dissertation explores is that which is 
employed and practiced by da‘wa activists. This narrative, which we could call “sincere 
secularism” or Secularism 2, emphasizes rights-based discourses as well as the alignment 
between internal registers of self and outside recognition of that self. As such, da‘wa secularists 
allege that the Lebanese state has refused to allow citizens to define their own identity and has 
instead imposed an injurious and dangerous form of sectarian misrecognition upon them. They 
emphasize that the state must legislate a mechanism for non-sectarian recognition, end 
corruption linked to sectarianism, and protect the freedom of expression and the rights of women 
(among other demands) in order to be “truly secular.” In a similar vein, da‘wa secularists 
emphasize that in order to be a true and modern Lebanese citizen one must have an unmediated 
relationship to the state, and must work on themselves and on others in order to transcend 
sectarianism and become “secular.” I have employed Charles Taylor's classification of different 
secularisms (above) in order to emphasize that in Lebanon, different articulations and practices 
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of secularity co-exist in parallel and are not linear “stages” of an unfolding secularism. Rather, 
the “classical secularism” of the Lebanese state and the “sincere secularism” of da‘wa secularists 
are both practiced (often simultaneously) in contemporary Lebanon, and they produce and 
emphasize different narratives of modernity, secularity, citizenship, and the subject. Moreover, 
these two articulations of secularism are informed by each other, and in fact one (da‘wa 
secularism) seeks to reform that of the other (the secularity of the state) which it views as 
atrophied and unable to cope with the challenges of contemporary Lebanon. Da‘wa secularism is 
also highly affective. It emerges from and reproduces fears of civil war in Lebanon in order to 
advocate for reforms such as the addition of a secular personal status and/or the right to not have 
a personal status – reforms that promote and foster an ever-elusive peace. Both the secularity of 
the state and that of da‘wa secularists highlight the intractability of citizenship, political 
sectarianism, sexual difference, and secularism in Lebanon.   
Citizenship as Difference 
 Many scholars, working from an archive of political philosophy that begins with 
Rousseau's social contract, assess the Arab national project of producing citizens with 
skepticism.xxxii There is a tendency in political theory to view members of authoritarian, 
corporatist, and brutal states as “subjects” rather than “citizens.”xxxiii In such studies, citizenship 
appears as a universal category that fosters an ideologically inflected and ideologically narrated 
subjectivity.xxxiv By contrast, a focus on citizenship as a set of formalized and institutionalized 
practices brings into focus the way that citizenship functions as a normative and regulatory 
category, and invariably leads to the study of law and bureaucracy. As scholars such as Suad 
Joseph, Carolyn Pateman and Frances Hasso have argued, it is here that citizenship and gender 
reveal themselves to be mutually constitutive. The citizen—whether male or female—is always 
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gendered and always sexed.xxxv Jacqueline Stevens has insisted that, because political society is 
constituted through state regulated kinship, one must study gender, sex, and their embodiments 
and regulations in order to approach the state and its citizens. She writes that “to see the artifice 
of the family (and its appearance as natural) is to see the artifice of political society (and its 
appearance as a nation).”xxxvi Crucially, interrogating citizenship and insisting on its very 
markedness allows us to study difference without assigning normative value.xxxvii In practice 
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citizenship is an assemblage that is contingent, tense, and often articulated through contradiction. 
One's gender privilege and class status, for example, often interrupt each other—just as a 
citizen's sect, class, and gender together structure and contingently frame each practice of 
citizenship as in, for example, Lebanon. By destabilizing these supposedly black boxed 
categories and terms, we demonstrate how they are inextricable from the production and 
regulation of gendered and sexual regimes.xxxviii  Furthermore, by interrogating the assumed 
coherence of the universal abstraction of “the citizen” we insist that particularities, often in 
tension with one another, mark every practice of citizenship.   
 Political theorists have long suggested that researchers should not take the myth of the 
universal unmarked citizen to heart, but rather focus on the distance between the ideal of 
citizenship and its everyday, embodied practices.xxxix These theorists argue that we should focus 
on what the citizen and the state do, rather than on the state's narration of itself.  In his critique of 
Benedict Anderson, Partha Chatterjee states that to endorse “unbound serialities,” such as the 
universal and anonymous citizen, is to imagine that nationalism and state practices can exist or 
function without governmentality. In fact the state's job is to organize and regulate the shared life 
of its structurally and practically unequal citizens and residents. “What modern politics can we 
have that has no truck with capitalism, state machineries, or mathematics?” Chatterjee asks. He 
goes on to answer: “It is morally illegitimate to uphold the universalist ideals of nationalism 
without simultaneously demanding that the politics spawned by governmentality be recognized 
as an equally legitimate part of the real time-space of the modern political life of the nation.”xl 
Theorists that use normative political theory to approach the subject of the citizen elide the ways 
that governmantality and biopower produce each citizen (as well as groups of citizens) as a 
particular derivation from the normative ideal. Above all these technologies are disciplinary 
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projects, and thus are always ongoing. If they were to succeed fully, and thus end, it would mean 
the end of the nation state as a regulatory structure. With each iteration of governmental and 
biopolitical techniques, the state comes into view as a bounded entity.xli Thus while citizenship is 
performative, it is always a marked form of citizenship that is being practiced and/or iterated. It 
is only repetition across a disciplinary matrix that the stability of the category of the citizen 
appears (and disappears). Crucially, the citizen can only emerge as a legal and embodied subject 
position if its negation, the non-citizen, is present. This insight is particularly important to the 
field of Middle East Studies, where the refugee and increasingly, the migrant laborer, are crucial 
areas of research. It is also particularly important in the context of Lebanon, where the making 
and unmaking of refugees by the Lebanese state is a process conditioned by central tenets and 
anxieties of Lebanese nationalism. The modern state produces, quantifies, and regulates citizens 
through census techniques that are both individuating and totalizing: name, sex, age, family, 
region, sect, religion. Finally, citizenship itself is simultaneously individuating and totalizing, 
inclusionary and exclusionary—the stitched together boundary of a nation.  
 To say that all citizenship is marked is not to deny that power relations and regimes of 
privilege exist. As Michael Warner has taught us, within a marked category such as “gay,” power 
regimes persist and reproduce themselves.xlii Similarly, while all citizens are marked in that all 
citizens are a project, at a distance from the normative ideal—some markings are more 
pronounced than others. Thus while all citizens are gendered, as Carole Pateman argues, the 
female citizen is defined by sexual difference, while heterosexual male citizenship is normalized 
as the universal. The intractability of citizenship and sex will come as no surprise to most 
students of the region as the laws that produce the category of the “citizen” are often the same 
laws that produce gendered differentiation between “male” and “female” citizens. In my 
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research, I have found that interrogating citizenship through focusing on the legal infrastructures 
of sex and gender allows us to re-think sectarianism, a normative trope that has dominated much 
of the intellectual archive on Lebanon. In turn, once sectarianism is interrupted as a normative 
trope, it emerges as inseparable from state and activist practices of and discourses about 
secularism.  
A Note on the Lebanese State and the Legal Systems  
 Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy that functions through a system of political 
sectarianism in which political power and positions are distributed among sectarian communities 
according to predetermined quotas.xliii It has a functional constitution, universal suffrage, a 
system of checks and balances, and an active judiciary, and it holds regular parliamentary 
elections that witness fierce competition between political rivals. By 2012, the main political 
division for the previous six years was between the Iranian–Syrian–allied and Hizballah-led 
“March 8” coalition on one hand and the opposing U.S.–Saudi Arabia–allied “March 14” 
coalition, which was led by the son of the assassinated former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri. 
While the system of political sectarianism defines (and erodes) much of political life in Lebanon, 
the fact that Lebanon has fairly functional democratic institutions cannot be denied. Lebanon 
also enjoys a relatively free press.  
The Lebanese state does not enjoy hegemony over the use of violence in Lebanon, and its 
coercive capacities have been weak. While there were attempts to build both the army and the 
internal security services in a bid to counter Hizballah’s military strength, the institutions of the 
army, the police, and the security services play very different roles in Lebanon than in most of 
the Arab world. They are relatively small institutions with little influence on state policy, but 
recently they played an important and impartial role during times of civil strife. Lebanon is not 
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an authoritarian state that must rely on force to sustain an unpopular regime. Furthermore, 
Hizballah’s militia is better trained and better equipped than the Lebanese army and has been 
much more effective than the army at defending Lebanon’s southern border against Israeli 
encroachment and occupation.  In fact, Hizballah ended Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon in 
2000. Hizballah’s ability to protect South Lebanon is the main reason for the group’s wide 
popular support, something many in the mainstream Western media refused to recognize. Still, it 
is the Lebanese army, not Hizballah, which remains the most respected national institution in the 
country, particularly as it began to de-sectarianize following the Lebanese civil war of 1975–
1990.xliv  
The Lebanese legal system is a hybrid of common law and jurisprudential law practices. 
It is based on the French legal system and as such follows a civil law system (code civil) 
composed of legal codes. The most extensive was promulgated in 1932 during the French 
Mandate. The Lebanese “Code of Obligations and Contracts” is the equivalent of the French 
Civil Code except for matters related to personal status, which are governed by a separate set of 
laws designed for the different sectarian communities. Importantly, all matters of personal status 
are organized under civil legal precepts set under the French mandate.  For example, although 
the Sunni personal status law is based on the Ottoman family law, which was promulgated in 
1918, the law that organizes the Sunni personal status courts and conduct within them was 
passed in 1963 and under the imprimatur of the Lebanese state.  Despite having a civil code 
system, Lebanese judges often follow established precedents, which are constituted through 
authoritative readings of the code and landmark rulings by the Court of Cassation. In addition to 
using legal precedents established by the Court of Cassation, many rulings in Lebanese courts 
reference legal precedent established in France or in Egypt, the two most influential legal 
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systems in Lebanon. The Public Council at the Court of Cassation, composed of the presidents of 
each of the different Courts of Cassation, is considered the most authoritative source for 
establishing legal precedent.xlv  
 In addition to the Court of Cassation, there are two judicial councils that serve to promote 
unity across the Lebanese legal system and to ensure that the rule of law is being followed in 
ways that are in line with established precepts. The Constitutional Council is meant to ensure that 
promulgated laws are constitutional, and adjudicate claims related to parliamentary or 
presidential elections. Similarly, the highest administrative court in Lebanon is the Shura 
Council, which assists in drafting and reviewing legislation that is promulgated by the 
Legislature. The Shura council also surveys jurisdiction over the lower first-degree 
administrative courts. However, both the Shura Council and the Constitutional Council do not 
hear cases brought forward by regular citizens. The highest civil courts that adjudicate the claims 
of citizens are the Court of Cassation and the Council. As stated earlier, the Council is the court 
that enjoys a limited jurisdiction over all personal status courts and civil courts and is the court 
that hears cases concerning the legality of a citizen's religious conversion. In these cases 
religious institutions and personal status courts from around the country often appeal to the 
Council, which is situated in Beirut.  
 While there are fifteen different sets of personal status laws in Lebanon, there are 
important differences between the ways that Christian personal status courts and Muslim 
personal status courts are incorporated into the state. Christian courts, owing in large part to 
Ottoman policies, are institutionally separate and enjoy a greater measure of independence from 
the state. The state, for example, has no say in who is elected the Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon, 
nor does it have a say in the staffing or wages of personal status court judges, scribes, and 
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bureaucrats.xlvi This is often cited as “evidence” that Christianity is more compatible with 
secularism in Lebanon than Islam. This statement carries within it ideological claims about the 
supposed relationships between tolerance, modernity and openness and Christianity or Islam. In 
reality, the lack of state oversight leaves Lebanese Christians in a more vulnerable position than 
their Muslim counterparts. For example, Muslim citizens who are getting a divorce have the right 
to demand that a representative from the attorney general's office attend all legal proceedings in 
order to insure that the rights of both plaintiffs are respected, while Christian citizens do not have 
this right. Similarly, the fees associated with legal proceedings at Muslim personal status courts 
are standardized across the country and according to civil precepts, while at the time of my 
research, the cost of initiating a divorce in Greek Orthodox personal status courts ranged from 
300,000LL ($200) in Beirut to 1,000,000LL ($667) in the wealthier mountain suburb of 
Brummana.xlvii Citizens are only allowed to appeal to courts of first instance where they reside 
according to census records. Perhaps most importantly, all Lebanese citizens are allowed to enter 
Muslim personal status courts because they are considered an aspect of the Lebanese legal 
system and thus cannot discriminate against citizens based on sectarian affiliation. This is not the 
case for Christian courts, which have the right to demand that those entering the court or 
practicing within it are Christians, and often Christians of the same sect. Despite these facts, 
there is a common assumption in Lebanon and abroad that the most discriminatory policies occur 
in Muslim personal status courts. Reflecting this assumption, at academic and public talks and 
events on Lebanon I am frequently asked about discrimination against women in personal status 
courts. At times I choose to begin my answer with an illustration of the difficult situation of 
female plaintiffs in the Maronite Church. I am usually asked more explicitly: but what about 
shari‘a? 
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Researching Religious Conversion and Da‘wa Secularism 
There are many registers through which one can study religious conversion and activism 
for a secular personal status in Lebanon. Both are practices that are predicated on an intimate 
knowledge of Lebanese bureaucracy and law. Despite, or rather, because of the “thickness” of 
both of these practices, the act of research is reductive. This dissertation focuses on the legal 
framework out of which these practices unfold and towards which they are directed. I also focus 
on the discursive and ideological frameworks that make these practices intelligible in the 
Lebanese context. Thus I have conducted archival research in government, press, and private 
archives, and participant observation among activists and inside courtrooms. In addition, I have 
collected the life histories of converts and da‘wa secularists. 
 The bulk of my archival research was conducted at the Public Council at the Court of 
Cassation, the highest judicial court in Lebanon that citizens have recourse to. The archive of this 
court is housed in three different locations and includes the case file of every case submitted to 
the Council since 1942. Each case file contains: the Council’s decision; those decisions being 
appealed from personal status and/or civil courts; lawyer’s arguments to civil and personal status 
courts; a copy of all evidence submitted; the handwritten notes of judges; and all fees paid in this 
particular case. The smallest case file I have seen is a mere twenty pages; the largest contains 
more than three hundred. By conducting archival research at the Council, I examine the 
production of a Lebanese legal discourse that is deeply concerned with the nature and role of the 
Lebanese state, the regulation of sexual difference, and the often competing rights and duties of 
citizens towards both personal status communities/sectarian communities, and the state. 
 I also conducted research at the archives of the lawyer’s syndicate. At these archives, 
largely only accessible to members of the Law Association of Lebanon and/or law students, I 
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examine the history of advocacy for a secular personal status in Lebanon. Using primary sources 
such as transcripts of parliamentary debates and ministerial communiqués, I also researched the 
history of the Lebanese legal system as a whole, and the history of the Council in particular. By 
focusing on cases of conversion, I illustrate how even during a civil war that often pitted 
sectarian militias against each other, citizens were changing their religions and/or sects to 
facilitate legal proceedings and to facilitate their lives. Furthermore, the Lebanese judicial system 
actively protected and continues to protect their right to do so. 
  In addition to this archival view of the workings of the Lebanese state, I also examine 
religious conversion and da‘wa secularism through participant observation and life histories. I 
have conducted interviews and participant observation at personal status and civil courts and 
institutions, in judges’ chambers and lawyers’ offices, and with citizens who clam to have 
practiced religious conversion as a form of legal strategy.  Activism for a secular personal status 
is also primarily concerned with the Lebanese legal system and its institutions, and as such two 
of the three interventions made by activists directly concern that complex legal system. I have 
collected the life histories of the architects of these three interventions: the shatb al-madhdhab 
campaign (henceforth the campaign to remove personal status identification), the drafting of a 
secular personal status and its submission to Parliament, and the Laique Pride March, a yearly 
protest organized by a group of artists and loosely affiliated with diverse advocacy groups. These 
three interventions are practices of what I call da‘wa  secularism in Lebanon. I introduce this 
term in order to illustrate the ways in which this form of activism is directed towards making the 
broader Lebanese population ready for secularism through symbolic, public, and pedagogical 
action and circulation. Da‘wa secularists do not wish to change political sectarianism, the system 
of the Lebanese state. Rather, da‘wa secularists wish to “reform” the population into what they 
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identify as modern secular citizens, who only then can then be “trusted” to change the system of 
political sectarianism. The legal and historical terrain of the Lebanese state must be understood 
in order to view the background picture out of which both da‘wa secularism and religious 
conversion emerge, and are practiced in contemporary Lebanon. 
 I examine the Lebanese legal system from two vantage points: the way it is theoretically 
supposed to function (paper law) and the way it actually does function (applications of law).  I 
also attend to the complex ways in which a theory and system of law maps unevenly into the 
practice of that system. In order to navigate this unevenness, knowledge of the larger political, 
social, economic, and gendered dynamics at play in Lebanon is necessary because it is often 
these factors that determine how laws are practiced in a courtroom, in judges’ chambers, in 
lawyer’s offices, and at civil and religious institutions. These gendered, economic, social and 
political dynamics are complex assemblages of power that often determine how the law is 
applied in each context. Furthermore, these dynamics are not static and their historical movement 
continues to affect the practice of the Lebanese legal system. Thus, for example, the past fifty 
years of feminist advocacy in Lebanon has had an effect (not always positive) on the ways that 
laws are practiced in Lebanon, as have growing rates of female employment and economic 
independence. However, law does not stand outside of this assemblage of gendered, political, 
social, and economic dynamics and practices that we call “the citizen.” Rather, law is one of the 
constitutive factors of this dynamic assemblage.  
The Plight of the Native Anthropologist 
 When I entered Columbia University's Department of Anthropology, I had no 
intention of ever working on or in Lebanon. I was worried that because I had been raised and 
educated there, I would be unable to write and research a milieu I was convinced I already knew 
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everything about.  Two years in, during a discussion on apostasy in Brinkley Messick's Islamic 
law class, I mentioned that a friend of mine had converted from Shi’a Islam to Maronite 
Catholicism in order to marry his girlfriend. A fellow student asked me what had happened to 
my friend, assuming some great bodily or psychological harm had come to him once marked an 
“apostate” in a Muslim majority country. My colleague was suspicious when I said that such 
conversions are legal in Lebanon and not always socially controversial. I am ashamed to say now 
that before this particular seminar session I had no idea that Lebanon is one of the few Muslim 
majority states where conversion out of Islam is not only legal, but is a right actively protected 
by the state.  
 Following this debate, I found myself studying the Lebanese legal system in my free 
time. I might as well have been studying a foreign language, not only because I had no deep 
knowledge of Lebanese law but also because legal language itself is a particular beast. Prior to 
delving into legal texts and legal histories, I had pedestrian knowledge – and a strong opinion—
of the Lebanese legal system. I thought it was corrupt, inefficient, and a symbol of why the 
Lebanese state was failing.  
While I had studied the Lebanese state in political science and economy classes at 
Georgetown and earlier, at the Lebanese American University, the study of the state had not 
included any literature on legal institutions, systems, or texts. At Columbia much of my training 
had focused on the anthropology of law, of the state, and of Islam—but until I began to explore 
the Lebanese legal system I had not thought that I would be able to craft a dissertation that 
brought together theories of secularism, law, and the state. I had no idea where to start. The 
summer of my second year of graduate school I began visiting courtrooms and meeting with 
lawyers in order to see what the possibilities for research were. After visiting the Druze court of 
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appeals in Beirut and interviewing one of the courts' judges, I was convinced that there was topic 
worth exploring here. I was particularly fascinated by a small exchange I had with the judge. I 
asked, somewhat provocatively, why, if the Druze were recognized and organized as a Muslim 
sect in Lebanon, they did not allow people to convert into the Muslim religious community. The 
sheikh/judge answered that while it was possible to convert to a religion, it was impossible to 
convert into a history. The Druze, he said, are both a religion and a history. With this statement, 
Judge Suleiman (perhaps unknowingly) inspired me to rethink theories and debates on 
secularism, religion, law, ethnicity and history—but from the historical standpoint of Lebanon. 
That summer I interviewed judges and lawyers at personal status courts of over ten religions and 
sects, all on the subject of religious conversion. But as the summer continued I was less 
convinced that I wanted to, or could, understand the ways that religious conversion works in 
Lebanon through conducting research at the personal status courts.  
 This uncertainty had much to do with the ways that my own gender, class and sect 
determined my access and presence at the personal status courts. Because I am identified by the 
state as a Sunni Lebanese woman and I am cis-gendered, the Sunni personal status courts were 
welcoming and in fact tried to facilitate my research by putting particular cases on display for 
me. The narrative seemed repetitive: this is why “our” law is the best, the most modern, the most 
fair, and the most concerned with protecting the rights of women. I doubt that there would have 
been such an emphasis on the gendered aspects of the courtroom (often in the presence of the 
plaintiffs-as-display) had I not been a woman.  While my sectarian identity—identified when I 
mentioned my last name—facilitated my research in Sunni, and to an extent, Shi‘a and Druze 
personal status courts, it seriously circumscribed my opportunities to conduct research in 
Maronite courts and archives. Had I been a foreigner or non-native anthropologist, and/or male 
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my access and lack of it would have been articulated in different ways. The fact that I was a 
Sunni Lebanese female colored my interviews with judges of other personal status courts as 
much as it did in the Sunni personal status courts. My most interesting research moments in 
personal status courts unfolded when judges, sheikhs, and priests tried to convert me to their sect 
or religion. The words “our” and “your” became highlights of these conversations, and there was 
always an undercurrent of why “our” law is just better than “yours.”  
 My gender and my perceived socio-class status also played an important role among 
activists and civil society groups advocating for a secular personal status and/or civil marriage 
law. Despite the increasing presence of women in law schools, law practices and in the judiciary, 
the practice of law remains a predominantly male field in Lebanon. Often, meetings with lawyers 
and/or judges (and prominent da‘wa secularists, for that matter) resulted in invitations to dinner 
and a strange feeling that I was being both flirted with and educated by a (sometimes overly) 
friendly father figure, a disturbing but common amalgamation.  
Throughout my fieldwork I lived in my own apartment rather than staying in my 
childhood home. I am an upper-middle-class Beiruti educated in local American schools and at 
an American university in Lebanon. My mother is an American who was born into a non-
practicing Methodist family, and my father is a non-practicing Sunni Muslim. He is a retired 
professor and dean at the Lebanese American University, and my mother is a retired 
schoolteacher and librarian at the American Community School in Beirut. They were married in 
a civil ceremony decades ago, and it was only three years ago that my mother converted to Islam 
in order to ensure her and her children's inheritance. Before moving to the United States, I had 
been an actress in Lebanese television and film. My social circles are populated by people who 
went to similar schools as me, are professionals, fixtures of Beirut's nightlife, and cohabitate with 
  34 
partners in both heterosexual and homosexual partnerships, both married and not. Throughout 
fieldwork my family history and social, political and economic milieu made people, particularly 
da‘wa secularists, believe that I actively supported, or should be actively supporting, their 
project. On many occasions, da‘wa secularists could not understand why I refused to be a public 
advocate for their project and in fact was critical of it, given than I am an outspoken feminist. 
Many prominent da‘wa secularists, and in particular one leader of the Laique Pride movement, 
have been friends and collaborators of mine for years. My friendships and deep social ties in the 
country facilitated my research among activists and among lawyers and judges who practice all 
aspects of the Lebanese legal system.  
 Conversion is not uncontroversial in Lebanon. The fact that it is legal for Muslims to 
convert to Christianity or Judaism does not render such acts socially acceptable. Likewise, 
friends, families, or even places of employment might ostracize Christians who convert to Islam. 
However, it is more controversial for Lebanese citizens to change their religion because they 
have experienced a change of faith than it is to convert in order to make use of a different 
personal status law. Despite the fact that religious conversion done for the sole purposes of 
manipulating law is illegal (tahayul ‘ala al-qanun), faith based conversion carries higher social 
sanctions.  In 2002 an American missionary was killed in the religiously conservative southern 
city of Sidon, allegedly for proselytizing. None of the missionary's Lebanese interlocutors were 
pressured or harmed. Lebanon has a long history with missionaries, as Ussama Makdisi has 
demonstrated.xlviii This solitary murder of an American missionary is inseparable from the United 
States' imperial interventions in the country and in the region, and teaches us little about the 
multiple practices and registers of religious conversion in Lebanon.  
   In order to test my theory that religious conversion for legal purposes is a recognized 
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practice in Lebanon, I conducted a small experiment in the summer of 2010. I drew up a chart of 
religious institutions in Lebanon and began cold calling them.  Each time, I asked to speak with 
the sheikh or priest responsible for conversion. Twelve of the fifteen phone calls resulted, 
without prompting, in a question of whether or not I was getting married to man who was from 
that sect. During the phone call to the Shi‘i sheikh responsible for conversions, he assumed that 
my husband and I had not been blessed with a son and thus wanted to become Shi’i in order to 
better ensure our daughter's inheritance. When I called the Armenian Orthodox Church, I was 
asked—with a laugh—who the lucky Armenian man was. All these responses were initiated by 
one question that I was repeating: “Can you please let me know what procedures are required for 
joining your religious community?” Invariably, the priests or sheikhs answering my question 
assumed that my motivation for converting was strategic. While this assumption of conversion as 
a strategy on behalf of religious figures may seem shocking to some readers, it is perhaps useful 
to remember the phenomenon of “forum shopping” in the United States, where citizens choose 
where to marry, incorporate their business, or get register property based on sophisticated 
understandings and use of different state law.   
 While planning my research, I had wanted to study religious conversion across the 
personal status system. I did not want to focus on one or two personal status courts, but rather on 
how the system as a whole functioned within the institutional embrace of the Lebanese state. I 
knew that the process of religious conversion could demonstrate the ways that the personal status 
system functioned as a whole. Once in the field, I realized that I simply could not get the access 
that I needed to study the legal and bureaucratic registers of religious conversion between 
personal status laws, particularly because I was most interested in people who changed their 
religion for the stated purpose of making use of different sets of rights and duties. This 
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realization coincided with my growing interest in activist campaigns advocating for the passage 
of an optional civil marriage and/or an optional civil personal status law. I decided to shift gears 
and focus on activist campaigns to produce what they were calling a “secular sect.” My interview 
with the President of the Shura Council (administrative courts) the Ministry of Justice took my 
research in a new direction and solved my problem of sources.  
 My interview with the President of the Shura Council revolved around his role in the 
ongoing campaign to secure the legal right to remove one's personal status from census records. 
The interview was interrupted by a visit from representatives of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon. While I waited, I decided to wander through the Ministry of Justice. Since conceiving 
of this research project a year ago, I had dreamt of gaining access to the archives of the Council, 
the highest civil court in Lebanon and one that has (limited) jurisdiction over all personal status 
courts. But I knew that getting access as a civilian was nearly impossible, so had not tried. Now, 
because I had time to kill, I walked the hallways until I found the archive room for the Court of 
Cassation. Following a short conversation with the head archivist, I was surprised to be given 
access to the Council's court decisions and later, after more persuasion, the Council's archives 
itself —composed of case files than ran hundreds of pages. I knew that the case files would 
contain the material I had been trying to collect from different personal status courts and lawyers 
because the majority of these cases concerned citizens who were accused of converting for 
insincere reasons. In addition and perhaps most importantly, these case files contained the notes 
of personal status and civil judges, lawyers' briefs, submitted evidence and receipts, and the 
decision of the Council itself. Throughout, I kept in touch with da‘wa secularists and began to 
realize that I did not have to choose between working with them or the archives, but instead they 
could both be sites from which to study the Lebanese state.   
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 My unique and unprecedented access to these archives has allowed me to view the 
ways that the Lebanese state regulates citizenship across the registers of personal status, 
constitutional, and civil law. It also allowed me to how the Lebanese state produces itself as 
secular, and more importantly, how these institutional practices were markedly different from 
what da‘wa activists considered “true secularism.” I spent endless hours in the archivists’ offices 
debating, listening to, and conversing with lawyers, judges, and plaintiffs that came and went 
demanding files, asking advice, and paying fees. I became a familiar figure at the Ministry of 
Justice and at the archives of Court of Cassation particularly. Because of this familiarity I was 
able to converse freely and provocatively about secularism, war, sectarianism, and the ways that 
the courts were perceived by average Lebanese citizens and by critical da‘wa secularists.  My 
access and engagement with court documents, institutions, and personalities, in addition to 
da‘wa secularists and rconverts enabled and shaped my suggestion that secularism and secularity 
is practiced in plural ways in Lebanon.  
 I conducted fieldwork and archival research in 2008, from 2009-2011, and again in 
2012. These were eventful years in Lebanon and in the Arab Middle East and fortuitous ones to 
study my topic.  Both the beginning of the campaign to remove personal status identification and 
planning for the first annual Laique Pride March began in 2009, an important year for da‘wa 
secularists. These two articulations of da‘wa secularism were directly informed by the 2009 
parliamentary elections and by the 2008 armed altercations that took place between Hizballah 
and their allies, and their rivals led by the Future movement and the Progressive Socialist Party.  
Finally, the uprisings across the Arab world, in which citizens overthrew governments in Egypt 
and in Tunisia and were ruthlessly stopped from doing so in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, has only 
emboldened da‘wa secularists in their attempts to secularize their fellow Lebanese citizens. They 
  38 
see their efforts as truly revolutionary. Finally, the sectarian undertones of the uprisings' 
repression in Bahrain and Syria, coupled with rising Sunni-Shi‘a tensions in Lebanon, have 
reignited ever-present fears (and realities) of civil war in Lebanon. The closer that sectarian civil 
war or unrest appears, the further urgency that da‘wa secularists feel.  As the Syrian uprising 
articulated into a civil war with sectarian (and classed and imperial) dynamics, and with 
Lebanese citizens fighting on both sides of this war, many da‘wa secularists believe this future is 
already here.  
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is composed of six chapters, each of which explores a different register 
of the practices of religious conversion and/or da‘wa secularism. The first chapter is an 
ethnography of the archives of the Council. It explores the history of the court’s adjudication of 
cases of religious conversion through life histories of the archivists and participant observation at 
personal status and civil courts in Lebanon. This chapter offers a review of Lebanon’s 
contemporary history through a reading of the archives of the Council, the highest court of 
cassation in Lebanon. These archives are housed at the Ministry of Justice and were bombed 
repeatedly during the civil war. The archive burned down in 1985, and many files were rescued 
and/or partially recovered by the archivists, most of whom still work there.   
The specter of war saturates case files that focus on religious converts from that period, as 
it does my interviews with the archivists themselves about that period. In addition I supplement 
the reading of the court’s adjudication of cases of conversion with interviews with two converts 
about their experiences at the Ministry of Justice and at personal status courts during the civil 
war. I focus on how this archive of war is the background against which people dream of, and 
lobby for, a secular personal status and its’ imagined promise of peace. In this chapter I also 
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outline what I am calling a citizenship of complicity, by which I mean the ways in which 
Lebanese citizens are differentially implicated in both accounts of past wars and imaginations of 
future wars. Importantly, the danger citizens potentially pose to each other is always read as 
sectarian, and markers and alliances of socioeconomic class or sexual difference are not a factor 
in this citizenship of complicity. This implication in violence against other citizens is inflected 
with meaning only so much as one is “read” by others through a (perhaps over-determined) 
historical archive of sectarian violence.  I suggest that in order to understand how people in 
Lebanon talk about the state, its problems and the need for reform, one must take into account 
the affective registers of living in a country that seems to be forever at war, often with itself.  
The second and third chapters delve more specifically into the practices of religious 
conversion and da‘wa secularism, focusing primarily on practices of “striking” (shatb) one’s 
personal status from Lebanese census records. The second chapter explains the divergences 
within the categories of religion, sect, personal status, and sex and gender. These divergences are 
the legal and social foundations upon which the practices of religious conversion and activism 
for a secular personal status are predicated. Importantly, they are also the legal skeleton upon 
which the autonomous Lebanese citizen is erected. To illustrate the primacy of the legal category 
of sex in the Lebanese legal system and the ways that the state secularity comes into view 
through the regulation of sexual difference, I offer the example of transsexual citizens who have 
“corrected their sex” in the census registry. I question what effect the legal and bureaucratic 
transformation of personal status and/or sex has on the identification and or/recognition of a 
citizen’s sect or gender. As we shall see, while sex and personal status are the main 
identifications through which citizens are recognized and reproduced in Lebanese law, sect and 
gender are more multivalent and dense categories. The density of sect and gender and their 
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uneven mapping into the legal categories of personal status and sex are revealed through the 
practices of religiou conversion, the removal of one’s personal status identification in the census 
registry, and “correcting” one’s sex. I suggest that researchers on Lebanon have been too quick 
to assume Lebanon as a “failed state” and have thus also assumed that the project to produce a 
coherent, unitary and ideologically inflected citizenry has also failed. I further argue that in order 
to understand the ways that citizenship is practiced in Lebanon, one must account for sex as 
much (if not more) as one accounts for sect.  
  The third chapter is an ethnographic and direct comparison between the practices of and 
discourses surrounding religious conversion and activism for a secular personal status, revealing 
how they articulate different practices of secularism. The first (Secularism 1) is that of the state. 
In particular, I focus on the legal praxis of the Council when it concerns charges of insincerity or 
legal manipulation related to a person’s religious conversion. The state’s role in ensuring that 
minority rights and the rights of the citizen are protected is clearly laid bare in these court 
documents. Conversion cases produce both the Lebanese state’s signature of sovereignty and its 
mark of universality as the structure that unites all these separate minority groups into one 
governmental structure. Importantly, conversion cases also produce the state as that which allows 
a citizen to leave the personal status community of her birth and join another. Also in this chapter 
I outline a second discourse (Secularism 2) and praxis of secularism practiced by self-termed 
"activists for secularism" in Lebanon. Here, I focus on two da‘wa secularism campaigns; that for 
civil marriage and for the removal of personal status identification in state census registries. The 
removal of one’s personal status identification and religious conversion are practices that 
highlight two different aspects of Lebanese statecraft. While both entail similar bureaucratic 
procedures and both invite the state’s legal intervention, they are predicated on two very 
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different readings of the Lebanese state. Comparing these two discourses on secularism and 
Lebanese statecraft, I suggest that secular activists mirror, to an extent, discourses of the state 
itself by emphasizing the fact that tolerance, pluralism, and freedom of religion are principles 
that are quintessentially “Lebanese.” In doing so, they lobby the state to reform itself and fulfill 
its promise as a secular, liberal state based on a belief in pluralism.   
The fourth chapter further illustrates what I am calling da‘wa secularism through an 
account of the 2010 and 2011 Laique Pride Marches and their focus on saturating the public 
sphere with a “culture of secularism,” that was, and is, being discursively opposed to a “culture 
of sectarianism.” I map how the march was conceptualized, planned, and executed. What was the 
aim of the Laique Pride March, and what did the planners hope to achieve? What were the 
alliances that were made in planning for the march, and how did those alliances hold up during 
and after its conclusion? In particular, I will focus on two controversies that threatened to unravel 
the first Laique Pride march, the inclusion of demands for sexual and gay rights, and the question 
of how, and when, to end political sectarianism.   
Finally, I conclude this dissertation by thinking more critically about how insights gained 
from studying practices of secularity, sexual difference, and citizenship in Lebanon can inform 
the study of secularism and the state more generally. I examine recent developments in Lebanon, 
including a civil marriage that was conducted and successfully registered in Lebanon and the 
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Chapter One  
A Mountain On My Back: War, Archives, and History in Lebanon 
 
In 1981 seven siblings objected to a Greek Orthodox Court decision and appealed to the 
Council.  In 1975, the year that the Lebanese civil war began, their father's cousin, a woman 
presumed to be in her seventies, died. A man claiming to be her son from a previous marriage 
had certified what he claimed to be her final will and testament at a Civil Court of First Instance, 
the court that adjudicates “the inheritance law for non-Muslims” in Lebanon. The siblings, the 
deceased's second cousins, claimed that the will was a forgery. They stated that the woman in 
question had never been married and had died “not [having] known any relationship with a 
man.” They begin their appeal at the civil courts, claiming that the man was a fraud and that even 
if he was the son of the deceased, he was an illegitimate son born out of wedlock. In Lebanon, 
illegitimate children cannot inherit from their parents unless their parents expressly claim 
paternity or maternity. To prove his inheritance claim and to “recover his mother's honor,” the 
man, Jean, began a legal case at the Greek Orthodox Court of First Instance seeking to prove his 
lineage by certifying that his mother and father were indeed married. The court ruled in his favor 
in 1978, and, following an appeal by the plaintiff’s cousins, in 1980 the Greek Orthodox Court of 
Appeals certified the ruling of the Greek Orthodox Court of First Instance. 
Undeterred, the siblings appealed to the Council claiming that gross violations to the 
public good occurred in the Greek Orthodox Court of Appeals. Five years later, a decision was 
issued.  The plaintiffs and the defendant marshaled evidence from the 19th and 20th centuries. 
The case explicitly refers to the methodological problems and flaws of the 1932 population 
census of Lebanon, the demographic skeleton upon which the system of political sectarianism, 
born under French occupation and institutionalized in the post-civil war second republic, 
continues to be legitimated by both state and activist discourses. Jean's case file provides a 
glimpse into old and new state-making technologies, and the uneasy transition between the 
two.xlix Moreover, the case’s life does not end with the death of the main plaintiffs and defendant.  
In an act that forces the retrieval of the case file from the court's archive and its introduction as 
evidence into a different dispute; Jean's heirs submitted an addendum to the case in 2008, asking 
for a statement from the court reaffirming Jean’s legitimacy, and thus their place in continuing 
family inheritance disputes.  
 
*** 
Using case material, life histories and participant observation, this chapter explores the 
ways in which Lebanese history is constructed in dominant discourses as an archive of 
sectarianism, state failure, and civil violence. I focus on my interactions with Mona, the archivist 
of the Council. I trace Lebanese statecraft through the workings of this high court and through 
life at the courthouse. l This tracing challenges the dominant historical narrative of Lebanon by 
emphasizing the daily workings, as opposed to the failings, of the wartime Lebanese state. These 
challenges are not incitements to historical “reversal” or “insurgency.” Instead, I heed Ann 
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Stoler's warning that “such an approach undoes the certainty that archives are ’stable things' with 
ready-made and neatly drawn boundaries. But the search for “dramatic reversal,” “usurpation” 
and successful “appropriation” can hide “events” that are more muted in their consequences, less 
bellicose in their seizures, less spectacular in how and what they reframe.”li Jean’s case file, 
outlined above, is a case in point. 
 In their decision, the jurists that sat on the Council in 1993 ruled that in cases where 
official documents show a contradiction between information recorded in the 1932 census and 
information recorded prior to the 1932 census, the documents preceding 1932 are more legally 
persuasive. Such a statement, issued by Lebanon's leading jurists and resting on logic that I will 
further explore below, challenges the very ideological foundations of the Lebanese state as well 
as the historiography of Lebanon. More generally, the case files found in the archives of the 
Council reveal a narrative that stresses rule of law, sovereignty, and the rights and duties 
afforded to and practiced by Lebanese citizens. In fact, the very jurisprudence of the court offers 
a view of the Lebanese state as secular, sovereign, and fiercely protective of citizens who are 
entangled in the web of personal status law.  As Brinkley Messick has suggested, this 
discrepancy may be partly attributed to the fact that legal jurisprudence circulates in a different 
world-the archive—from that of historiography—the realm of the library.lii Over two years of 
working in the legal archives of Lebanon's highest civil court, the absence of legal research in the 
historiography of the state grew glaring. The history of the court, its life world, and its 
jurisprudence are an “arrested history” that is “suspended from received historiography.”liii By 
studying them, we can begin to question the ways that dominant historiography has framed the 
Lebanese state. 
This chapter details parts of a secular movement in Lebanon that has in recent years 
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rallied for a secular personal status law, aimed to alert others to the dangers of a new Sunni-Shi‘a 
civil war, and advocated for the importance of a civil and secular state. By engaging the nuances 
and memory-scape of the Lebanese judiciary archive and the archive’s lifeworld, I explore how 
secular activism and the archives of Lebanon's high court function nationally, regionally, and 
internationally. First, I explain what “secular activism” means in the context of Lebanon and how 
it is linked to a fear of civil war as well as understandings of secularism, modernity, and 
liberalism. I call this type of activism da‘wa secularism. I then discuss the archive of the 
Council, showing how these secular activists read the judicial archive and the archivists 
themselves under the twinned signs of corruption and sectarianism. In doing so, I outline 
hegemonic readings of Lebanese history and the ways in which they intersect and diverge with 
court archives. Finally I demonstrate that the archives of the Council not only illustrate the 
Lebanese state’s adjudication of cases concerning conflict between personal status courts, but 
also its ability and mandate to gather, categorize, and archive the work of the legal system. One 
can read, as Derrida has suggested, the signature of sovereignty in these files.liv  
Extending from one quadrant of what used to be known as the “green line” separating 
civil war time West Beirut from East Beirut is an area known as the “‘adliyya.” Technically, the 
‘adliyya - or  judiciary - is composed of three connected and sprawling concrete structures: the 
Qasr al-‘Adl (Palais de Justice/Courthouse), the Wizarat al-‘Adl (Ministère de la Justice/Ministry 
of Justice) and the Bayt al-Muhami (Maison de l'Avocat/the lawyers’ syndicate). Parking lots, 
soldiers, and a proliferation of cafes, copy centers, and wandering coffee sellers connect these 
buildings.  Hundreds of lawyers, judges, civil servants, employees, entrepreneurs, litigants, 
defendants, soldiers, visitors, and law students crowd these three structures daily. These daily 
circulations of people and of thousands of pages of paper transform these informally connected 
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structures into an organic compound. In particular, paper moves back and forth between the 
courthouse and the syndicate with great frequency.  Court documents are reviewed in the cafe of 
the lawyers' syndicate and then filed before the proper judicial clerk (qalam) at the courthouse. 
The judicial clerks dispense documents issued by the court to lawyers attached to the cases in 
question.  Entrepreneurs sell stamps that all legal documents, both filed and received by lawyers, 
must be certified with in order to conform to bureaucratic procedures. These stamps, of different 
currencies and classifications, are sold in the parking lot that connects the syndicate and the 
courthouse. A soldier stands at the passageway between these two buildings and requests to see 
the papers of anyone deemed worthy of his suspicion. Notes are scribbled on scraps of paper and 
are sent between judges, lawyers and employees who are in different rooms on the same floor, 
different floors in the same building, or in the different buildings that compose this compound.  
  Of these three buildings, the lawyer’s syndicate is the newest. It was constructed after 
the civil war ended, and funded through the fees that every practicing lawyer must pay to the 
lawyers’ syndicate.  No expense was spared in the construction of this building, which includes a 
glass elevator that goes directly to the office of the president of the syndicate. The floors and 
walls are made of marble and granite, and a popular and local chain cafe, Le Chase, runs the 
cafeteria. To enter the syndicate the visitor must show identification to a soldier standing guard 
outside the entrance, who may or may not ask to see additional proof that the visitor is a member 
of the syndicate, a student or professor at a law school, a judge, or an employee of the Ministry 
of Justice. The solider will ask to see additional proof based on his or her reading of the visitor’s 
appearance. It is much easier to gain entrance into the courthouse, because by law every 
Lebanese citizen has a right to attend court proceedings. Still, a proliferation of soldiers carrying 
machine guns mill around both the outside and inside entrances of the courthouse, where people 
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line up to go through metal detectors, get signed in manually by a uniformed officer, and, finally, 
get personally searched by a male or female soldier. There are signs on the outside entrance 
stating that everyone entering the courthouse must be wearing shoes and “proper” clothing; 
though this dictum seems to apply only to people wearing cheaply made slippers usually 
associated with manual labor. What counts as “appropriate clothing” depends more on the person 
and their class status. Many female lawyers enter the courthouse wearing blue jeans and shoes 
that expose their manicured toenails. This system of performing and reading class continues once 
inside.  In fact, at the courthouse, class, to paraphrase Clifford Geertz, is at the skin's edge. It is 
the most evident, and constant, marker of difference. Civil servants, lawyers, judges, plaintiffs, 
defendants, and army personnel read each other and interact according (in part) to this reading of 
class. A soldier may simultaneously point his gun to indicate where a cheaply dressed defendant 
should move and bow his head to an established lawyer passing by. A woman selling stamps 
might treat two lawyers differently depending on the state of their lawyers' robes, and judges and 
archivists order Turkish coffee from two different cafes in the building; one costs one thousand 
and five hundred liras a cup, the other five hundred. While markers of class stubbornly shape the 
world of the judiciary into familiar patterns, other markers of difference, such as sect and gender 
and profession, shift and reposition themselves in line with the political climate (from Muslim 
versus Christian to Sunni versus Shi‘i, for example) and according to readings of class. For 
example, an upper middle class female lawyer or citizen will be in a stronger position than a 
lower middle class man, but if a man and a woman are read as being from the same class, the 
familiar gender hierarchies prevail. 
  On the first floor of the courthouse, a Roman style marble statue of “blind justice” stands 
in the center of the great hall where different courtrooms and offices jut out. The statue is of a 
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woman wearing a toga that barely covers her marble skin. Millennia ago, the Roman Empire 
established its first law school in Berytus, which would later become Beirut. The statue is a 
reminder of the Lebanese judiciary's Roman pedigree, just as the excavated and landscaped 
Roman bath ruins at the foot of Lebanese Parliament make claims to the western, and grand, 
origins of Lebanon. As Pope John Paul II stated in 1999, “Lebanon is more than a country, it is a 
message.”lv The pope's expression of Lebanon's exceptional status in the Middle East, in 
reference to the fact that the country is a mosaic of different religions and denominations living 
side by side, is a common refrain among Lebanese nationalists and da‘wa secularists. 
The second floor of the courthouse is composed mainly of judges' offices; the third floor 
is primarily the domain of the Cassation court and the offices of high-level jurists, including that 
of the President of the Judiciary. Still higher up are the offices of the Shura Council, a court 
system that is supposed to ensure that the ministries, courts, and parliament are functioning 
according to legal precepts. Upon entering the first floor of the courthouse, the great hall seems 
grand–until one notices the grime that sticks intransigently to the marble floors, the once white 
walls now turned ivory by years of collected dirt and the clock that has decided the time is 
forever eleven thirty. Still, the hall suggests grandeur, albeit tired and haggard. On one side of 
the great hall is a row of wall to ceiling glass doors. They lead to the wide and steep steps of a 
pristine entrance, which is viewable from the street, but accessible only to judges and high-level 
employees of the Ministry. The statue of blind justice, facing the glass doors, clutches a marble 
scroll in her delicately carved fingers.  Around her, lawyers and citizens smoke cigarettes and 
drink coffee, using the grounds in their plastic cups as makeshift ashtrays, which they leave—an 
offering of human waste—at her bare feet. 
(Sectarian) War and (Secular) Peace 
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The historiography of Lebanon has, for the most part, settled around the following 
categories of analysis: political sectarianism, sectarianism, violence, clientelism, and corruption.  
While analyses of these factors are essential to approaching the history, politics and 
anthropology of Lebanon, they are also insufficient.lvi Taken together, these macro factors 
narrate what has become common sense knowledge of (and perhaps an overly confident 
discourse on) that country: that Lebanon is a machine composed of many parts that are supposed 
to, but do not always, interlock. This machine sputters along precariously and often breaks down. 
At those points, local, regional, and foreign mechanics rush to maintain, but not redesign, a 
system that protects and promotes their interests. But factors at the micro-political level 
complicate this neat analogy. While Lebanese history can be read as a history of violence and 
state failure, these episodes of violence and failures have had a productive effect on Lebanese 
citizens. The Lebanese citizen does not stand outside the state, a history of wars, and the system 
of political sectarianism. Lebanese citizenship is constituted through this system and its periodic 
breakdown. The legacy of these breakdowns— in 1958, 1975, 1982, 2006, and 2008—not only 
signifies an increasingly sectarian political and geographic terrain, the slow and painful 
eradication of the middle class, or the polarization of the population into rival political camps 
that have successfully paralyzed the country since 2005. More than a fractured political body, the 
legacy of these multiple breakdowns of the Lebanese state shows a fragmented memory-scape 
that Lebanese citizens find themselves positioned within differently. These memories often split 
the country into shifting terrains of perpetrators and victims. Increasingly, the future is beginning 
to look like a feedback loop of civil war, only this time the battlegrounds will be drawn between 
Sunni and Shi’i Lebanese and their domestic and international allies.  
Beginning with the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, the past eleven years have 
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seen unprecedented Sunni-Shi‘a sectarianism across the Islamic world. The roots of this tension 
are informed by theology and compounded by the periods of oppression that Shi‘a (and other 
minority sects) were subjected to under Sunni-dominated empires.lvii This oppression fueled 
desires for Shi’a legal “recognition” under French and British mandates, intersecting neatly with 
imperialist strategies of indirect rule through legal pluralism.lviii As Martin Chanok, Mahmood 
Mamdani, and Nicholas Dirks have written in the context of colonial Africa and India, the 
codification of group difference within state structures in fact transforms, hardens, and 
“ethnicizes” these group identities.lix Thus they become, in Wendy Brown's words, the grounds 
from which one speaks and engages in politics—a politics of identity grounded in governmental 
institutions and narrations of a “common history.”lx Shared memories are crucial to these 
narrations, and through repetition form an important part of what Mahmood Mamdani has called 
a historic community.lxi Writing from the context of post-genocide Rwanda, Mamdani argues 
that while a historic community is motivated by a sense of a shared past and particularly, a 
shared injurious past, a political community is one that is oriented towards a common future.lxii 
In post-civil war countries, it is collective memories of violence and loss that “refers to 
knowledge about the past that is shared, mutually acknowledged, and reinforced by a 
collectivity.” These memories of the past intersect with and inform how people experience 
current events.lxiii Political theorists have argued that post-civil war countries transitioning from a 
plurality of historic communities to a sole political community are less likely to repeat the cycle 
of civil war.lxiv  The system of political sectarianism seems to foreclose that possibility. Theodor 
Hanf has called that system “the great incorporator” as it ensures a vertical integration into a 
state structure posited as the arbiter between preexisting sectarian communities.lxv The 
mechanism for political recognition and representation is the passage of a separate personal 
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status law or explicit legal recognition that a particular sect will follow an already established 
personal status. 
The aim of many da‘wa secularists is to achieve political recognition via a secular 
personal status, which will then enable them to lobby for seats in Parliament. When asked 
whether this could be understood to be a sectarian desire, Jihad, a self-styled “father figure” of 
the da‘wa secularist movement, said that the difference between a possible “secular sect” and 
“sectarian sects” was that the content of the secular sect would be filled by members guided by 
rational thinking, and not historical and traditional legacies of hatred and discriminations. He 
stated that a secular sect was tantamount to having an “independent” political party, and that it 
would be a model of coexistence for people from all sects, in addition to men and women, who 
would be treated equally under a secular personal status. The presence of a secular personal 
status, Jihad went on, and even of a secular political community, would show the youth that they 
had a choice, that they did not have to hate each other just because they are Sunni or Shi‘i.lxvi In 
fact, people have been defining and redefining both the secular and the sectarian for years. While 
today da‘wa secularists believe that they need a secular personal status in order to achieve a 
secular political community, others have long associated religious personal status laws (and 
sects) with particular ideologies and/or discriminations.  
Towards the beginning of the Lebanese civil war, the parents of one of my informants got 
engaged. The informant’s father was a Palestinian-Jordanian Muslim, the mother a Maronite 
Lebanese. They both converted to Greek Orthodoxy and got married, in part to quell complaints 
from family members that one of them would have to convert to the others' religion, and in part 
because they believed that the Greek Orthodox sect was historically allied to the causes of 
secularism, liberalism and Arabism—causes which they both shared. When my informant was 
  51 
sixteen, she converted to Greek Orthodoxy from Islam—her father was still a Muslim according 
to Jordanian authorities and thus so was she—in order to facilitate her naturalization as a 
Lebanese citizen. When I asked her why she choose Greek Orthodoxy as opposed to the myriad 
Christian sects in Lebanon, she responded by saying that the Greek Orthodox law is the most 
progressive and “feminist” of the personal status laws, and the Greek Orthodox sect had long 
been associated with secular pan-Arabism, a political ideology with which she identified. These 
examples show how Lebanese citizens have redefined, and continue to redefine, the secular in 
relation to historical and political contexts in addition to sectarianism and to law.  Just as 
secularism and its relation to law has and is going through multiple iterations, so too has 
sectarianism.  
In Lebanon, increased Sunni-Shi‘a sectarianism is the result of at least four factors: 1) 
historical discourses of underdevelopment and discrimination that emphasize Shi‘a oppression at 
the hands of Sunnis; 2) rapidly changing economic conditions and migration and remittance 
patterns that have transformed traditional patterns of resource control and distribution in 
Lebanon; 3) the fixing of Hizballah (and its production as a “Shi‘a Lebanese party”) in the cross 
hairs of the Global War on Terror. This factor has mobilized cultural and racial discourses 
around Islam, fundamentalism, and militancy that have been reproduced and deployed in 
Lebanon following the assassination of Rafik al Hariri and following the 2006 Israel-Lebanon 
war. And finally, 4) the invasion and occupation of Iraq has unleashed a Saudi-Iranian cold war, 
mobilized and fought using sectarian discourses, across the region. Countries that have large 
populations of Sunni and Shi‘i citizens, such as Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen,Syria, and Lebanon, are 
increasingly spaces where this cold war is heating up. In these countries, Saudi Arabia claims to 
speak on behalf of Sunnis while Iran does the same for Shi‘a.  
  52 
This increasing Sunni-Shi‘a sectarianism can be measured in both extraordinary and 
quotidian ways. While conducting fieldwork, increasing Sunni-Shi‘i tension was evident in 
several ways.  Two such moments stand out in particular. In 2009, I was conducting participant 
observation at the Sunni Personal Status Court of First Instance, located in Tariq al Jadidah, 
considered to be the “Sunni bastion” of Beirut. I was accompanying a lawyer, Sawsan, on her 
daily rounds. Before entering judges' chambers for an arbitration session, she explained her 
strategy. 
Sawsan: So my client wants a divorce, but she doesn't really 
have a legal standing. But we do know that her husband's best 
friend is a Shi‘i named Ali. 
Maya: So? 
Sawsan: So nothing. But I also know that the judge hearing the 
case is a Hariri supporter, and is very sectarian. . . he hates 
Shi‘a. So I am going to say that the husband has been converted 
to Shi‘ism by his friend and may have contracted a mut‘a 
marriage which you know is illegal for Sunnis. 
Maya: But is it true? 
Sawsan: That’s the point. We don't know that it’s true or not. 
It’s an allegation . . .  it’s all talk. But it’s good enough.lxvii 
  
Almost eight months later, I was sitting on a comfortable couch in a high rise apartment in one of 
Beirut's most expensive neighborhoods. I was interviewing a Syrian woman who, along with her 
husband, had converted to Shi‘ism decades earlier to safeguard their female daughters' sizable 
inheritance. I asked her if this had been a difficult decision to make and she laughed, saying that 
everyone she knew who was Sunni and had only daughters had become Shi‘i. She gave me the 
name of a man who sits on the board of the Maqasid foundation, the largest and most reputable 
Sunni charitable organization in Lebanon. He had also become a Shi‘i in recent years, she said. 
She promised to call me later that afternoon with his phone number. When she did call, she 
urged me not to use her husband's name in my dissertation and refused to give me the number of 
the Maqsid board member. “My husband [whose business interests lie mostly in the Gulf] says 
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that it might cause problems if we said publicly that we were Shi‘i now.” When I asked her if she 
would prefer I strike her interview from my records as well she laughed and said, “No, I don't 
care. In Syria we don't have these problems. You Lebanese are obsessed with this sectarian 
thing. You always have been and you always will be.”lxviii At the time of the interview the 
increasingly sectarian war in Syria, and the involvement of Lebanese citizens on both sides of 
that conflict, had not happened yet.  
Theodor Hanf has argued that shared memories of civil war are the best hope for a stable 
future in Lebanon.lxix The horror of civil war, Hanf suggests, could inspire Lebanese to work 
towards ensuring peaceful coexistence. Fawwaz Traboulsi has recently expanded on this 
argument, writing that the majority of Lebanese citizens want to avoid the horrors of another war 
and that this fear contributes to a fragile peace,lxx which I suggest is perhaps better characterized 
as a state of perpetual cease-fire. Many Lebanese activists who fight against sectarianism and for 
secularism would agree with this statement. Activists for a secular personal status law and a 
secular state—da‘wa secularists—are convinced that unless the Lebanese state becomes “truly 
secular,” the future will be a repetition of differently configured civil wars.  Despite the fact that 
da‘wa secularists are arguing for a non-sectarian personal status, da‘wa secularism is grounded 
in a discourse of complicity whereby citizens are assumed to be sectarian until proven otherwise. 
By a discourse of complicity, I mean the ways in which Lebanese citizens are differentially 
implicated in accounts of sectarian violence and tension. The “proof” that one is not sectarian 
lies in one’s actions. In this case proof of being non-sectarian could be public antipathy towards 
established and sectarian politicians, a refusal to answer when asked what sect you belong to, 
taking part in a multi-sectarian environment, or practicing tolerance and openness to religious 
and sectarian difference. In more extreme cases, having a civil marriage or, as happened for a 
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short while in 2009-2010, striking out one's sect from the census registries, is evidence of being 
non-sectarian. The idea behind these actions was to challenge the notion that to be a Lebanese 
citizen today is to be a sectarian citizen. Da‘wa secularists want to build a legal and social 
infrastructure that makes possible the flourishing of secular, civil, and non-sectarian citizens. In 
large measure this infrastructure is legal, both due to the fact that many prominent da‘wa 
secularists are lawyers, and the ministry of justice, the lawyers' syndicate, and prominent judges 
have at different times supported the secularization and centralization of all Lebanese laws.lxxi 
Following this logic, being secular is equated with being non-sectarian—even if the stated aim of 
many da‘wa secularists is to create a secular sect.  
 Da‘wa secularists argue that Lebanon will be safe only when its citizens have become 
non-sectarian, have sole allegiance to the state, and thus cease to pose a threat to each other. 
They believe that the presence of religious personal status laws and institutions weaken the state 
and oppresses citizens, particularly women and children. Activists cite religious personal status 
courts as the cause of what they call the backwardness and corruption of the Lebanese state, its 
leaders, and its citizens. Da‘wa secularists, most of whom come from a middle and professional 
class background, highlight the importance of choice, independence, and self-transformation. 
They argue that if someone really wants to, they can break free of the “gilded cage,” as Kamal 
Salibi puts it, of sectarianism.lxxii Da‘wa secularists, I suggest in subsequent chapters, view the 
current personal status system, whereby a citizen inherits their personal status along with their 
sect from their father, as inhospitable to the creation of free and autonomous citizens. “The 
personal status system,” a leading da‘wa secularist told me, “creates groups, not individuals.” 
For this lawyer, a secular personal status promises to produce a new type of citizen, an individual 
with sole allegiance to the state. “And secular laws,” he continued, “are easier to change than 
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religious ones.”lxxiii When I suggested that in fact, on average, the frequency with which 
particular personal status laws have been amended equals if not surpasses the frequency of 
amendments made to civil laws, he answered that if the state were made stronger and more 
sovereign the judiciary would be more responsive to the demands of citizens.  
Da‘wa secularists have faith in the promise of a secular state; the importance and almost 
sacred nature of individual choice is central to this faith. They argue that until Lebanese citizens 
can choose to marry whomever they want in their own country they are not fully “free,” no 
matter to what sect, gender, or economic class they belong. Thus we see how these activists draw 
on the choice to love and marry freely and without legal constraint as central to building the 
architecture of the autonomous self.lxxiv These are the grounds from which a new Lebanese 
citizen, one less prone to sectarian feelings or violence, will emerge. The past is seen as 
something that can be collectively shed, like snakeskin. In this faith system, one can rationally 
overcome affective registers of memory and political emotion.lxxv On the website of Laique Pride 
(see chapter five) for example, readers are told in three languages the importance of self-
transformation through ethical action and rationalization: “Nothing will change if we don't 
change.” 
A Dangerous Past 
During my first meeting with Mona, the archivist of the Council and the person with 
whom I worked most closely while conducting research at the judiciary, we discovered that we 
are from the same neighborhood in Beirut. Mona has been my aunt's neighbor for years. This 
connection of class, family, and sect, shaped our interactions at the archives. It allowed for an 
easy intimacy and trust to develop. After all, I was now accountable to my family for my 
comportment at the judiciary, a form of accountability much more immediate and pressing than a 
distant IRB board, for example. In addition, our exchanges at the judiciary folded us deeper into 
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an economy of favors that had linked our families together years before either of us was born. 
Such a relationship allowed for heated disagreements about contemporary politicians and 
political issues to take place. It also meant that Mona considered her and me to form an “us,” 
particularly when talking about the past and specifically when discussing violence. To illustrate 
how the assumption of an “us” inflected my experiences with Mona at the judiciary I have 
reproduced the transcript of an interview I conducted with her where we discussed how she 
navigated her job during the civil war. The transcript highlights the ways in which discussions of 
the civil war, and of future violence, rely on what are assumed to be shared experiences, 
vulnerabilities, and alliances.  
Mona: We were used to it. We used to go to the parking garage, and when 
the shelling happened [got worse], we would go under the garage. When 
all of this was burned (points around the room), we sat in the big hall over 
there (points across the hallway), we put our desks and our files and our 
cabinets and we sat, and we would be exposed to sniper fire there. 
Maya: Here? (points across the hallway). 
Mona: We were sniped at. Because around here [judiciary] it is East/West, 
we were in the middle [of the green line]. 
Maya: I see.  
Mona: [We were] on the front lines. Yes, we suffered a lot. 
Maya: Where were you living at the time? 
Mona: My place. In Tariq al Jadidah. 
Maya: And you used to come here every day? 
Mona: Yes. I would come walking. From my house . . . sometimes my 
husband would give me a ride to Barbir, Barbir was all sandbags, so we 
couldn’t pass. Sandbags up to here [points to her neck]. You remember, 
right? 
Maya: I remember that.  
Mona: So there is a sector that is under us [i.e. our jurisdiction], and a 
sector that is under the [jurisdiction of] the East, you have to pass like a 
zigzag between them [the two sectors], to get to behind the Museum and to 
here, we would come walking and pass through this entire road. 
Maya: And it was the same for…  
Mona: Coming back, it was the same. 
Maya: Was it the same for those coming from the East side? 
Mona: No, from the East side, they come in their cars, it is close. There is 
no zigzag (laughs). Not like us. 
Maya: I see. 
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Mona: It was normal [for them]. But those in the East side, if they wanted 
to come to the West side, yes it was the same . . . the same process. 
Maya: But not to the judiciary. 
Mona: No. 
Maya: So you used to walk from Barbir to here. 
Mona: Yes. 
Maya: And was there ever . . . I mean, did you used to tell them that you 
worked at the judiciary? Did you have any problems or… 
Mona: No, nobody ever assaulted me, I was never exposed to anything 
dangerous. Ever. Quite the opposite. Maybe they used to make it easier on 
government employees…I don't know…there are people…maybe they 
were crossing but they weren’t employees with a purpose, those that used to 
pass through these places could have been kidnapped, robbed, exposed to 
sniper fire… 
Maya: I see. 
Mona: I don’t know, but for me thank God [hamdillah], not one day, and 
throughout the entire war I would cross.  
Maya: Thank God [hamdillah].  
Mona: Yes I was never exposed to anything, not one time. 
Maya: Did you ever have to sleep here? 
Mona: No, when the bombing would let up I would leave. 
Sometimes…there is a day I will never forget. It was a Monday. The 
shelling started from the mountains to here (points out the window and 
mimics the trajectory of a mortar, tapping her finger on her desk to illustrate 
impact). We went down (to the parking garage). I had my transistor radio. 
They always used to give out the flashes (on the radio). 
Maya: Yes, I remember those. 
Mona: Yes. So we went downstairs. And my car was outside, here that day 
because I was sick and I drove. I waited a little bit until 11 [pm]. It was 
quieter so I got into the car. I drove on to the Museum. As soon as I got to 
the National Museum. I passed the Museum, I got to the Military Court [a 
distance about 200 meters], and a shell landed on the National Museum.  . . 
How I passed through Barbir, I don’t know. I got there. There was a 
checkpoint there. I stopped. I just stopped the car and as if I was feeling as 
if…there is a mountain on my back and I want to…I want to bring it 
down…I couldn’t anymore I was emotionally exhausted…[ti‘bit nafsiyyan]. 
It was if I arrived yellowed. They [militiamen/boys] ran to me. They told 
me what’s wrong with you? What happened? I told them nothing I crossed 
the road and a shell landed behind me. But as you know ustaza, all of this 
was nothing [compared to other's experiences].lxxvi  
 
 Mona began working at the judiciary in 1985, the year a large portion of the archives of 
the Cassation Court and the ledgers that corresponded to them were burnt in a fire.  She is a 
trained archeologist and classicist (she learned Greek, Latin, and ancient Hebrew in college), a 
  58 
mother, and a grandmother.  During the years I conducted fieldwork Mona was responsible for 
maintaining the archives and the ongoing cases of the Council and of the Court of Cassation for 
[Civil] Personal Status. But this is an incomplete picture of her average workday.  She also 
spends hours offering legal advice, quoting jurisprudential tenets to young lawyers, remembering 
the history of the court and its jurists, and acts as a shoulder to cry on, literally, for the many 
plaintiffs and defendants who come to her desk in order to put a face to the details of abuse, 
adultery, and other horrors that color the files she works with every day. They know that she is 
powerful.  
 Later I learned that Mona herself was soon to become a convert from Sunni to Shi‘i 
Islam. When I asked her why she and her husband would convert, she threw up her hands and 
said, “What can we do? We only had girls, and I'm not going to allow my husbands' brothers to 
take my money,” in a reference to the different inheritance laws practiced by these two Muslim 
sects. While we were having this conversation, another archivist interjected to explain the 
jurisprudential and religious tenets behind these different laws.lxxvii As Omar was quoting hadith, 
Mona told him that hadith had no place in personal status courts, unfortunately. I told her that I 
found her impending conversion to be a strange coincidence, given that the case files I was 
researching were specifically about religious conversion and the Council's role in arbitrating 
between personal status courts. She responded by showing me a case file that involved her 
family, laughing that she was already in the archives. Her family had sued the Sunni waqf of 
Sidon over a tract of land they said had been illegally seized. “We won,” she said happily as I 
flipped through the pages of her family’s case file.  
 There are three types of organized collected documents in the courthouse and the 
syndicate: the archives of the courts; the legal library that is housed at the syndicate; and the 
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personal libraries of the judges, which are housed in their offices. The court archives are housed 
in different floors of the courthouse. For example, the archives of the Civil Court for Personal 
Status are on the first floor, which neighbors the Court itself and the office of the judge 
responsible for it in one of the rooms that jut out of the grand hall.  A woman in a headscarf, 
called “Pasha” by those who work in the archive, holds court in that room, reprimanding anyone 
who dares use a cell phone in “her” archive and enforcing strict rules about standing in line to 
request a file, no small feat in Lebanon. In fact, at the courthouse women hold several positions 
of power: they are archivists, judges and lawyers. Women constitute the majority of students in 
Lebanese law schools and the judges' college, and they currently constitute thirty percent of the 
judiciary.lxxviii As of yet, however, men still occupy the vast majority of higher-level judicial 
appointments.  Many of the da‘wa secularists with whom I worked—male and female lawyers—
disapproved of my research at the judiciary and of the archivists themselves. The da‘wa 
secularists condemned the archivists for being inefficient, for not knowing their place, and for 
being, in the lawyers’ words, “corrupt.” 
 The archives of the Cassation Court are in a room facing the offices of the Cassation 
Court clerks. A locked metal door protects them, and inside there are metal shelves stacked with 
files. Facing this room is a long hallway adjacent to the clerk’s room; this hallway is lined with 
locked wooden cabinets that house recent case files. Standing behind the locked metal door 
facing the archivists' room are files from the different branches of the Court of Cassation, 
stacked on metal shelves sorted roughly according to date. At the side of this room is an alcove 
lined with shelves. This is the archive of the Council.  In the space between the second and third 
floor—in an attic—of the judiciary is another set of case files from the Council, these dating 
from 1942 to 1967. Getting to these files requires a boost or a chair to step on. The archivists do 
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not have access to a ladder. Mona broke her arm once while jumping down from the attic to the 
ground. A third set of files, dated from 1967 to 1985, are stacked underground in a “depot” near 
the parking lot, a “mountain of case files” (jabal malaffat) according to Mona, which I saw the 
first day of research at the judiciary. Lilliane, the head archivist of the Cassation Court, told me 
that when Syrian workers were hired to sort the case files years ago, they dumped these files 
“like Sukleen [the private company contracted by the state for waste management], they made a 
mountain of garbage.”lxxix The first day I spent with Mona at the archive, I followed her 
directions through the parking lot to a photocopy service that she said was the cheapest in the 
compound. I was looking for the mountain of files when a well-dressed older lawyer stopped me 
and asked me what I was doing. When I told him I was looking for the photocopy service he 
urged me to use the library at the syndicate, assuring me that it was new, clean, and more suited 
to “people like us.” 
 There is no light bulb in the room that houses the case files of Lebanon's highest civil 
court. When searching for files Mona and I used the weak flashlights built into disposable light 
bulbs. When I asked why there was no light bulb in the room, Mona remarked that the archivists 
had collectively decided to stop buying light bulbs until the state had reimbursed them for past 
purchases. That had been months ago. Archivists also pay for the upkeep of their bathroom 
(which they all share) and their office, Mona told me.lxxx The case files contained in the dark 
alcove correspond to “after the fire of 1985.” The fire had begun after a vicious bout of shelling 
during the civil war.  In the thirty-seven of the seventy years it has been independent,French, 
Israeli, American, and Syrian troops have occupied Lebanon. In 1985, the country was still 
immersed in a civil war that pitted Christian militias allied to Israel and the United States and 
against the PLO and their Arab and Lebanese allies, secular Arab parties allied to different Arab 
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regimes, and Islamist parties allied to Iran against each other in complex alliances and counter-
alliances. The barrage of mortars that struck the second floor of the Ministry of Justice and the 
High Court seemed, to the archivists, to be aimed at the archive itself.    
 Today when discussing the fire, archivists, who work together in this room, refuse to 
speculate on where the shelling came from that night. To speculate on the direction from where 
the bombs came is to speculate on “which side” shelled the Ministry of Justice—and the six 
clerks come from all possible sides in Lebanon. When pressed, they claim that the only logical 
explanation for the mortars' trajectory into the archive is that some militia leader must have 
wanted his criminal case file to be burnt and thus, lost. They render the shelling personal, and not 
political. They share the story that whoever gave the order to shell the archives must have had a 
criminal file he wanted forever expunged from the record. One day I tried to press Mona and her 
co-workers about who could have shelled the ministry that night. One of the women waved 
vaguely westward and said the shells must have come from there. Mona immediately looked at 
me and half-jokingly said, “See? She thinks it came from our side.”lxxxi While war requires the 
mobilization of collective memory, post-war terrains—particularly post-civil war terrains-require 
either a selective forgetting or a necessary lie. It may not be true that these archivists have no 
opinion as to where the shells came from that night. Making it true and insisting upon that truth 
enables the room to function and the archivists to remain friends and good co-workers.  
   The archivists in this room are each in charge of a different branch of the Cassation 
Court. They are diverse in terms of gender, sect, age and regional origins. In fact, their sectarian 
makeup is purposefully diverse, keeping in line with the unofficial practice of maintaining a 
sectarian balance among Lebanon's high-level civil servants. Despite this veneer of “diversity,” 
there is a unifying characteristic: they are all from the same class background and from 
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generations when a government job all but guaranteed entry into a professional middle class, 
economic stability, and the chance to provide for one's family. They were hired either before the 
civil war, before the devaluation of the Lebanese pound, or before the neoliberal market reforms 
introduced by then-Prime Minister Rafik al Hariri, which all but destroyed the middle class. 
These reforms led to hyperinflation and to Beirut being consistently ranked one of the most 
expensive cities to live in the world.lxxxii The youngest archivist, Tariq, joined the judiciary as a 
civil servant after having spent years unemployed and looking for a job in the private sector 
following his college graduation. As of 2012, he was still looking for work in the private sector, 
and hopes to move to the Gulf.  
All six archivists attended public schools and public universities; they are paid between 
$500 and $800 a month (a starting salary for a judge is $1,500), depending on seniority. Two of 
them in fact attended law school, but could not afford the unpaid three year “internship” required 
of all law graduates before they are allowed to take the bar exam and enter practice. The tips they 
receive from lawyers in return for their services are in part a recognition that they cannot live on 
their salaries. During my fieldwork I witnessed exchanges between archivists, lawyers, and 
judges conducted in several currencies. While paper money is the most common, lawyers with 
closer relationships and histories with the judiciary also brought archivists olive oil, fish, and 
kilos of fruit from their family farms. The most popular currency is the favor and the delayed 
reciprocity expected in any gift-exchange. In fact, an economy of favors accomplishes two 
things: 1) it produces a cycle of exchange that uses several commodities and currencies and thus 
functions to ameliorate the ravages of an “official economy” pockmarked by both war and 
neoliberal market restructuring; and 2) sociality travels at each point of this cycle of exchange, 
creating ties between people occupying very different positions in the socio-political space of 
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Lebanon.  Thus archivists, who are economically disadvantaged in relation to judges and 
lawyers, give favors knowing that they will, at some point, be paid back in kind. In addition, 
these favors also ensure the continuation of inter-sectarian and interclass exchange in a country 
where ordinary citizens are convinced their politicians are leading them to a sectarian war. At 
times of war, such exchanges and relations can ensure the safety of one's loved ones.  Discourses 
on corruption flatten these complexities and bring everyone under the “official” and international 
monetary economy. These discourses also comment on the correct way to be a citizen and a 
“productive” member of society, many of which have been circulated for decades in Lebanon by 
actors such as USAID, UNICEF, and other international funding/policy groups: a citizen who 
cannot be bought.lxxxiii  
Many da‘wa secularists believe that sectarianism breeds political and economic 
corruption and economic stagnation, and not, as several Lebanon scholars have suggested, the 
other way around.lxxxiv Da‘wa secularists framed the relationship between sectarianism and 
corruption with the trope of the chicken and egg. For these activists, citizens who have enough 
dignity can and should end these practices. During the 2009 parliamentary elections, the 
Lebanese press regularly reported on political parties and citizens buying and selling votes. 
Citizens who live abroad were bought plane tickets in order to ensure that they could vote and 
citizen-residents were allegedly paid up to three thousand dollars for a “family vote.”lxxxv In a 
country where thirty percent of the population lives below the official poverty line, these 
amounts are extremely significant.lxxxvi  Still, a da‘wa secularist repeated a common theme when 
she told me that people would not sell their vote if they had karama, or dignity. Two years later, 
she emailed me and emphasized that the secular movement would bring dignity back to 
Lebanese citizens, echoing a refrain that had become popular in Egypt and Tunisia during the 
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uprisings of 2011.lxxxvii  
 The relationship between politicians/factions and the state/state institutions is more 
complicated than an easy categorization of corrupt and backward practices. In fact one could 
understand established politicians and factions to be locked in a parasitic relationship with the 
state and its institutions. To put it simply, as the state grows weaker, the political channels 
become stronger and provide economic assistance, usually delivered on a sectarian basis. This 
relationship cuts both ways: the stronger non-state institutions and patronage networks grow, the 
weaker the state becomes. Politicians and political parties often are at the heads of these extra-
state patronage networks. As Michael Johnson has suggested, the less able the state is to provide 
a modicum of social services and protection to its citizens, the stronger the networks of 
patronage, clientelism, and corruption become–each carefully maintained by parties across the 
political spectrum in Lebanon.lxxxviii  For da‘wa secularists, the potential danger citizens pose to 
each other is always read as sectarian, while markers and alliances of socioeconomic class, so 
visible and prevalent in laboratories of quotidian life (such as at the judiciary), are not considered 
factors of possible violence or danger. This selective reading of the dangers Lebanese citizens 
could pose to one another is not surprising, given that the historical archive itself emphasizes 
sectarian narratives of violence above all other factors. There is an arrested history of the class 
and economic dynamics of both the 1958 and 1975 civil wars, to say nothing of the political 
economy of the periodic violence in nineteenth century Mount Lebanon.lxxxix  
Immersed in and speaking from a sectarian discourse about violence in Lebanon, da‘wa 
secularists repeat many of its tropes: people are sectarian until proven otherwise, past and future 
wars are reducible to and incited by sectarianism, political sectarianism cannot be abruptly ended 
because popular sectarianism would ensure the majority’s tyranny at the expense of Christians 
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and other minorities, and in order to combat sectarianism the state must become stronger. Such 
claims recycle the ideology of the Lebanese state, which asserts that it is, alone, the structure that 
can reform citizens away from sectarianism and towards nationalism.  In addition, this discourse 
naturalizes sectarianism rather than understanding Lebanese citizenship as constituted at, and 
through, the quilting point between sex, sect, and class.xc The interplay of these three forces is 
evident in the case that opens this chapter, a case that also suggests that there may be 
indeterminacy in the official history of sectarianism and the system that it legitimates, political 
sectarianism.  
After appealing to the Greek Orthodox Court of First Instance to save Jean’s dead 
mother's honor by certifying his legitimacy, the cousins, who had tried to litigate their 
inheritance claim at the Civil Court for Personal status, had no option but to engage the personal 
status courts. The panel of judges sitting on the Greek Orthodox Court of Appeals (and later, the 
judges at the Council) was presented with two sets of contradictory evidence. The siblings, Jean's 
supposed cousins, presented copies of the plaintiff’s state-issued identification, which 
documented all family information, recorded in the Lebanese census registry. This identification 
listed the woman as “single” and makes no mention of her having children. The siblings 
demonstrated that this information has remained consistent from 1932 (the year of the only 
official Lebanese census-conducted under the French mandate) to 1975, the year of her death. 
However, Jean had his own documents. He presented the court with photocopies of the 
information recorded in the first French mandate census of 1924, his 1940 Grand Liban-issued 
carte d'identité, and a certificate that proves that he was baptized in the Greek Orthodox Church 
in 1920. All three of these documents list him as the legitimate son of his mother (the woman 
who died in 1975) and father (of whom nothing is known). 
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Upon reviewing these documents the judges must contend with the discrepancy between 
state documents that state that the woman was single, and French Mandate and church 
documents, that list the woman as married and the mother of Jean. The cousins claimed that their 
documents proved that Jean, if indeed he was the son of their aunt, was an illegitimate son and 
thus could not inherit. They claimed that Jean was a bastard born of an unwed mother who had 
made mistakes in her youth. This claim inflamed Jean, who insisted throughout this court case 
that his main desire was to restore his mother's rightful honor. To explain their set of documents, 
Jean's lawyers stated that by 1932, Jean's mother and father were separated and living in different 
areas of Lebanon. When the census representatives came to her home, which she shared with her 
son, she saw an opportunity to get out of a bad marriage and thus told the mandate officials she 
was single. She saw this as a cheap way to leave her husband, and she did not have the money to 
lobby the Greek Orthodox Church for a divorce.  Jean, in accordance with the patriarchal 
bureaucratic system organized under French rule and still in place today, was listed only under 
his father's census entry. Thus the woman is alleged to have used the census, until now the only 
officially conducted survey in Lebanon, to begin a new life as an officially “single” woman.xci 
In their decision, the three Greek Orthodox judges wrote that in cases where official documents 
show a contradiction between information recorded in the 1932 census and information recorded 
prior to the 1932 census, the documents preceding 1932 should carry more legal weight. Because 
the 1932 census was conducted by way of an unverified question and answer methodology, it can 
be unreliable, the judges reasoned.  
 The plaintiff's lawyers point out, correctly, that Greek Orthodox personal status law 
demands that the godmother and godfather be identified by their full names on all baptism 
certificates and sets the age of marriage consent for girls at sixteen. However, the judges refuse 
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to allow present legal procedures to be applied to what was acceptable legally in the past, and 
suggest that because this case actually begins before the Lebanese state was independent and 
before the Lebanese Greek Orthodox personal status law was used, what was acceptable legally 
“then” should be considered evidence “now.” Thus they reject the plaintiff's claims that the birth 
certificate should be nullified because on the document the Godmother is listed only as “Umm 
Youssef” (the mother of Youssef) and because it is unclear how old the mother was when she 
had her son and thus, at what age she was married. In a somewhat odd sideline, the judges also 
write, “everyone knows” that the age of puberty for girls in Lebanon is eleven and in “hotter 
countries,” it can be as low as eight. They thus rule that Jean is his mother and father's son, who 
were married at the time of his birth. Because his lineage through his mother has been legally 
certified, Jean's inheritance claim will hold up in civil court. Undeterred, the cousins turn to the 
Council.  
 The Council judges stated that the 1924 French mandate census is more credible because 
both parents certified that Jean was their son. In addition, the Greek Orthodox baptismal record 
demonstrates third party certification of Jean's lineage (that of the priest), and such documents 
have been accepted as “legal proof since 1876, when the Ottomans recognized the work of the 
Greek Orthodox court.”xcii Thus, the Council judges ruled that the set of evidence that proves 
Jean is the legitimate son of the woman in question is more legally persuasive than the set of 
evidence that is taken from the Lebanese state archives. They respond to the absence of a 
marriage certificate by saying that “just because a marriage is not recorded [found] in the state 
registry, does not mean it did not take place.” In addition, they claim that since the state registry 
did not exist in 1922 or in 1924 (because, they say pointedly, the Lebanese state did not 
officially exist), the Church archive is the correct repository of evidence concerning this case.  
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Because of this final appeal, years later I stood with the woman who had sent weekly 
plates of food to my sickly aunt. Squinting in the weak light of the archive room, provided by a 
disposable lighter, Mona handed over Jean's file after brushing off a layer of dust. In this 
ethnographic space, one is assaulted by unexpected facts, citations, and stories. Anne Stoler 
writes, “The ethnographic space of the archive resides in the disjuncture between prescription 
and practice, between state mandates and the maneuvers people made in response to them, 
between rules and how people actually lived their lives.”xciii In those battered pages, we read that 
a woman used the French mandate census in 1932 as a vehicle to escape a bad marriage while 
avoiding a costly divorce. We find the Lebanese state claiming that the census upon which it was 
built is less legally persuasive than Church archives due to a flaw in methodology. We read new 
descriptions for the action of census taking and the ways citizens used the technology of the 
census for their own purposes.  In this room without a light bulb, one finds evidence of absences 
in the historical record, absences whose contours are visible, as in Jean's case file, but not filled 
in.xciv  
Legal Memories 
 In 2009, the Ministry of Justice received a grant from USAID to modernize Lebanese 
court archives by digitizing files, substituting handwriting for type, and standardizing the filing 
and retrieval system.  A following report notes that “the clerks are resistant to change” because 
they would lose part of their income if the archival process became streamlined. In fact, during 
an interview with Lilliane, the chief archivist of the Court of Cassation, she confirmed that her 
employees had sabotaged her reform efforts.xcv They assumed they would be fired, a belief she 
assured would not be true for those who could change. During one of our meetings, Lilliane 
showed me a file from the 1950s that she said had been lost for years and had been assumed 
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disappeared.  It was found by accident, she said; such a loss would never have happened had the 
file been archived according to modern and USAID mandated procedures. Thus the imagined 
smell of a twenty-five year old burn must be replaced by an image of the burned page accessible 
through a click of the mouse. And it will have electronic traces, of who accessed it and when. 
Now there will be a record of readers, not only writers. The possibility of loss, of losing this or 
that file, is assumed to disappear. In this way, the files will no longer be “archival texts”—that 
can only be comprehended by acts of active and ethnographic reading—in Brinkley Messick's 
terms.xcvi They will become library texts that can be removed from their immediate physical 
context and still be comprehensible to readers who are rendered more passive. Moreover, these 
changes will have an effect on jurisprudence itself; which, at times, currently requires acts of 
collective memory and sensitivity to life's contingencies and reversals to be experienced 
emotively and collectively, rather than electronically.   
Cases adjudicated during the Lebanese civil war, for example, contain lawyers' briefs that 
directly impress on judges, archivists, and researchers the shared reality of terrifying violence. 
Reading them, one is also struck by the absurdity of life, and law, continuing during a war where 
an estimated one in eight Lebanese residents were killed or injured. By referencing the war to 
judges, who were also living and working, through it, there is another appeal: We are all in this 
together. “My client could not come to the courthouse because there was a militia checkpoint at 
the mouth of the road.” “This Christian personal status ruling must be nullified because it begins 
with ‘In the name of God almighty’ rather than ‘In the name of the Lebanese people’—which is 
a threat to the state's sovereignty and public order.” “This man has perverted Christianity and 
Islam and turned them against each other through his manipulations of religious conversion—a 
danger to the spirit of Ta’if.” As Charles Hirshkind writes, these statements are a “performance 
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that links the sensory sedimentations of the past to the horizon of present actions . . . [that] 
moves us away from a mentalist understanding that locates experience in a silent interior toward 
one that places it in a body practically engaged with the world.”xcvii Here, the body is that which 
has experienced war –and appeals to the judges that cite the war are based on the affective 
registers of those shared experiences and on a shared practical knowledge that comes with living 
during and through wars. The files that contain these appeals, moreover, are all in this burned 
and shelled room, rendering the archive an artifact, or even a museum, of war.  
 The process of digitization and modernization will transform the archivists themselves 
from actors involved in producing and embodying the archive of Lebanese jurisprudence, into 
clerks whose job is to type, file, and retrieve court files and records. They will transform from 
archivists—whose handwriting, legal advice, and memories cannot be disambiguated from court 
files—into clerks who adhere to international standards of training and professionalism.  Their 
job description will be clear, their hours and tasks regimented, and they will be easily fired, 
hired, and replaced.  As James Ferguson has suggested, international standards of “development” 
in the third and postcolonial worlds not only revamp institutions and processes, but also 
subjectivities, modes of thought and action, and ways of inhabiting and being positioned within 
the world.xcviii  
The transition from “archivist” to “clerk,” I suggest, must be understood as one aspect of 
re-imagining the benefits of a society that is based on individuals autonomously tied (only) to the 
Lebanese state. Da‘wa secularists find aspects of these reforms attractive because they believe 
them to promote meritocracy. Indeed, for many of these activists, the state of the archives, and 
the corruption of the archivists and the judiciary, are shameful and must be changed. “They have 
too much power,” Basil, a corporate lawyer and leader of a leading activist group and NGO 
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called the Civil Society Movement, once said to me. “Her job,” he said in a hypothetical 
reference to Mona, “is to bring me the file I ask for. That's it. The judiciary is rotten. The papers, 
the people, the process. It’s all rotten.” In a different conversation, Basil jokingly asked me about 
my research budget, wondering how I could afford to conduct archival research at the courthouse 
measuring the time of my fieldwork through the accumulation of bribes.xcix  
 In 1992 a group of siblings presented a case to the Council of Public Order. In his brief, 
their lawyer wrote that his clients are the heirs of a man whose case was presented to the Council 
in 1982 and decided on in 1985. Their father had won his case, which concerned ownership of 
the land upon which a beach resort rests. The case file consisted of the legally binding ruling, 
arguments by both the plaintiff and the defendants, evidence presented to the court, and copies of 
every step of this case as it was heard and ruled on, at two different civil and personal status 
courts, before being appealed at the Council. Because the case file was lost and, the lawyer 
states, the archivists have been unable to find either its remnants or the ledger that indexes its 
presence, he asks the court to certify a photocopy of the decision, held by the siblings, as a 
legally binding copy of the original. He suggests that the “burning of the file” in the “fire that 
struck the archive” (note the passive tense) has made it incumbent to treat the copy as the 
original, which should be certified and re-archived. To reach a decision, the judges analyzed 
handwriting, questioned archivists, and both separately and collectively remembered the case 
and the search for fire-eaten remnants of files and ledgers. They also remembered the judges 
presiding and the archivists employed at the time, and even what their writing quirks were in 
order to decide whether the siblings’ copy was an un-tampered copy of the original which, they 
write, was “lost among with many others” in the fire of 1985.c 
  Engseng Ho has named texts that require study of the circumstances under which they 
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were written in order to be understandable or comprehensible—creole texts. Such texts, he 
suggests, incorporated a “real world blending of history, geography, and biography as people 
lived it.”ci In the context of Lebanon's legal archive, we must not only attend to the 
“circumstances under which [the files] were written,” but also to the people, the history, the 
institutions, the salaries of judiciary employees, the acts of reading, and the sharp awareness that 
an archival file could be lost or destroyed, be culled from the shelves and reintroduced into court 
proceedings as “evidence,” or be subjected to a trespass reading of a researcher or an enterprising 
publisher looking for the most “interesting” cases to include in books of collected judgments. We 
must attend to these registers because together they allow us to think about how a collection of 
case files becomes an archive-and what kind of archive the collection may become.  
Reading the above case file closely, it is thick with historical narratives. It is the history 
of a family, of a beach resort, and of careers made and retired at the judiciary. In this case file 
one can even read the history of Mona's employment and that of her predecessor, as the 
photocopy of the original file carries the signature of a different archivist, but the pages that 
certify the copy as the original are marked with Mona's distinctive two letter imprint. Along with 
Jean's case, the pages also tell the story of wartime economies, devaluation, and inflation. With 
each passing year, the number of stamps necessary to pay various fees increases exponentially. 
Finally, in recognition of this inflation, new stamps denoting higher currencies are issued and 
used in the latter pages of the case file. Thinking with Derrida, throughout these files the 
researcher also encounters the magistrate, licensing each page with the force of legal 
procedure.cii However, as Steedman reminds us, the magistrate is not always a mythical and 
transcendent figure. The magistrate is also sometimes irritable, arbitrary, or bored. Steedman 
urges us to approach archives with a sense of cynicism and humor, an arched eyebrow, to 
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understand that we will never find what we are actually looking for. Moreover, the record that is 
left by legal procedure is always necessarily incomplete; we encounter stories at the middle and 
before they end, and when we read a story such as Jean's, we are encountering a forced narration 
of the self.ciii The force that compels one to narrate according to formal procedures and within 
particular expert discourses is the force of the state.  In a case file, we read the ultimate authority 
of the state as that which can license truth statements and give a document, a photocopy in this 
case, the force of law.civ In certifying a copy as the original, the Lebanese state performs its 
sovereignty and scripts its own history of civil war as a history of legal procedure and the 
continuation of professional life at the judiciary. 
Describing War 
 To understand war in Lebanon, one has to pluralize both the wars themselves and the 
actors involved in them. In Lebanon, Lebanese nationalists (allied to the United States) and Arab 
nationalists (allied to Egypt) have fought a civil war. Arab nationalists allied to Syria have also 
fought against Arab nationalists allied to Iraq. Protectors of the political and economic status quo 
and supporters of Palestinian liberation who wanted to change Lebanon's sectarian and capitalist 
system have also fought a civil war. Indeed, the infamous “war of the camps” pitted two Shi’a 
militias against one another—with the Palestinian residents of the camps the main victims. Yet, 
despite these complex and rapidly shifting alliances and counter-alliances, the popular 
imagination and memory of these wars, reduces and simplifies them to Christians versus 
Muslims. In a slightly more critical register of collective Lebanese memory, some understand the 
civil wars as taking place between Maronite-led militias allied to the United States and to Israel; 
and secular and Islamist parties allied to Arab states, the Soviet Union, and Iran. This is the 
dominant description of the Lebanese civil war of 1975, but the wars themselves are a tangle of 
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intersecting and diverging descriptions. Some histories of the war, such as the sexual violence 
that made life for Lebanese women “hell”—in the curt words of an informant—will never be 
told.  
In Rewriting the Soul, Ian Hacking suggests that in order to study events that seem 
overburdened, or over signified with dominant discourses, we should be attentive to the multiple 
descriptions that any one act can fall under in order to study the conditions under which one of 
these descriptions will become hegemonic.cv One day while I was at the archives, Mona picked 
up a file (that I had not asked for) and remarked that it was a case of treason against a notorious 
Maronite militia leader. This leader, an ally of the United States and Israel during the civil war, 
was responsible for several massacres of Palestinian refugees, the most gruesome of which 
occurred streets away from where both Mona and I were living at the time. She asked me if I 
wanted to see it and threw it onto the dusty floor. Thinking that she was testing my 
professionalism, I told her I was only interested in the files I had actually requested.  
When I was back in New York, I struggled to find a way to explain what I saw as the 
density of this action.  There are several ways to describe Mona's throwing the case file of the 
warlord-turned-politician at my feet, all of which are accurate. For example: Mona threw X's 
case file at Maya's feet; or, Mona threw X's file at Maya's feet as a statement of disrespect and 
dislike. Or perhaps, Mona threw X's file because X had mercilessly shelled their neighborhood 
and had committed an infamous wartime massacre in the refugee camp that borders, and that 
enjoys a symbiotic relationship with, their neighborhood—and this neighborhood is “Sunni,” 
“pro-Palestinian,” “Arab nationalist,” and “working class.” Or, finally, Mona demonstrated her 
unprofessionalism by throwing a file that is supposed to be confidential at Maya's feet. All of 
these explanations describe the same act—the throwing of an archival file belonging to X at a 
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researcher's feet. But some descriptions are in fact statements, and the discourse that licenses 
these statements anticipates the act of throwing a file and reads it as acting under the twinned 
signs of corruption (hers) and sectarianism (all of ours). Moreover, these statements reach back 
into the past to place previous unrelated action, and memory, under their signs—a process that 
Ian Hacking calls “semantic contagion.”cvi Thus the Lebanese civil war of 1958 is often read 
under the signs of sectarianism and clientelism, though it was fought also under the signs of Cold 
War alliances and anticolonial nationalisms.cvii Finally, if we zoom out still further, we see that 
Mona is throwing the file during a “war on terror” that divides the Lebanese population into 
radicals and moderates, secularists and fundamentalists, and perhaps most dangerously, Sunnis 
and Shi‘a. In fact, at this moment when Mona is throwing the file, Sunni political leaders are 
now allied with X against what is seen as the larger threat of Shi‘a power. New questions 
become possible. Who is Mona's disgust directed towards at this moment, X or Sunni political 
leaders who have gotten into bed with him? There is indeterminacy to Mona's action, which the 
twinned discourses of sectarianism and corruption try to fix. Once fixed, Mona's action only can 
be understood as evidence that together we are sectarian towards our common Sunni sect and 
that together we are performing the corruption in state institutions that this sectarianism fosters.  
 For French imperialists, the division of Lebanon's Muslims into legally separate “sects” 
that formed the basis of different political communities ensured that their historic ally, Maronite 
Christians, could claim that it was Lebanon's largest sect and thus the country’s most legitimate 
political community. As Rania Maktabi has argued, the census of 1932 was central to this 
project.cviii The census delineated “Sunni,” “Shi‘a,” and “Druze” as separate sects, a delineation 
that would later serve as the basis upon which Druze and Shi’a leaders lobbied for “their own” 
personal status laws.cix  The census of 1932 is infamous for its many omissions,cx yet it remains 
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the official basis upon which the system of political sectarianism is legitimated. But we have 
seen that the 1932 census was also used as a strategy to maneuver around state mandates 
concerning marriage, kinship, and patriarchy in addition to the economic realities of divorce in 
an interwar society. We have seen the country's highest civil court deem the 1932 census less 
legally persuasive due to faults in its methodology, a critique that opens a space from which to 
question not only its omissions of the census, but the very rules and slippages upon which 
information was solicited and given. 
 Today, secular activists want to create their own secular personal status law to be 
considered sovereign in their own secular courts.  They use rhetoric that would be familiar to 
residents of Western multicultural states, and engage in what Wendy Brown critiques as a 
discourse of injury in American LGBTQ and feminist movements. Moreover, this mode of 
politics is generative. Under the Ottoman Empire, the area that was to become Lebanon had four 
operational family laws: Hanafi Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Catholic, and Jewish. Today there 
are fifteen Lebanese personal status laws (the highest number in the world, with Israel and India 
following); eleven Christian, four Muslim, and one Jewish.  Secular activists are aware that once 
they achieve their goal of codifying a secular personal status law, their efforts may lead to the 
creation of Lebanon's nineteenth and secular sect and Lebanon’s sixteenth personal status law. 
But they believe that because this secular personal status law will ensure the equal rights of men 
and women and because civil personal status courts will be less prone to corruption than their 
religious counterparts, more and more Lebanese citizens will “choose” its jurisdiction. They 
envision the community they are building to be without a beginning and without an end. This 
community will create new and more expansive forms of collective memory and belonging. It 
will be a sect that will eventually end sectarianism. When citizens are conterminous with the 
  77 
newly reformed, de-corrupted and strong state, and when that state has complete and sole 
jurisdiction over all aspects of life—Lebanese people will finally be safe.  Mona and her friends 
will not have to rely on informal networks of exchange in order to collect and horde favors for a 
rainy day. Sectarian citizens will become national citizens. Mona will no longer “have” to 
convert in order to save her daughter's inheritance because there will be an alternative, secular 
personal status law that ensures equity between men and women. The judiciary will be 
professional, strong, and able to enforce Lebanese law equally and impartially. We will be able 
to transcend our (always and only sectarian) differences. We will have peace. Behind all of this 
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Chapter Two 
Sex and Sectarianism: The Legal Architecture of Lebanese Citizenship 
 
 
 On June 24, 1988 a Lebanese Catholic Melkite man and a Sunni Muslim Lebanese 
woman were married in the Melkite Catholic Church. They registered their marriage with the 
civil authorities, Dar al-Nufus. Six days later, the same couple received a marriage certificate 
from Dar al-Fatwa, the institution that oversees the Sunni Muslim personal status courts in 
Lebanon and is the seat of the Mufti of the Republic. In order to do so, the man had to receive a 
certificate of conversion from Dar al-Fatwa, a process the Sunni woman did not have to undergo 
because the couple received special permission from the presiding Melkite priest to have a 
“mixed marriage.” The couple did not register the man’s conversion to Islam or the Muslim 
marriage and they remained, in the eyes of the state, a Sunni Muslim woman married to a 
Melkite Catholic man under Melkite law. According to court documents filed by lawyers for 
both the wife and the husband in 2006, for many years the couple was in “crazy love.” But then 
something happened. On May 7, 2003 the wife filed for an annulment with the Catholic Melkite 
Church, asking for both child support and custody of the couple’s minor children. She claimed 
that the husband had been neglecting his sexual and financial duties towards her and that he had 
also neglected his children. However, the grounds on which she sought annulment were that she, 
as a practicing Sunni Muslim woman, did not believe in the sanctity of marriage and had always 
believed in the right to divorce, a belief evidenced by the fact that she insisted on the right to 
initiate divorce in the unregistered Muslim marriage contract. She submitted sworn affidavits 
from her parents, siblings, and friends attesting to the fact that she always believed that Islam 
was a more just religion due to the ability of Muslims to divorce their spouses. She had never 
been baptized, and because she thought that marriage was not an irrevocable holy contract but 
rather a breakable civil one, her lawyers argued that the Catholic Church should annul her 
marriage. This situation put the court in a quandary. The children were legally Melkite Catholics, 
yet a self-professed practicing Muslim was asking for custody and claiming that their Melkite 
Catholic father was an unfit parent. The husband argued that he should not be required to pay 
alimony because the woman was seeking an annulment and because he was “surprised” to 
discover that she did not believe in the sacrament of marriage. At this stage, he did not request 
custody over his children.   
On June 26, 2003, the husband began a legal case in the Sunni personal status court, 
before the Melkite Catholic Church issued a verdict. He demanded that his wife return to the 
marital home and fulfill her marital duties due to him as a Muslim husband, a first step in legally 
ascertaining that she has broken the marriage contract and thus, in the event of a divorce, should 
not receive any of the stipulations agreed upon at the time of marriage.  On December 7, 2004, 
the Melkite Catholic Court of First Instance granted the Muslim Sunni woman an annulment, 
custody over her minor Melkite children, and required the husband to pay for all legal expenses, 
child support, and for the children’s medical and school expenses.  
On February 11, 2005 the husband registered his 1988 conversion to Islam with the state. 
He obtained a certified document from Dar al-Fatwa claiming that both he and his children had 
been Sunni Muslims since 1988, as minor children are automatically converted with their fathers 
according to Lebanese law. Two months later, the Sunni personal status court granted him a 
divorce and custody over his minor children. The wife and her lawyer returned to the Melkite 
Court of Appeals to certify the first verdict. This time, the husband and his lawyers claimed in 
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legal briefs to the court that his wife “tricked him” into converting, that she refused to raise their 
children as Christians, that she forced the children to fast during Ramadan, and that she schemed 
to make him leave Lebanon to find work so that she could be with her boyfriend. He also 
claimed that she enjoyed oriental dancing in public, taught oriental dance lessons, and had also 
taught his daughters despite his protestations. Throughout these legal briefs, the fact that he had 
already begun legal proceedings at the Sunni courts and had already been granted a divorce was 
unmentioned. The wife submitted evidence, in the form of the family’s census IDs, that he and 
his children only became Muslims in February of 2005—after she had initiated her claim for 
annulment.  The Melkite Catholic Court of Appeals certified the verdict issued by the Court of 
First Instance and again granted the wife an annulment, custody, and child support.  At this point 
the man and the woman were each awarded a favorable verdict from a different court.  
To arbitrate this case, both appealed to the Council. In their arguments to the court, each 
claims that “their courts” have jurisdiction over all legal issues pertaining to their marriage 
contract. The man argued that because they are both (now) Sunni Muslims the Sunni personal 
status court has jurisdiction. The woman argued that because they were married under Catholic 
Melkite law and because the man only “officially” converted to Islam after court proceedings 
had already begun, the jurisdiction remains with the Church.cxi 
In this chapter I move through three ethnographic and archival examples of citizens who 
have changed an aspect of their civil status. Converts who have changed their religion and sect in 
the civil registry and thus legally placed under the jurisdiction of a different personal status law; 
citizens who have sued the state in order to change the sex they were assigned at birth—a change 
which is articulated through the different civil, criminal, personal status, and procedural rights 
and duties assigned to male and female citizens; and secular activists who have removed their 
sect from government registries (shatb), a removal which resulted in legal procedures that have 
reconfigured the relationship between citizens, religious institutions, and the state. These 
examples illustrate the ways in which citizenship, sovereignty, and secularism are articulated 
through the production and regulation of both sexed and sectarian difference. I call for the 
categories of personal status and “sect” to be critically re-interrogated and suggest the categories 
of sex and gender are foundational to Lebanese citizenship. I further suggest that the complex 
intersections and impasses between the legal and social registers of personal status, sect, sex, and 
gender allow us to view citizenship not as an abstract ideal, but rather as a reiterative category of 
practice and a site produced through governmental and disciplinary practices that foreground, in 
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the case of Lebanon, sexual and sectarian difference. With Lisa Wedeen, I argue that these 
highly bureaucratized and formalized practices are productive, not merely reflective, of 
nationalism and of state sovereignty.cxii Thus while religious conversion, legal transformations in 
sex, and the removal of personal status may be sites of my research and analysis, it is the 
Lebanese state and the ways in which citizenship is produced and regulated in Lebanon that I am 
mapping and interrogating. What is being performed when a citizen's personal status is different 
from the sect to which they (and others) feel they belong? What are the levels of complexity in 
citizenship that become visible when a transsexual citizen seeks recognition from the state as 
having been "misrecognized" as a certain sex? The need to focus on the productive forces of law 
and on citizenship as a category of (not always coherent of aligned) practices is highlighted in an 
analysis of law because it is here that two categories of citizenship, the sexed and the sectarian, 
are intertwined most visibly. 
Personal Status / Sect 
There are four million citizens in Lebanon; eighteen officially recognized religious sects 
and fifteen corresponding personal status laws. These personal status laws are applied in separate 
personal status courts and have jurisdiction over areas such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and 
adoption: they determine, regulate, and legislate blood based kinship regimes in Lebanon. Four 
of the most salient categories in these laws are “man”, “woman,”cxiii “adult” and “minor.” The 
Lebanese legal system itself is a hybrid of common law and jurisprudential law practices. It is 
based on and inspired by the French legal system and as such follows a civil law system (code 
civil) composed of legal codes. The French mandate’s “Code of Obligations and Contracts” is 
the equivalent of the French Civil Code except for matters related to personal status, which are 
governed by a separate set of laws designed for the different sectarian communities. The law that 
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set into place the personal status system and organizes it was also promulgated under the French 
mandate,cxiv a law that dictated the procedures for sectarian communities appeal to the state for 
recognition of their personal status.cxv  
The divergences between personal status (madhhab) and sect (ta’ifa) are vital to 
understanding the sociopolitical realities of Lebanon and the myriad ways that citizens practice 
them, sometimes to subversive ends. While Suad Joseph has convincingly illustrated the tension 
between the sociopolitical realities of “sect” and “religion” in Lebanon,cxviI am further clarifying 
these categories by introducing personal status as a third form of identification and recognition 
that, although distinct, is often collapsed with/in sect. The Lebanese state uses personal status to 
denote which sect applies to each citizen—whether Muslim, Christian or Jewish—and not in the 
conventional understanding of the word, which refers to schools of Islamic jurisprudence. One of 
the three official identity cards in Lebanon displays this information, where under the category of 
“personal status” Muslim Shi‘i or Chaldean Christian, for example, will be listed.cxvii This is not 
because the state views personal status and sect as one and the same, but rather, because the state 
only recognizes one official personal status per sect. Sects that do not have their “own” 
recognized personal status and its attendant legal/bureaucratic apparatus follow that of the sect 
closest to them, such as the case of the ‘Alawi sect that follows the Ja‘fari (Shi`i) code of 
procedures in Lebanon. The practice of “ conversion” occurs at (and plays on) the jagged line of 
disambiguation between sect and personal status. 
 Religious conversion always engenders movement between personal status laws, but it 
does not always engender movement between sects or between religions. This is because “sect” 
is a larger and thicker category than personal status. It incorporates shared historical narratives, 
shared religious beliefs and practices, and for many, shared political aspirations and anxieties. In 
  82 
the logic of the Lebanese state, a sect is both a historical (oriented towards a common past) and a 
political (oriented to towards a common future) community.cxviii A citizen is recognized as 
belonging to a particular sect according to a much wider set of criteria than that of personal 
status. Lebanese history is littered with examples of “conversion” among the political and 
economic elite; from Emir Bashircxix, to most recently, Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader who 
converted to Sunni Islam in order to marry a Sunni Lebanese woman.cxx These examples 
illustrate what is often neglected in Lebanese historiography or political science: the state’s 
recognition of a citizen’s sectarian affiliation (through her personal status) may not be the same 
as (1) what that citizen identifies herself as; or (2) what society recognizes her as; or (3) what 
political party she votes for or leads. Further, neither sect nor personal status necessarily reflects 
one’s religious beliefs and practices. A citizen who converts in order to obtain a divorce may be 
an atheist who is recognized by the government as following the Greek Orthodox personal status 
but is socially recognized as a member of the Maronite community.cxxi Likewise, if a citizen 
chooses not to identify with her sect, she will still be sociopolitically and legally recognized by 
state institutions as, for example, a “Druze” woman, because personal status and sex are the 
technologies of recognition which the Lebanese census and the state follow. Despite her personal 
identifications and protestations, these technologies of social recognition that rely on markers 
such as family name or regional origin will place her within a particular community. In fact, 
markers such as family names are semiotically hard in that they contain and express meaning 
that may, in the case of converts, be technically outdated.cxxii 
Sect, Gender, Citizen 
In much scholarship on Lebanon the personal status system it is often portrayed as a 
primordial roadblock on the path to "true", "modern" citizenship.cxxiii  The notion of temporality 
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that undergirds such a discourse is the time of “progress” from the sect to the citizen, from a 
sectarian identity to a national one. It represents what Partha Chatterjee has called the ethical 
norm implicit in a theory of nationalism,cxxiv  that there should be progress to a unified, 
homogenized notion of national space and time. In this mode, the Lebanese personal status 
system is seen as something to be overcome on the path to modernity. When the personal status 
system is studied, it is often to explain why a unified nation-state does not (yet) exist in Lebanon. 
Many self-termed secular activists believe that the personal status system in Lebanon can simply 
be lobbed off of the legal skeleton of the state. Many believe that this legal amputation will allow 
Lebanon to finally become a “truly” secular state. Their hope is that citizens will shift their 
allegiances from their sects to the nation once they are under the sole jurisdiction of secular state 
institutions. Eventually, they suggest, Lebanese citizens will develop a positive affective 
relationship to the state and to each other, which will allow them to finally live in peace. A 
shared and hegemonic secular legal system will enable these bonds to develop.  
Despite the vital roles that personal status and civil law play in the production of “the 
citizen,” in much secular activist discourse women and men are seen as “oppressed” or 
“privileged” under particular personal status regimes, mirroring to a certain extent academic 
literatures on gender and personal status.cxxv Rarely is it noted that in fact, the juridical bodies of 
“male” and “female” citizens do not exist prior to the legal recognition of sex and the gendered 
laws that are operationalized and performed according to that legal recognition.cxxvi  Female 
citizens are legally constituted as a particular constellation and practice of rights and duties, just 
as are male citizens.cxxvii The state and its attendant medico-legal complex determine biological 
sex, a recognition that determines which gendered laws will structure that citizen’s life. 
Jacqueline Stevens reminds us that “laws bring about gendered forms of being” and that “gender 
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is what occurs though very specific rules a political society develops as it reproduces itself.cxxviii  
The state regulates this intersection between rights, gender and kinship through the simultaneous 
application of civil and personal status law and through civil institutions that both regulate and 
provide oversight to these two legal systems.  Both produced and refracted through this legal 
regime, citizens are tied to their own individual identity as well as to larger, totalizing categories 
of identification and practice such as "sex," "sect" or the "citizenry." The interstitial nature of 
personal status and civil laws makes possible one of the main functions of the nation state; to 
produce a body of people that, although differentiated by sex and sect, are unified under the 
overarching category of Lebanese citizenship. 
The legal scaffolding of gender and sect becomes clear when examining the cases of 
transsexual citizens who have succeeded in “correcting” their sex in the government registry, and 
that of citizens who have converted between sects and/or religions. Citizens who convert from 
Sunni Islam to Roman Catholicism are in fact moving between personal status laws and between 
the differently constituted categories of “female” or “male” in each of these laws. Critically, this 
movement is only possible because all personal status laws fall within the embrace of the 
Lebanese state, which guarantees and protects the rights of its citizens to convert based on the 
constitutional principles of the freedom of religion and the freedom of thought. Citizens who 
change their sex in the census registry do not move between different personal status laws, but 
they do move between the differently constituted categories of “male” and “female” within 
personal status, civil, and criminal law. However, there are different stakes involved in 
correcting your sex or changing your religion or sect. By far, religious conversion is easier to 
practice. Conversion is considered part of the freedom of religion, and is thus a right of the 
citizen and primarily a bureaucratic practice.  The correction of sex, however, is primarily a legal 
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process; the plaintiff must sue the state in order to prove that the state made a mistake in its 
initial assignation of sex. 
Similar to the case of sex and gender, the juridical body of a sectarian-citizen does not 
exist prior to the legal recognition of sect by the state and the application of the personal status 
and civil laws that follow that initial recognition. The sectarian-citizen, moreover, is not (only) 
an abstract theoretical metonym that was constituted at particular historical moments when 
Orientalist, modernist, and colonial discourses met. cxxix  Rather, the sectarian citizen is a 
contemporary political, legal, and social category of everyday practice. The sectarian citizen 
does not precede the advent of the independent Lebanese state and its system of political 
sectarianism. Rather, the sectarian citizen is reproduced daily through interactions with the 
Lebanese state, its bureaucratic and legal appendages, and through various technologies and 
registers of recognition. In the same vein, the gendered citizen is not a coherent, trans-historical 
category of practice that can be attributed to a stable discourse of patriarchy, Islam, colonialism, 
or modernity. Rather, the gendered Lebanese citizen and the various institutions of the Lebanese 
state are mutually reinforcing arenas of recognition, identification, practice, and negotiation. 
Studies that take the "Lebanese citizenry" as their object of study most often are studying "male" 
practices of citizenship and positing them as the national, gender neutral category. A study of 
how citizens practice their legal rights and duties must take into account gendered and sexual 
differentiation insofar as the majority of these rights and duties are differentiated according to the 
presumed sex and gender of the citizen, which do not always align consistently.   
The claim that laws only regulate these categories of citizenship, rather than play an 
active role in producing them, serves to stabilize and naturalize the disciplinary matrix behind 
the production of the sectarian-citizen (and thus political sectarianism) on the one hand, and the 
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production of  “male” and “female” citizens on the other. Once naturalized, citizens may turn to 
the state for protection from the abuses of both sectarian and gender-based discrimination, rather 
than recognizing the state as invested in producing and maintaining these categories of 
difference. The naturalization of sectarianism often assumes that sectarianism is a stable thing 
and that there are no gaps between one’s experience of sect, the personal status that applies to 
one’s experience, one’s practice of religion and one’s political affiliations. With these four 
categories thus amalgamated, sectarianism is assumed to saturate the sociopolitical landscape of 
the citizen. Such an assumption is problematic when it is not accompanied by a study of how 
citizens act within this system in order to subvert the sociopolitical landscape and, to put it 
crudely, make it work for them. It is only because personal status, sect, and religion were not 
coherent that the man recognized as the Sunni founding father of Lebanon could be, in fact, a 
Shi‘i according to government records. It is only because these categories were understood to be 
distinct that this fact would be widely known and yet have no effect on the public memory of 
former Prime Minister Riad al-Solh, who, the story goes, had no sons and thus “understandably 
converted,”cxxx a sentiment that highlights how conversion is often practiced to make use of 
gendered categories of law. 
Evidentiary Terrains of Sex and Personal Status 
In Lebanon, citizens have the right to change their biological sex. This right can be 
practiced if a citizen can prove to a court that there was a mistake in the categorization of their 
biological sex in government documents. Their ability to do so stems from a close (and rather 
subversive) reading of the 1932 mandate-era directive outlining the procedures governing the 
census and its employees. This directive allows citizens to correct “mistakes” in the census 
registry such as sex or family name through raising a court case against the state, the author of 
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the alleged clerical error. The procedures mentioned in this directive were subsequently repeated 
in post-independence laws that regulate the census registry—demonstrating the ambiguous 
relationship between colonial and postcolonial law. The legal article governing this procedure is 
in fact the same one that governs acts of conversion between religious communities, and 
changing one’s official residence. However, these other procedures, unlike changing one’s sex or 
name, do not require a court case and do not require the state’s admission that it has made a 
“mistake.” Conversion and the changing of one’s residence are acts that are considered the 
sovereign choice, desire and right of the citizen. However, a citizen cannot “choose” to change 
their sex—instead they can “correct” it. As a young female lawyer said to me one day while I 
was watching such a case unfold, “there is no changing your sex, there is only correcting your 
sex” in the law.cxxxi Further, the state allows family members to testify in support of or against 
the plaintiff seeking to change their sex during court proceedings. A number of transsexuals have 
been able to use this law in order to be re-categorized as “male” or female—demonstrating how 
laws are practiced in ways that exceed the intentions of lawmakers. Legal arguments presented to 
the court must prove that their recognized sex in the census registry is not the sex in which they 
live, and that therefore the two must be reconciled.  
When (and if) a citizen achieves recognition as a “miscategorized” male or female by the 
state, their biological sex is changed from “male” to “female” or vice versa in government 
records. Similar to how an act of conversion transforms the personal status law that applies to a 
citizen, this bureaucratic change in the recognition of bio-sex stimulates a transfer in the 
gendered legal category that a citizen occupies and performs.cxxxii Legally, a citizen is a “man” if 
all of the appropriately gendered aspects of the legal system apply to him. As such, the cases of 
transsexuals who have been able to change their sex in the census registry highlights the fact that 
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personal status is just one integral part of the legal production of the gendered citizen. If you are 
a biological female who is recognized by the state to be “male,” you gain the (civil) right to pass 
on your citizenship to your children and spouse and to physically force your wife to have sex at 
your discretion. If you are a Sunni or Shi’i man, you also gain the right to have more than one 
wife, and if you are a Catholic, you gain the right to ban your wife from the use of 
contraceptives. Despite the fact that it is possible to sue the government to change your sex in 
census records, it is not a common practice among transsexuals in Lebanon. This is due to the 
stigma associated with “outing” oneself as transsexual, the lawyers’ and doctors’ fees associated 
with mounting such a case, and the lack of general knowledge within transsexual communities 
concerning their legal position.  
Paying For Sex, Paying for Madhhab 
Both religious conversion and the “correcting” of sex are practices that often require 
monetary exchange from the citizen to the relevant institutions or individuals. In such situations, 
citizens pay the religious head who will issue the certificate of conversion into his religion just as 
they will pay the medical doctors and psychiatrists who will testify that their sex has been 
misrecognized and must thus be corrected in the census registry. While this exchange does not 
occur each time a citizen changes either their personal status or sex, it is a common practice 
according to the converts and the transsexuals whom I have interviewed.  In fact, monetary 
transactions are understood to be, by many, the grease on the wheels of religious conversion. As 
an informant said, “they [the religious heads] know that you need them, that you need to convert 
[to better your legal situation]. So they know that you will pay.”cxxxiii  Many of the lawyers and 
citizens that I interviewed over the course of two years posited the money making potential of 
the personal status system as the main reason why religious institutions are against the passage of 
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an optional civil marriage law.  
The payment of personal status judges, witnesses, secretaries, and other human parts of 
the legal system, occurs in many forms. It can consist of a bulk sum given to the court’s secretary 
in exchange for influencing a judge, the exchange of political, legal and economic favors 
between a powerful plaintiff and a sheikh or priest, or it can take the form of a large donation to 
the Assyrian or Greek Orthodox Church. In cases where transsexuals wish to correct their sex in 
the census records, a monetary exchange could occur between the plaintiff and an expert witness 
(such as a psychiatrist or a court appointed medical doctor) and/or between the plaintiff and the 
court bureaucrats who ensure that papers are filed properly and on time. In both civil and 
personal status courts, money is almost never exchanged between a judge and a plaintiff or 
defendant. Throughout this dissertation, I keep the possibility of economic exchange and benefit 
in mind as I read through cases of conversion. When relevant and based on ethnographic or 
archival evidence, I will demonstrate the role that the exchange of money plays in this practice. 
However, in examples of personal status change and, in this chapter, sex change drawn from 
court documents alone, I urge the reader to understand that the legal record is always incomplete, 
and must be understood as always containing the possibility of extra-legal (and thus unrecorded) 
mechanisms that were vital to the achieved verdict. Civil society, state and religious institutions 
have responded to the fact that citizens may be converting and/or correcting their sex in ways 
that are subversive by enacting measures that are meant to curb these practices. 
The case of Elie is illustrative of the interconnected nature of civil and personal status 
law.cxxxiv Elie is a female-to-male (FTM) pre-operative (pre-op) transsexual who recently won his 
case against the Lebanese government and has changed his sex to “male” in government census 
records. During an interview, Elie acknowledged that as a Catholic man he would be legally 
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obligated to financially care for his future wife and children, a prospect he finds daunting given 
his lack of a formal education. Prior to changing his sex in government records and beginning at 
the age of fourteen he had been working under the table in mechanics shops, restaurants, and as a 
laborer. He could not work “officially” because to do so he would have to present his employer 
with his identification papers that listed him as female. Given that he had been living as a man 
for years, using his identification papers was not an option (or he considered it a dangerous one). 
He could not continue his formal education for the same reasons. Now, after winning his court 
case and because his identification papers matched the life he had already been living, he felt that 
he could continue his education or enter the army or police without fear of being “discovered.” 
During our interview Elie also expressed joy at the prospect of being able to marry his future 
wife in the church where his brother is a priest. As a devout Maronite, he believes in the sanctity 
of marriage and hopes to have a family. Describing how his legal position has changed, Elie 
relayed the story of his FTM friend who, once recognized as a “man,” was able to marry his 
Australian girlfriend and transfer Lebanese citizenship to her. The marriage would have been 
impossible, Elie argued, if his friend had not been recognized as a male in the eyes of the state. 
His friend had not only gained the right to marry his female partner, he had also gained the right 
to pass on Lebanese citizenship to his wife and future children, a right denied to Lebanese 
females. Similarly, yet conversely, male-to-female transsexuals (or MTF’s) lose many rights 
associated with the male gender and gain others that are associated with the female gender if they 
win their legal case against the state to change their sex and thus become recognized as 
“females.”  
In a number of cases concerning transsexualscxxxv who successfully changed their sex in 
government registries, social recognition is cited as a terrain of evidence. Such evidence is 
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legally persuasive if it proves to locate a dissonance between one’s legal sex and what could be 
called one’s “social sex,” or often what is understood more broadly as one’s outward gender 
presentation. For example, judges have ruled that a situation where a plaintiff is registered as a 
“male” in the government census records but has had breast implants and is referred to by a 
female name in his social setting causes harm to the plaintiff, whose legal sex must be corrected 
in order to reflect his “social reality.” Likewise, in another case a judge cited the presence of 
facial and chest hair (the results of testosterone hormone therapy), same-sex desire (as 
understood in the eyes of the court, though opposite-sex desire in the eyes of the plaintiff), and 
the scars of “top surgery,” a surgical procedure where one’s breast are removed, as evidence that 
the plaintiff’s sex should be re-categorized from female to male. In the cases I reviewed, not all 
the plaintiffs had undergone sex change procedures. Some of the biological males who were 
recognized as females by Lebanese courts (or recognized as having been initially misrecognized 
by the state as males, as it were) had penises, and some of the bio-females who were recognized 
as males by the Lebanese courts had vaginas. In these cases, sex/gender re-assignment was a 
social, legal and bureaucratic procedure, not (only) a medical one.cxxxvi  
As the case of Elie demonstrates, Lebanese male and female citizens are differentiated in 
the same ways, in civil law and along parallel trajectories, according to their sex. However, the 
situation is more complex when it comes to personal status.  Here, while men and women are 
differentiated legally according to their sex; they are differentiated in each law pertaining to their 
sect also. As such, there are fifteen articulations of sex-based differentiated citizenship operating 
in Lebanon. For example, neither a Sunni Muslim woman nor a Maronite Christian woman can 
transfer their Lebanese citizenship to their foreign husbands or to their children, but the Sunni 
Muslim woman can file for divorce under Hanafi personal status, while a Maronite Christian 
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woman cannot under canon law. In fact, two of the most common patterns of “ conversion” are 
predicated on the legally differentiated categories of male and female (see Table One). Catholic 
men who convert to Islam so that they can remarry are doing so in order to utilize the rights 
given to Shi‘i and Sunni men. Similarly, men and women who convert from Sunni to Shi‘i are 
doing so because their female offspring will inherit more of their estate if they follow Shi’i 
personal status. As mentioned earlier, former prime ministers Riad al-Solh and Salim al-Hoss 
were converts. Both were by necessity Sunni Muslim, as mandated for the position by the system 
of political sectarianism, yet converted from Sunni to Shi‘a Islam, an act that neither jeopardized 
nor called into question their political eligibility. They did so in order to ensure that their 
daughters inherited as much as they could of their wealth. 
 






Legal Reason of Conversion 
Christian Catholic 
personal status, such as 
that of Greek Catholics 
or Maronites 
Christian Orthodox 
personal status, such as 
that of Greek Orthodox 
or Assyrian Orthodox 
A couple will convert to an Orthodox personal status in order to 
obtain a divorce, which is difficult if not impossible to obtain under 
canon law. Under Lebanese civil law, in order for the jurisdiction of 
a marriage contract to move to a different personal status both 
members of a couple must convert to the same personal status, 
whose law will then apply. 
Christian Catholic 
personal status, such as 
that of Greek Catholics 
or Maronites 
Hanafi personal status 
(Sunni) or Ja`fari 
personal status (Shi’a) 
Both members of a couple must convert in order for the jurisdiction 
of a marriage contract to move between personal status laws. If the 
wife refuses to convert, refuses to divorce and/or if the husband is 
acting without concern for his wife, a man from a Catholic personal 
status can convert to either the Shi’i or Sunni Islam because both 
Hanafi and Ja`fari personal status allow men to take up to four 
wives. In such cases, the first wife remains married under the 
original Catholic marriage contract.   
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Sunni Muslim (Hanafi) 
personal status  
Shi‘a Muslim (Ja‘fari 
personal status) 
There is a difference in the laws of inheritance between the Ja‘fari 
and Hanafi personal status. Sunnis who do not have a son will 
convert to Shi’a Islam in order to ensure that their wealth is 
inherited solely by their daughters and is not shared with male 
agnates. In the presence of a son, the laws of inheritance between 
the two personal status laws are the same and daughters inherit one 
half a share while sons inherit a full share.  
 
Any of the fifteen 
currently recognized 
personal statuses 
Any of the other fifteen 
recognized personal 
statuses 
Marriage between members of different personal status groups is 
common. Because for many it would be financially or logistically 
impossible, or morally or religiously unthinkable, to travel abroad to 
conduct a civil marriage ceremony, oftentimes one member of the 
couple will convert to the other’s personal status in order to get 
married in Lebanon. Furthermore, even if a couple receives a civil 
marriage certificate abroad and registers it in Lebanon, Lebanese 
law states that in order to inherit, both members of a couple (and 
their children) must belong to the same religion. Thus many 
religiously mixed couples travel in order to conduct a civil marriage 




Religious conversion plays at the intersection between what Elizabeth Povinelli calls the 
“autological subject” that is self-authorizing and (supposedly) masterful over one’s identity, and 
the genealogical subject that is inescapably tied to others for meaning and for the practice of 
life.cxxxvii  Conversion reveals that the subject is always both autological and genealogical. Take 
for example the case of the Melkite Catholic man that opens this article. He has the sovereign 
“right” to convert to Islam, but his conversion embeds him within a different legal relationship to 
his children, his wife, and his parents. It does not release him from his legal obligations towards 
others. It merely reconfigures them. 
Despite the fact that the Lebanese legal system produces citizens at the intersection of the 
autological and genealogical registers of being, activist discourses for a secular personal status 
law speaks of this constitutive relationship in terms of a battle. The majority of these activists are 
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in their twenties, are middle class, multilingual, and Beirut based. They come from all sects and 
all regions of the country. What unites them is a belief in the redemptive promise of what they 
consider “true” secularism. Activists view their project as a struggle that will allow the 
sovereign, modern register of self to overcome an overdependence on others for meaning; in this 
narrative embodied by the primordial attachments engendered by religious personal status law. 
Echoing Partha Chatterjee’s critique of Benedict Anderson, these secular activists wish to pose 
“universal unbounded serialities”— such as the nation and the citizen, against “bounded 
serialities”—such as ethnicity or, in the case of Lebanon, sectarianism.cxxxviii   For the secular 
activists with whom I conducted research, the citizen can only exist if the sect is overcome and a 
love of nation overcomes a supposed attachment to sect. They seek safety, stability, and 
independence from sectarian influence within the state.cxxxix Thus, secularist thinking serves to 
elide the complex ways in which sect and gender have been historically constructed and highly 
regulated since the formation of the Lebanese state. Instead, they draft, circulate, protest and 
stage sit ins for the recognition of a secular personal status law, which they see as a necessary 
step that will allow the Lebanese state to be truly liberal, secular, and stable. They believe that 
this law will enable a non- or anti-sectarian lifeworld to flourish. Crucially, their desire for an 
alternative way of organizing personal status is refracted through an ongoing history of what is 
understood as sectarian-articulated violence. While a desire to be a self-authorizing subject 
drives an activists' struggle for mastery over their identity through refusing, for example, to be 
identified as a member of a particular personal status and opting to officially remove it, that 
desire also drives one into the arms of the state—a structure that is by definition both a 
repository and a producer of shared regulated practices.cxl In their desire for recognition, secular 
activists stabilize, demarcate, and extend that state's sovereign power to recognize and ultimately 
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they reproduce what Timothy Mitchell has described as the "state effect."cxliWhile political 
theorists have framed this double bind as the jagged edge of recognition,cxlii activists in Lebanon 
want to strengthen the state. They both desire the state's protection as secular citizens, and they 
believe placing themselves under the sole jurisdiction of the state will enable that state to be 
more modern, more effective, and more liberal. 
 For some, recognition is not primarily about human flourishing or achieving one's 
potential or "distinguishing mark."cxliii  The desire to be recognized stems from a need to ensure 
the minimum requirements of a livable life, such as that of a transsexual man or woman from a 
northern village in Lebanon or that of a citizen who is scarred by the civil wars of the past. 
Though the seductive nature of recognition in Lebanon is not inflected by a history of settler 
colonialism, as it is for the Aboriginal Australians with whom Povinelli works, the desire for 
recognition of a secular personal status is inflected by an archive of sectarian civil war. These 
citizens do not want an intermediary between themselves and the state. However, this framing 
posits the idea of a "secular state" as somehow less prone to violence, a supposition that 
Lebanese history itself contradicts. cxliv  By harnessing what they view as a struggle for 
individuality, modernity, secularity, and peace to the passage of an optional secular personal 
status, secular activists are re-tying themselves to blood-based kinship law that fixes a subject's 
position in relation to their family ties. By desiring a fuller incorporation into the state, they are 
also re-tying themselves to a complex web of civil laws that constitute the citizen as always 
already in relation to other citizens. This fixing of a subject position as always in (a particular) 
relation to others precisely is what makes possible the phenomenon of religious conversion in 
Lebanon.  
Self-identification and social and legal recognition never overlap perfectly. We are never 
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in control of who we are, despite the fact that we, as modern secular liberal subjects, continually 
struggle to be self-authorizing.cxlv We are not sovereign over our identity, which emerges out of a 
complex matrix of constantly shifting terrains of inter-relationality, contingency, and 
recognition. Further, the multiple subject positions occupied by each citizen simultaneously 
(citizen, mother, employer, communist, and Jew, for example) serve to amplify the tension 
between self-authorization as a normative ideal in liberal accounts of the self, and the 
impossibility of ever being actually self-authorized. We are caught between how we think and 
act our identity, and what other manifestations of shared life (such as social interactions, political 
life, and bureaucracy) determine our identity to be. These two registers never cohere fully and 
are open to the contingencies and reversals of time. In Lebanon, this disentanglement between 
self-identification and recognition, and the simultaneous entanglement between the autological 
and the genealogical subject was recently put on display by activists who wished not to be 
recognized by the state as belonging either to any personal status or to any sect. These activists 
were, and are, motivated by a shared desire for a secular personal status or civil marriage law. 
Paying For Sex, Paying for Madhhab 
Both religious conversion and the “correcting” of sex are practices that often require 
monetary exchange from the citizen to the relevant institutions or individuals. In such situations, 
citizens pay the religious head who will issue the certificate of conversion into his religion just as 
they will pay the medical doctors and psychiatrists who will testify that their sex has been 
misrecognized and must thus be corrected in the census registry. While this exchange does not 
occur each time a citizen changes either their personal status or sex, it is a common practice 
according to the converts and the transsexuals whom I have interviewed.  In fact, monetary 
transactions are understood to be, by many, the grease on the wheels of religious conversion. As 
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an informant said, “they [the religious heads] know that you need them, that you need to convert 
[to better your legal situation]. So they know that you will pay.”3 Many of the lawyers and 
citizens that I interviewed over the course of two years posited the money making potential of 
the personal status system as the main reason why religious institutions are against the passage of 
an optional civil marriage law.  
The payment of personal status judges, witnesses, secretaries, and other human parts of 
the legal system, occurs in many forms. It can consist of a bulk sum given to the court’s secretary 
in exchange for influencing a judge, the exchange of political, legal and economic favors 
between a powerful plaintiff and a sheikh or priest, or it can take the form of a large donation to 
the Assyrian or Greek Orthodox Church. In cases where transsexuals wish to correct their sex in 
the census records, a monetary exchange could occur between the plaintiff and an expert witness 
(such as a psychiatrist or a court appointed medical doctor) and/or between the plaintiff and the 
court bureaucrats who ensure that papers are filed properly and on time. In both civil and 
personal status courts, money is almost never exchanged between a judge and a plaintiff or 
defendant. Throughout this dissertation, I keep the possibility of economic exchange and benefit 
in mind as I read through cases of religious conversion. When relevant and based on 
ethnographic or archival evidence, I demonstrate the role that money exchange plays in this 
practice. However, in examples of personal status change and, in this chapter, sex change drawn 
from court documents alone, I understand that the legal record is always incomplete and must be 
understood as always containing the possibility of extra-legal (and thus unrecorded) mechanisms 
that were vital to the achieved verdict. Civil society, state and religious institutions have 
responded to the fact that citizens may be converting and/or correcting their sex in ways that are 
subversive by enacting measures that are meant to curb these practices. 
                                                
3 Interview with male informant, March 2010. 
  98 
Removing Personal Status, Transforming Religion 
In March 2009 the Lebanese Minister of the Interior issued a directive allowing Lebanese 
citizens to remove their sectarian affiliation from the state’s census records and from the 
government ID that publicly records that information. This move was greatly applauded by a 
group of citizens who rushed to "strike out" (shatb) their personal status, and with it what they 
perceived as an unjust and dangerous mechanism of sectarian recognition. Their fear was, and is, 
that the state’s recognition of its citizens through the category of sect has had a performative 
effect on people’s self-identification as sectarian citizens, and vice versa. Unknowingly 
paraphrasing liberal theorists of recognition such as Charles Taylor, they believe that the state's 
recognition of the population as "sectarian citizens" has imprisoned them in an atrophied version 
of themselves—one that has denied Lebanese the opportunity to be "true citizens" and has made 
them more prone to both inflict and be vulnerable to sectarian violence. A number of Lebanon’s 
public intellectuals, civil society leaders, and even high-ranking clergy members joined the effort 
and removed their personal status identification from state records. By doing so, they were 
removing themselves from the jurisdiction of personal status courts and placing themselves in a 
legal vacuum in regards to issues such as marriage and inheritance. The motivation behind this 
campaign was to create a bureaucratic logjam large enough to force the government to pass an 
additional secular personal status law.cxlvi   
Bureaucracy emerged as a direct political tactic and conduit through which citizens hoped 
to challenge and subvert the state and its institutions. As such the campaign relied on persuading 
large numbers of Lebanese citizens to remove their personal status. The campaign stressed that a 
citizen had the right to self-identify as a member of a particular sect or of a particular religion (or 
not) but that the state should not recognize or categorize its citizens according to that personal 
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identification or non-identification. For many of these activists, the gap between self-
identification and socio-legal recognition is experienced as an injury to their autonomous 
decision-making process to decide who they are and as what they wish to be officially 
recognized. They view the patrilineal inheritance of personal status to be a coercive assignation, 
as it were, and not reflective of who they are actually are. Through the removal of their personal 
status from government registries, they believe they are breaking free of the sect they were 
coercively assigned at birthcxlvii and announcing their true self both to the state and to the national 
community. Beginning in 2010, this initiative stalled; in part due to the legal complications of 
not having a personal status and thus being “outside the law” and quite literally cut off from the 
possibility of legal kinship. Many citizens who have removed their personal status identification 
and replaced it with an empty sign have found themselves unable to inherit, unable to run for 
public office, and unable to register their marriage certificate or their newborn children in the 
government registries.cxlviii  
Further, the state’s responses to this campaign have led to an unexpected transformation 
of the power relationship between Lebanese citizens and religious institutions. The state has 
mandated that citizens who have removed their personal status from government registries must 
obtain a “certificate of belonging” from religious establishments such the Maronite Patriarchate. 
This certificate will allow them engage in legal practices such as marriage, divorce, or 
inheritance, or to run for parliamentary elections in Lebanon—all practices that require the 
identification of a citizen’s personal status. Citizens will thus need the approval of religious 
leaders in Lebanon, who may consider them “apostates” because they have taken the step to 
remove their personal status—a position that has been taken by both Sunni and Shi‘i clerics in 
Lebanon.cxlix  A citizen who has not removed his personal status, paradoxically, does not need to 
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prove anything to religious figures in order to have access to the bureaucratic and legal 
applications of the personal status system. A Muslim who publicly professes atheism is still a 
Muslim by law because personal status and sect are, according to the state, inherited patrilineally 
through blood-based kinship and are not necessarily markers of faith or religious practice.cl An 
atheist Maronite thus can both be a candidate for political offices reserved for Christians, and can 
(or must) marry under canon law. Citizens who have removed their personal status affiliation 
from government records have a different relationship to religious institutions. The intervention 
from secular activists has had an unlikely result; it has reconstituted and re-entrenched religion as 
a separate, measurable category of faith that can be interrogated by religious leaders.cli   
According to the directive of the Ministry of the Interior, it would be possible for one 
person to give testimony to a religious figure regarding the other citizen’s “true” identity as a 
Muslim or a Christian. Similarly, it would be possible for a sheikh or a priest to ask a citizen if 
they fast during Ramadan or if they have been baptized. The “evidence” cited in response to 
these inquiries could determine if the clergyman issues a certificate that will allow the citizen in 
question to inherit and to bequeath, to run for public office, or to be employed in companies that 
discriminate along sectarian lines. This scenario, where religious practice becomes an 
evidentiary terrain for the legal determination of personal status, would have been unthinkable 
prior to the campaign to remove one’s personal status. Those that have removed their personal 
status from government records have collapsed the previously illustrated tension between 
personal status, sect, and religion. They are now in the position of having to prove that they are 
members of a particular sect to religious figures in order to access the personal status legal 
system. The case of the Melkite Catholic-born Muslim convert discussed at this article’s outset 
would have been decided very differently had this understanding of the relationship between 
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personal status and religion, and religious institutions and citizens, been in place.  
In his case, the man had argued that because he had converted to Islam and now he and 
his wife were both Sunni Muslims, the Sunni personal status court should have jurisdiction over 
their marriage. However, the Council ultimately rejected his argument, ruling that in order for 
the jurisdiction of the marriage contract to be transferred to a different personal status court both 
members of a couple must convert at the same time. They also ruled that because he registered 
his conversion in 2005, he only became a Muslim and applied to the Sunni court after the 
Melkite court had already issued a verdict in his case. If the court were to allow the Sunni court’s 
verdict to stand, it would cause harm to public order and to the harmony of the personal status 
system.  As such, the court states definitively that in order for a Sunni court to have jurisdiction 
over this case, both the man and the woman would have had to become Muslim (a moot point, 
given that she is already a Muslim) at the same time in order to demonstrate legal intent. The 
state and its institutions, the jurists argue, do not have the right to interrogate the faith of a citizen 
or what he or she believes. Instead, the state must limit itself to examining legal and bureaucratic 
evidence in order to decide the proper jurisdiction of a case between personal status courts. It is 
according to this standard that the Melkite-Sunni convert loses his case. The Council reaffirms 
the decision of the Melkite Court of Appeals, and the Sunni Muslim woman is awarded custody 
over her minor children, alimony, and child support.clii  
Sexual and Sectarian Difference: Regulating Citizenship in Lebanon 
In Lebanon it is officially illegal to convert with the intent of subverting the law. Despite 
this fact, the Public Council at the Court of Cassation, which has jurisdiction over such cases, 
almost never penalizes Lebanese citizens for doing so, arguing that the courts cannot investigate 
the intent behind an act of religious conversion. Such an investigation, the Council argues, would 
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be a breach of civil liberties guaranteed to Lebanese citizens and of the rights guaranteed to the 
personal status courts—rights that the Lebanese state is supposed to both protect and arbitrate 
between. The use of social recognition as legal evidence is a principle that is struck down by the 
Council in dealing with cases of conversion, even when there is a dissonance between the legal 
recognition of personal status and the social recognition of sect. In such cases, the court argues 
that no one should be allowed to investigate or determine the privacy of another’s faith, and thus 
the most persuasive legal evidence of a “correct” conversion is a bureaucratically correct paper 
trail. For the Council, evidence of religious belief or faith does not count as legal evidence of 
conversion. Thus the potential incoherence in each citizen’s experience of the interrelated 
categories of personal status/sect/religion is left un-interrogated. There is no attempt to make 
these categories, which are refracted along the dual axis of personal identification and socio-legal 
recognition, cohere. The government’s response to citizens that have removed their personal 
status from census registries transforms the legal principle of a citizen’s faith as private and the 
possibility of incoherence that this legal principle protects. Interestingly, in cases where citizens 
“correct” their sex, judges consider coherence between the social and the personal registers of 
sex and gender.cliii  
Two essential identifications articulate the legal practice of Lebanese citizenship, sex and 
personal status. While this conferral, or recognition of sex and personal status, most often occurs 
with the registering of birth and the issuing of a birth certificate, it can, as in the case of citizens 
who correct their sex and converts (and minor children of male converts), re-occur later in life. 
The state manages sexed and sectarian difference through different applications of law and 
bureaucracy. The legal differentiation between “sex” and “gender” mirror, to an extent, the 
differentiation between “personal status” and “sect.” To be concise, gender and sect are denser 
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categories than sex or personal status. As stated previously, the state has turned the social sphere 
into a terrain of evidence for the demarcation of sectarian belonging by requiring those who have 
removed their personal status from government registries to receive a “certificate of belonging” 
from clergymen. This position mirrors that of judges who view the social world as a potential 
terrain of evidence in cases where there has been a “mistake” in the categorization of a citizen’s 
sex at birth. In such cases, how society at large “reads” another citizen’s gender is paramount to 
determining one’s sex, just as currently, citizens who have removed their personal status must be 
“read” as belonging to particular sects in order to access their full civil rights. Furthermore, both 
trans citizens who try to correct their sex in government registries, and citizens who remove their 
personal status from government registries, understand their actions as a transformation of 
markers they were coercively assigned at birth—sex and sect. This transformation brings their 
legal and bureaucratic identities more in line with who they believe they actually are.cliv  
The gaps between the categories of personal status, sect, and religion and between sex 
and gender make possible seemingly impossible subject positions that are occupied and 
negotiated daily in Lebanon, such that of a man with a vagina who wants to be married in a 
Catholic Church, or that of a Catholic Priest whose census record lists his name as al-mutran 
(Bishop) Gregoire Haddad but lists his personal status as ___.  These subject positions are 
produced at the jagged intersections and impasses between the legal, social, and ethical registers 
of recognition. The work of the state as the producer and regulator of difference becomes clear at 
each moment of recognition and misrecognition—as seen in both the court case that opens this 
article and in appeals to be recognized as a secular community—and in appeals (or turns) to the 
state for a correction in sex or in order to remove one’s personal status. Personal status and sex 
may be the point of departure for the reading of sect and gender, but the path these lived 
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categories take, once refracted across other technologies of recognition, can be unexpected. 
While social registers of recognition intersect and reproduce the gendered sectarian 
citizen as a category of practice, they can become untied—as in the case of converts and 
transsexuals. This untying of recognition highlights the ways in which modern subject positions 
are refracted across both the autological desire to be self-authorizing and the genealogical reality 
of their dependence on others. Further, the desire to be self-authorizing often re-entrenches 
genealogical registers of subjectivity. Thus in order to self-authorize your sex you must rely on 
the social world for evidence of your gender and win a court case against the state, while 
conversion is an “autonomous” decision that re-embeds you (and your minor children, if you are 
a man) in a different genealogical subject position. In the case of activists lobbying for a secular 
personal status, this re-entrenchment can be as obvious as the desire to be legally positioned in 
an alternative, secular blood-based kinship system. It can also emerge as an unintended 
consequence of struggles to be self-authorizing, as in the campaign to remove personal status and 
the subsequent transformation of the relationship between citizens who removed their personal 
status and religious institutions.   
All of these “autonomous” practices rely on the state and its bureaucratic legal 
apparatuses for meaning and the facility of practice. They are predicated on the organization of 
shared life and of politico-legal space. The nation-state is a highly regulated genealogical 
structure that engenders subject positions that are inflected with an impossible desire to be 
autonomous and to be, in the words of an activist I have worked with, “just citizens.”clv A desire 
to be “just a citizen” neglects the fact that the “citizenry” itself is a highly regulated population 
who are tied to each other in innumerable ways and through various political technologies. The 
citizen, quite literally, cannot exist alone. The price of such imagined autonomy is attachment 
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and re-attachment to the state through practices that reproduce both the stability of state 
structures and a practice of state sovereignty. It is the thick layer of scar tissue that emerges from 
such necessary attachment and reattachment to the state that we call “the citizen.”  
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Chapter Three 
 The Remedial State: Law, Sincerity,  
And the Making of Good and Bad Citizens 
 
In this chapter I trace two practices and discourses on secularism in Lebanon. The first is 
that of the state; or more specifically, the secularism that is performed by the state's highest civil 
court, the Public Council at the Court of Cassation. In particular, I focus on the legal praxis of 
this court when it comes to cases involving citizens who have converted from one religion or sect 
to another, and are subsequently accused of doing so specifically to facilitate specific legal 
actions, such as divorce.  
Lebanese politicians, religious leaders, and prominent civil society actors often cite the 
personal status legal regime as evidence of Lebanon’s pluralism. In this ideological framework, 
the secular state protects the rights of religious communities to legally practice “their own” code 
of norms and ethics.  In Lebanese state ideology, the presence of personal status laws is a way to 
make sure that not only are these practices protected, they are allowed to flourish. The state’s 
role in ensuring that minority rights are thus protected is what produces both its signature of 
sovereignty and its mark of universality as the structure that unites separate minority groups into 
one governmental arrangement.clvi This practice of secularity is what I have been calling 
Secularism 1. Through the practices of the Council, the state also demonstrates its ability to 
regulate the personal status system and unify it into a body of state jurisprudence or ijtihad.   
Self-termed “activists for secularism” in Lebanon practice the second discourse on 
secularism and which I will be discussing in this chapter. Within this broad and diverse group, I 
focus on members of one of the most established civil society networks in Lebanon that is 
currently advocating for the passage of an additional secular/civil "optional civil marriage law."  
This network was started before the Lebanese civil war by a Catholic priest who was, and 
  107 
remains, dedicated to dismantling the system of political sectarianism in Lebanon. Today the 
tayyar al-mujtama‘ al-madani (henceforth the tayyar) consists of hundreds of activists from 
several generations.  In their work, they emphasize the idea that the Lebanese state is neither 
civil nor secular, and that until it is considered civil and secular Lebanon will always be prone to 
outbreaks of sectarian violence and civil war.  Particularly, I focus on members of the tayyar 
who have made use of their recently granted right to remove their personal status affiliation from 
government census records. In fact, the founder and ideological inspiration of the tayyar, the 
aforementioned priest, was one of the first to remove his personal status from state registries. His 
current identification lists him as a “mutran” (bishop) but lists his personal status as unknown.    
Shatb al-madhhab (the removal of personal status from census registries) and taghyir al-
madhhab (changing of madhhab, or conversion) are practices that highlight two different aspects 
of Lebanese statecraft. While both practices entail similar bureaucratic procedures and both 
invite the state’s legal intervention, each are predicated on two very different readings of the 
Lebanese state. Conversion requires and reproduces the Lebanese state as a secular space that 
protects a citizen’s right to transcend the personal status inherited at birth from one’s biological 
father. The removal of one's personal status is an intervention and bureaucratic provocation 
performed by activists who wish to reform the state into a “truly” civil and secular body that is 
not built around a skeleton of sectarianism. 
Comparing these two discourses on secularism and Lebanese statecraft, I suggest that 
secular activists mirror, to an extent, discourses of the state itself by emphasizing the fact that 
tolerance, pluralism, and freedom of religion are principles that are quintessentially “Lebanese.” 
In doing so, they lobby the state to reform itself and fulfill its promise as a secular, liberal 
governing body based on a dedication to pluralism.  Such a comparison engenders a host of 
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questions on and relating to the intersections of liberalism, secularism, governmentality, and 
nationalism in Lebanon.  To begin to approach these questions I focus on secular activism 
undertaken by? in order to convince the broader public of the need for a secular personal status 
law. The removal of personal status from census records, we shall see in this chapter, was one 
tactic deployed in this larger campaign. The practices of da‘wa secularism and religious 
conversion are grounded in contending views of secularity, the role that religion should play in 
public life, and the ethical/legal constitution of Lebanese citizens.  Da‘wa secularism is practiced 
with the goal of building a form of sincere citizenship that constitutes an autonomous individual 
and ties her to the secular state.  Religious conversion, on the other hand, is predicated on a 
multiplicity of subject positions and kinship relationships made possible by the presence of 
fifteen personal status laws in the country, and on social and legal acceptance that religious 
conversion is often, and necessarily, insincere.  
Secularism should not be approached with a clearly defined notion of all that it 
encompasses or what it looks like in practice; or indeed that there are two (US, France) or three 
(US, France, Turkey) or four (US, France, Turkey, India) models of secularism that are then 
renegotiated and operationalized in different contexts.  Instead, I take seriously what the 
Lebanese courts and these activists are doing when they make statements such as "the Lebanese 
state is secular," or "the Lebanese state is not secular," or "I only have friends who are secular," 
or indeed, when comparisons are made between what secular activists perceive as the "culture of 
sectarianism" and "the culture of secularism." After outlining the way discourses of secularism 
are articulated at the Council and among da‘wa secularists, I examine some of the intersections 
and impasses between these two articulations. Then I directly compare practices of conversion 
and removal of personal status. I end with a series of questions that not only may help us think 
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more about secularism, but also about law, citizenship, and the circulation and reproduction of 
national ideology in Lebanon.  
The Public Council at the Court of Cassation 
 
The judges that preside on the Council are the presidents of each of the branches of the 
Lebanese Cassation Court. The First President of the Judiciary heads the Council itself. Article 
95 of the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedures outlines the strict guidelines under which cases can 
be advanced to the Council’s chambers: 
The Council, which convenes according to the procedures set by the law that 
organizes the judiciary, has jurisdiction under the following circumstances. 
1) In a case against the state regarding its liability for the [illegal] acts of Judges who 
are part of the Lebanese judiciary.  
2) In any case whose resolution requires and rests on vital legal principles or in any 
case whose resolution has the potential to contradict [jurisprudential] precedents. 
Under these circumstances, the case is referred to the Court of Cassation by the 
original court dealing with the case. 
3) In requests for decisions regarding court jurisdiction when there is a positive or 
negative disagreement over court jurisdiction: 
a. Between two `adliyya (courts where state appointed judges preside) courts; 
b. Between an `adliyya court and a Shari`a court and/or a Christian personal 
status court; 
c. Between two Christian personal status courts or two Shari`a courts. 
4) In an objection to a final decision issued by a Christian or Muslim personal status 
court because of the lack of that court’s proper jurisdiction [over the case] or 
because of an infringement of the substantive forms [of legal proceedings] that 
can impact public order.  
5) In the analysis of court decisions that will inform a [draft] law presented by the 
Attorney General to the Court of Cassation for its input. 
The Council of Oversight can only convene in the presence of the 1st President of the 
Judiciary and at least four other presidents of the Courts of Cassation. When there is a 
split decision the 1st President of the Judiciary casts the deciding vote. 
Most of the cases dealing with converts that are accepted for arbitration at the Council 
satisfy the third and fourth requirements of Article 95 of the Civil Code of Procedures.  In cases 
dealing with converts, often different personal status courts, or one personal status and one civil 
court, will issue rulings, each claiming that it has jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
or custody issues.  In addition, cases are often submitted to the Council with allegations of 
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judicial misconduct in the personal status courts. the Council of General Oversight has the power 
to invalidate rulings, and to decide which court has jurisdiction over a particular case. While they 
cannot intervene in the details of the personal status rulings (and the judges always stress in their 
rulings that they are not a court of appeals for personal status courts) the judges do scrutinize the 
workings of the personal status courts in their notes, which are scribbled liberally at the margins 
of lawyers' briefs and of rulings from lower civil and personal status courts. Furthermore, the 
invalidation of a ruling is an intervention, as are decisions issued by the Council determining 
which personal status court has jurisdiction over a particular case. In these two examples, the 
Council, a civil and secular body composed of the highest ranking judges of the judiciary 
(positions that exclude by definition personal status judges), practices its unitary sovereignty 
over the fifteen different personal status institutions in Lebanon.  
Once a case is submitted to the Council, the judges review the case file in order to 
determine if it satisfies the requirements of Article 95. The case is then accepted or not accepted, 
for arbitration.  The decision issued by the judges is added to the case file, which is deposited in 
the archives of the Council. Each case file contains a decision by the Council, the decisions that 
are being appealed from personal status or civil courts, lawyers’ arguments to both the civil and 
personal status courts, copies of all evidence submitted to each court, the hand written notes of 
judges, and copies of all fees paid so far in pursuit of the case. In over two years of dissertation 
research, the thinnest case file I ever saw was a mere twenty pages, and the largest contained 
more than three hundred pages (see Chapter One). These files lay bare the production of a 
Lebanese legal discourse that is uniquely inflected with competing discourses of secularism, the 
nature and role of the Lebanese state, and the rights and duties of citizens towards both personal 
status institutions and state institutions. The case files also expose the legal and bureaucratic 
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ladder that must be climbed in order for personal status cases to reach the jurisdiction of the 
country’s highest civil court.  
In cases that are heard at the Council, oftentimes the competing rights and duties of 
Lebanese citizens clash between personal status courts and state institutions. For example, the 
Maronite Church considers certificates of conversion that they issue to be evidence of a person’s 
conversion to Maronite Christianity, but the Lebanese state demands that the conversion be 
certified at the state census registry before it has any legal bearing. Consistently, the Council 
argues that the civil right of citizens to change their personal status supersedes complaints issued 
by personal status courts that people are converting only, and obviously, in order to subvert the 
law. Often, the plaintiff will try to “prove” that the defendant (usually the convert) did not truly 
change their religion or experience a change of faith, but rather only changed their personal 
status in order to subvert Lebanese law. This disentanglement between personal status as legal 
practice and religion as faith and belief is demonstrated in many cases concerning converts at the 
Council. 
In a case decided by the Council in 2008 the Sunni Muslim waqf of Tripoli alleged that a 
man had converted to Islam in order to benefit financially, and had thus committed the crime of 
“subverting the law” (tahhayul `ala al-qanun).  The case concerned the inheritance of an elderly 
man who had converted from Maronite Catholicism to Sunni Islam many years earlier. This man 
was unmarried and had no children and no Muslim relatives.  According to the Ottoman family 
law of 1917 and laws of procedure related to the Sunni Lebanese personal status, this meant that 
the Sunni waqf of Tripoli stood to inherit his estate. However, his nephew had converted to Islam 
while his uncle was on his deathbed, which transformed him, according to Sunni personal status 
law, into his uncle’s only legal heir.  The waqf accused the nephew of not really having become 
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a Muslim, since he still attended Church services. Obviously, the waqf alleges, this man only 
became a Muslim in order to inherit from his uncle, who had “truly” converted from Maronite 
Christianity to Sunni Islam decades earlier. Ultimately, the case hinged on the fact that the 
nephew had not completed the bureaucratic procedures of his conversion in time for his uncle’s 
death, and only received his new identification card after his uncle had passed away. Thus at the 
time of his uncle’s death, the judges at the Council reason, the defendant was a Muslim by 
religion (because he had said the two shahadas) but he was still legally a Maronite.  
 In their decision, the judges carefully examine the temporality of how and when religion, 
personal status, and sect are tied and untied.  However, when responding to the waqf’s allegation 
that the nephew had subverted Lebanese law, the judges argue that they cannot interfere in a 
citizen’s practice of the freedom of religion. The court (and thus, the state) only has the right to 
interrogate a citizen’s practices of personal status and even then, it is confined to examining a 
citizen’s bureaucratic actions. The Council consistently argues that a citizen’s religious beliefs 
and sectarian belonging should not be exposed to public and legal interrogation and should not 
constitute an evidentiary terrain during legal proceedings.clvii  
Despite the fact that conversion with the intent to subvert the law is illegal, the Council 
almost always rules that conversion is one of the quintessential rights of citizenship in a plural 
and "civil" state. Conversion, the court consistently argues, should be judged by the actions 
undertaken by the citizen, and not by the intention motivating the citizen to convert. To be more 
specific, the court argues that the evidentiary terrain of intent should be found in bureaucratic 
action, not in questions of faith or interiority. During a conversation with a judge who presides 
on the Court of First Instance for Personal Status in Beirut (a court that adjudicates the “civil” 
aspects of one's personal status, such as name and sex), I asked if she was ever worried that 
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someone might be converting solely in order to subvert the law.  She told me that as long as the 
person had satisfied the legal requirements of conversion, she was satisfied, because it was not 
her place to look into someone’s soul.  “I am a judge” she responded, “and I adjudicate the law.” 
 Interestingly, the court's emphasis on the actions of the convert, and its understanding 
that questions of faith are beyond the purview of (any) court often puts it at odds with religious, 
and particularly, Christian discourses on conversion. Conversely, Islamic institutional discourses 
on religious conversion are similar to that of the state. The sheikh who is responsible for 
accepting converts at Dar al-Fatwa alerted me to this similarity. 
 Maya: Do you ever worry that people may be converting to Sunni Islam 
For reasons other than religious? 
Sheikh Omar: What do you mean? 
Maya: I mean, let’s say that someone wanted to get out of a certain situation- 
Sheikh Omar: I know what you are saying, you mean like when a Christian will 
become a Muslim in order to get a divorce. 
Maya: Yes, well, if only the husband becomes a Muslim he can’t get a divorce. 
But he can remarry. 
Sheikh Omar: Yes, I know about these things, but I am not a priest. I do not have 
jurisdiction over someone’s soul. I can’t question it. If this person says the two 
shahadas and signs the papers, what is inside of him is between him and God.  
Maya: But a friend of mine, her fiancée wanted to become a Muslim and he was 
asked to take religious classes. 
Sheikh Omar: That is a little different. It is not allowed for a Muslim woman to 
marry a Christian man, so in that case, we want to make sure that he knows what 
Islam is, for her sake in the eyes of God. 
Maya: But he is not legally bound to take these classes 
Sheikh Omar: ...No, he is not. We can only ask [him to].clviii 
 
In this conversation sheikh Omar further demonstrated the ways in which conversion, and 
practices of personal status more generally, are inherently gendered. The situation itself is 
gendered, as there are no legal prohibitions against Muslim men marrying non-Muslim women. 
Despite the fact that sheikhs “do not have jurisdiction over someone's soul” they are expressly 
concerned with the possibility that crypto-Christians are marrying Muslim women under the 
legal and bureaucratic guise of conversion to Islam. Although they do not have the right to 
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require anyone to take classes in Islam before converting, they often request that people do so 
before marrying. The majority of mixed religious couples at Dar al-Fatwa are therefore Muslim 
women wishing to marry non-Muslim men. Sheikhs often request that these would be converts 
learn about Islam in classes run by that institution before saying the shahadas. These classes 
serve two purposes, to “ease our conscience,” as Sheikh Omar told me, and, as recent 
investigations into corruption allege, as ways to generate funds for Dar al-Fatwa.  
 During our conversation sheikh Omar also compared Islamic and Christian discourses on 
religious conversion, emphasizing that Islam was more “secular” because a sheikh is an ordinary 
person and serves as an advisor, not as a shepherd, to his people. While Muslim sheikhs can only 
request that a would-be convert attend religion classes, Lebanese Christian priests require a 
potential convert to take classes and be baptized before being allowed to join the faith. The priest 
must be convinced that this person is now truly Christian before signing a certificate of 
conversion.  Yet even this general rule can be and is flouted, as a Syrian Orthodox priest said 
during an interview, laughing and rubbing his thumb and his middle finger in the universal 
gesture that denotes monetary exchange. In fact, based on my research, the Maronite Church is 
the community that is most concerned, and takes most seriously, the question of conversion. The 
church’s concern is due to the fact that a high number of Maronites convert out of their personal 
status in order to get divorced and/or remarried, thus circumventing Catholic marriage and 
divorce laws. This concern is informed by political discourses that highlight the demographic 
decline of Christians in the Middle East. In Lebanon, a state that was intended to be Christian-
dominated, these discourses and fear of Christian decline take on a particular salience. As such, 
Maronite courts advance and support those cases dealing with converts to the Court of Public 
Order with much greater frequency than any other personal status court. In these cases the 
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Maronite Church itself is sometimes listed as the plaintiff, alleging that Lebanese citizens are 
harming the public good by changing their religion for reasons that have little to do with religion 
and everything to do with material life.  Both Muslim and Christian personal status courts 
fiercely guard their powers against what they see as secular state intervention. In 2010 the Sunni 
personal status courts advanced two cases to the Council and argued that the Court for Juveniles, 
a civil body, had intervened in the Islamic courts’ jurisdiction over custody matters. The Islamic 
courts and the mufti, who is listed as lead plaintiff in both cases, had their appeals overturned by 
the Council.  
 In making decisions about jurisdiction in cases dealing with converts, the Council 
invokes the impartiality of the state when dealing with different personal status groups, 
emphasizing its role as the arbiter between them. In fact, on several occasions the court writes 
that the Lebanese state came into existence in order to arbitrate between pre-existing 
communities and maintain harmony between them. Not only does such jurisprudential discourse 
reproduce a nationalist narrative that sectarian communities preceded the state which was formed 
by incorporating these competing sectarian groups into it, but it also, to paraphrase Wendy 
Brown, casts the state as a zone of compromise and a space for redress of injuries, rather than 
bringing into focus the state's role, and interest, in the (re)production of those political identities 
and injuries.clix In Lebanon, such jurisprudential discourse masks the active role that state 
structures and practices have played in the production of modern sectarianism and of modern 
Lebanese citizenship.   
 Political sectarianism had been framed as a temporary political solution in the  Lebanese 
constitution of 1926, in the National Pact of 1943, and the Ta’if Accord of 1990.clx  Despite this 
initial framing, there has never been a sustained program for the formation of a non-confessional 
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state, a goal that has always been projected into the undefined future. The idea is, always, that 
Lebanon cannot get rid of sectarianism until the population is "ready," thus positing the state as a 
remedial structure that makes its citizenry ready for secular liberal democracy.  In this way the 
modern Lebanese state mimics the logic of the French mandate, which was supposed to “make 
the population ready” for the modern idea of a nation-state.clxi  
Many da‘wa secularists pressure the Lebanese state to build a civil society that will be 
able to overcome sectarian affiliations. During an interview with a prominent da‘wa secularist 
named Khaled, a Harvard-educated corporate lawyer practicing in Beirut, I brought up this point. 
Khaled stated that Lebanon's sects were cultural communities (thus he could be an atheist Shi’i, 
he explained) that must be protected and have a say in the direction the country takes. He 
explained that if political sectarianism were abolished tomorrow, the entire government would be 
run by Shi’is because people are not yet politically educated enough to be trusted with a “one 
citizen-one vote” system. Instead, he believes that another congressional chamber should be 
created in parliament in tandem with the end of political sectarianism. This chamber would be 
modeled on the US Senate and within it, every sect—regardless of its size—would have two 
representatives.clxii Da‘wa secularists such as Khaled lobby the state for anti-sectarian legal 
reforms such as the addition of a secular personal status or the right to not have one’s personal 
status recorded in the census registry. In doing so, these activists mimic the state’s view of itself 
as an impartial structure whose work (and overall purpose) is to wean its population away from 
sectarian affiliations and towards national ones. Thus they task the state with reforming itself, an 
additive attempt at change, rather than suggesting that the state, as a governing agent wielding 
structural power, plays a role (and has a stake) in the production (and recirculation) of gendered 
and sectarian differences (see Chapter Two). 
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This reading of the state's role as the protector, and not the producer of, minorities, is 
reflected in the jurisprudence of the Council. In its decisions, the Council consistently argues that 
the Lebanese state is the structure that both transcends and unites these different groups under 
the promises of a protected pluralism within a nation of minorities. the Council sees itself as 
protecting the “public good” by ensuring that all personal status institutions are held to the same 
legal standard and that, importantly, the citizen is protected from the overreaching of those 
personal status institutions. The Council maintains in its jurisprudence that it is the citizens' right 
to transcend, through the universal and overarching space of the secular state, the singularity of 
each personal status. The citizen has the right to practice conversion freely without interference 
by the community that she is "choosing" to leave. The state, in this discourse, is the condition of 
possibility for the citizen’s "choice," and by extension, the freedom of religion and the autonomy 
of the rights-bearing individual, to emerge. In their decisions the Council insists on the sanctity 
of a citizen’s right to convert freely, safely, and in a sovereign fashion. The judges who sit on the 
Council invariably cite three legal pillars in their decisions; (1) Article 7 of the Lebanese 
Constitution, which guarantees equality between all citizens; (2) Article 9 of the Lebanese 
Constitution, which guarantees the absolute freedom of religion; (3) and 60LR, a French 
mandate-era law passed in 1936.  
In fact, 60LR is perhaps the law that is cited most by both the decisions in the Council 
and among da‘wa secularists. This mandate-era directive organizes the infrastructure of the 
Lebanese Personal Status System and outlines the mechanism for the recognition of new sects by 
the Lebanese state. This directive also includes an article that outlines provisions for the passage 
of a civil/secular personal status. This law would organize the personal status of a “sect that will 
follow the common law” and/or those Lebanese citizens who do not have a sect. The vague 
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wording of 60LR has been a focus both for state officials and for activists, who use that directive 
to try to determine whether or not the legal provision for a secular personal status is already 
mandated by Lebanese law.clxiii  If it is, then activists reason that the state is legally bound to 
recognize a secular personal status.  The provision for this secular law, in addition to an article 
stating that citizens could marry abroad under foreign and civil marriage laws, made 60LR very 
controversial at the time when it was announced in 1936. Massive demonstrations were led by 
the then-Mufti of Lebanon, who chafed under the realization that in an independent Lebanon 
Sunni Islam would be just one sect among many. The Mufti demanded the law’s repeal,clxiv 
arguing that the shari‘a should not be subject to the votes and amendments of parliamentarians. 
In response, a directive was issued exempting all Muslim sects from the provisions of 60LR. 
Despite this exemption, 60LR continues to be cited as one of the most authoritative laws in 
matters dealing with the relationship between the Lebanese state and all personal status 
communities.  
I Have Surrendered to the State 
The difference between a civil marriage law and a personal status law is that while the 
former confines itself to the legal aspects of marriage and divorce, the latter enjoys a broader 
jurisdiction, which includes custody, inheritance, and adoption. Da‘wa secularists are divided 
over what to lobby for. One camp argues that they should focus on a civil marriage law because 
Muslim religious institutions will vehemently block any draft law that covers questions of 
inheritance. The other camp suggests that a civil personal status law is needed so that citizens 
will not have to return to religious personal status law to resolve any legal issue. Secularists are 
also divided over a second issue, with one camp arguing that there should be one compulsive 
civil/secular personal status law for all Lebanese citizens, and the other camp believing that it is 
both more strategic and democratic to lobby for an additional, “optional” secular personal status 
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law of which citizens can “choose” to be under the jurisdiction. The first camp believes that in 
order to build a unified, civil, and secular citizenry and in order to strengthen the Lebanese state 
and its institutions all Lebanese must be under the same law. They firmly believe that without a 
compulsory law that would greatly reduce the power of all religious institutions, Lebanon will 
never be free from the “disease” of sectarianism.clxv  The second camp cites the freedom of 
religion as the reason why they do not support forcing everyone to be under the jurisdiction of a 
civil law.  For members of this camp, the element of “choice” is paramount to a civil and secular 
state. On a more strategic level, they believe that while it may be possible to get an optional law 
passed by the Lebanese Parliament, a compulsory personal status law would be laughed out of 
chambers. In an illustration of this tension, in 2010 two different groups of activists were writing 
two different secular personal status laws, an optional civil marriage law and a compulsory 
personal status. Yet a third group of activists submitted a draft secular personal status law to the 
Lebanese Parliament for review in 2011. 
Activism for a secular personal status relies on the same three legal pillars that the 
Council uses to arbitrate cases dealing with converts, Articles 9 and 7 of the Lebanese 
Constitution, and 60LR.  Da‘wa secularists ague that the state has failed to uphold equality 
between citizens and to protect freedom of religion, and that it has been negligent in fulfilling its 
mandate (outlined in 60LR) to "recognize" a community that does not belong to a religion or 
sect. Further, activists suggest that the Lebanese state has a duty to recognize a secular/civil 
personal status law if it is truly committed to pluralism and co-existence.clxvi  Secular activists 
argue that there is a direct link between the ever-present threat of a sectarian civil war in 
Lebanon and the absence of a national civil marriage and/or personal status law. For them, the 
presence of a civil personal status demonstrates the freedom to love whomever you choose, 
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regardless of religious sect, and the need for a strong state that can guarantee the freedom to 
make those choices.   
The freedom to love and marry someone from another sect or religion not only becomes a 
political demand, but in this discourse it demonstrates a redemptive quality in a society 
perpetually dancing on the edge of a civil war. Here, love (i.e. inter-sectarian, "romantic" 
heteronormative love) is emphasized as that which will save us from ourselves. This sentiment 
can be clearly demonstrated by the popular tagline used by activists at demonstrations: Say Yes 
to Civil Marriage and No to Civil War. The link of secularism to peace ignores the fact that, as 
Talal Asad has written, much of the most destructive violence unleashed in the world has been 
secular, state violence.clxvii  However, for many of these activists, the fear of internalized, civil 
violence is so present that they actively and consciously ignore this contradiction. Many cite the 
events of May 2008clxviii as a radicalizing moment in their secularism. Many of my interlocutors 
framed the events of 2008 as a “mini-civil war” that foreshadows a coming Sunni-Shi‘a “real 
war.” They view their work to pass a civil marriage law as an attempt to intervene into this future 
war.  
 Leila: In 2008, it was the first time I really saw how bad things could get. This  
 Sunni-Shi‘i thing, it is poison. 
 Maya: But what does that have to do with a civil marriage law?  
 Leila: It doesn’t, not directly. But we should feel like we are all Lebanese first, not 
Lebanese Sunni or Shi‘a or Christian or whatever.  
 Maya: And this law will enable that? 
 Leila: It is a start, an important start to thinking this way.  
 Maya: How would you classify yourself politically? Meaning, what political  
 Issues, other than advocating for a secular personal status, matter to you? 
 Leila: I was politicized, like so many of us, around the Palestinian issue. My  
 family is Arab nationalist, and I was always pro-Arab. But when 2008  
 happened, I thought that something different has to happen, now.  
 Maya: Earlier in this conversation you were making fun of Lebanon as a “historical 
mistake,” and now you are a leading activist in the campaign to strengthen that state. Is 
this a contradiction? 
 Leila: Look Maya, I understand everything you are saying. But here, on the  
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 ground, what are we supposed to do? Give up our citizenship because we don’t  
 believe in this state and how it came to be? We know what happens to  
 people who don’t have a state, look at how Palestinians here live. Do you  
 want that? We have to be realistic. 
 Maya: So what do we do?  
 Leila: I have surrendered (istaslamit) to this state. Khalas, it is here. It is not going  
 anywhere.clxix  
  
 Leila is a twenty something da‘wa secularist who is a member of the tayyar. She studied 
marketing at the public Lebanese University and now works in the private sector as a sales 
associate. During our conversation she imagined herself as outside of the state and as having a 
choice in the matter of being a citizen, the condition of which is “surrender.” While interviewing 
a young atheist man, Issam, who comes from a Sunni family that lives in the Hizballah-
dominated southern suburbs of Beirut, it was also made clear that the antidote to civil strife is 
hyper-nationalism. Like Leila this man believed that one could choose to cultivate a sense of 
nationalism and a sense of emotional attachment to the state and one’s fellow citizens. Issam, 
who recently removed his personal status from his identification papers and is now recognized 
by the Lebanese state as not following any particular personal status, is convinced that peace will 
come to Lebanon only if citizens cease to care about political issues that are “not Lebanese.” To 
illustrate his belief that we should be thinking only about our country, Issam used what he told 
me he knew was a controversial, and, he said, “extreme” example. “If,” he stated, “at some point 
it becomes clear that we could benefit from a strong relationship with Israel, we should do it and 
not have to worry about Palestine or Syria or anyone else … we have to start thinking like this, 
about ourselves first, if we are ever going to move forward and actually be a strong and unified 
country. Even if I hate Israel now, and even if my family has a long and proud history of 
resistance, I want to get to the point where I don’t anymore, where I just want what is best for 
Lebanon as a whole. I work towards this, and it is not easy, every day.”clxx  
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 Such statements demonstrate the motivations of da‘wa secularism, which entail ethical 
practices that are supposed to foster “civility” and a sense of political community that includes 
the entire (new) nation. For Issam, the need to build this new nation is more important than even 
the right to resist Israeli colonialism in Palestine and in Lebanon—a right which he views as 
sacred. In order to produce the nation, however, sacrilege— articulated as a re-ordering of 
political affect and practices of community—is required.  Ethical practices are important to 
reordering one's notion of “community” and who counts within a nation. These practices rely in 
part on what William Connolly has called a politics of disposition.clxxi  The unquantifiable ways 
in which one is psychologically, physically, and emotionally formed by war forms political 
dispositions in Lebanon—orientations towards and affective investments in particular political 
projects above others.   One of the ethical practices that both emerges from and challenges the 
subject's political dispositions is the removal of one's personal status from state registry records. 
Issam, who has done so, explains that his action is two-fold; to sever institutional ties with his 
sect and thus proclaim his desire to belong to the state only; and to demonstrate to his fellow 
Lebanese citizens that they need opposed to one other but instead can build a new nation built on 
commonality not difference 
Da‘wa Secularism and the Making of Modern Lebanese Citizens 
Da‘wa secularists believe that Lebanese citizens are not yet ready for the end of political 
sectarianism and the establishment a “truly secular” state. They see their work as playing an 
important role in preparing and educating the population about their civic duties in the (eventual) 
secular state that they desire. Like Khaled, the Harvard-educated corporate lawyer mentioned 
above, da‘wa secularists believe that if political sectarianism were abolished tomorrow, the 
country would cease to be safe for minorities.   
In 2008 Hagop, a Lebanese Armenian mixed media artist, sued the Lebanese government 
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for his right to remove any mention of his personal status from the Lebanese census registry. In 
fact it was the decision issued in this case that allowed the Ministry of the Interior to issue a 
directive in 2009 allowing all Lebanese citizens to remove their personal status from the census 
(see Chapter Two).  One year later, it was another decision regarding Hagop's case, this time 
issued by a different branch of the legal system (but presided over by the same judge, who had 
been promoted), that effectively froze all applications concerning the removal of personal status 
identification from census records. Explaining his decision to sue the government, Hagop said, “I 
wanted to make a statement for everyone else to see. . . . Everyone should know that they have 
the right to not be classified religiously by the government . . . but nobody does know that.”  
 Throughout our interview, Hagop stressed that people in Lebanon had to be educated in 
what secularism means before there can be any meaningful attempt to change the political 
system. “We need to teach them, Maya,” he entreated at one point.  I suggested that in fact the 
Lebanese state is already secular, but practices a different form of secularism than what he 
envisioned. Hagop disagreed, pointing to the fact that the Maronite Patriarch is always weighing 
in on political issues in Lebanon. Again I challenged him, saying that in secular states religious 
leaders have the freedom to publicly comment on political, social and economic affairs. Hagop 
continued: 
Hagop: Do you know [of] Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah? 
Maya: Yes, of course I know him. Who doesn’t know of him? 
Hagop: Let’s say that Sayyed Fadlallah issued a fatwa making gay sex between 
two men halal.  
Maya: What? 
Hagop: Let’s say, he went on his radio station, and on al-Manar TV and on 
teleliban, and he said that anal sex between two men is not haram, it is halal. 
Would that be a good thing? 
Maya: I think that it would be very strange, first of all. But yes, I suppose it would 
be a powerful statement. Would you? 
Hagop: I wouldn’t. Not because I think that gay sex is haram, but because I 
believe that religious leaders have no right to comment on such issues, even if 
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they are commenting in a way that I support. Fadlallah has no right to say 
anything about gay sex, or any kind of sex, in public. That’s what I mean by a 
secular and civil state. The law comes from one place, the state. Nobody else can 
make something legal or illegal.clxxii 
 
In Lebanon secularism is often equated with anti-sectarianism. For activists such as 
Hagop, secularism is not only about the separation of Church and State. It is a way of life, an 
archive of knowledge, and a set of values and principles that one should aspire to. Hagop and 
others, including leaders of the Laique Pride movement (see Chapter Four) speak of a “culture of 
sectarianism," which they characterize as traditional, corrupt, prone to violence, and oriented 
toward the past. They contrast this “culture of sectarianism” with a "culture of secularism,” 
which they characterize as modern, accountable, able to ensure peace, and oriented toward the 
future. To understand the framework within which da‘wa secularism operates, it is important to 
note the differences between sectarianism as a social, economic and political discourse and the 
system of political sectarianism. 
Sectarianism is often understood as the manifestation of group bias, fragmented political 
allegiances, and a system of patronage that keeps a citizen tied to her sect at the expense of her 
ties to the state. Thus sectarianism, when activists speak of it, is a corrosive agent eating away at 
the possibility of a cohesive national body.  Political sectarianism, by contrast, is seen as the end 
result of the “reality” of sectarianism. The idea of da‘wa secularism comes from this reading of 
sectarianism and political sectarianism. In this reading, to put it simply, political sectarianism 
cannot be changed until Lebanese citizens are no longer considered sectarian.  Indeed, many 
secular activists believe that the Lebanese state should continue to be a structure that guarantees 
(through political representation at the highest levels) the continued flourishing of Lebanon's 
pluralism and of its perennially at-risk minorities. The fear is that if political sectarianism is 
changed before the population is “ready,” one sect and/or one religion (which is always implied 
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to be Islam, given that the majority of Lebanese citizens are Muslim) would dominate the state at 
the expense of others. For many, such a result would ensure the end of Lebanese pluralism. Thus, 
instead of calling for the end of political sectarianism, da‘wa secularists wish to saturate the 
public sphere with the “culture of secularism” until the reign of the “culture of sectarianism” is 
over.  Sectarianism is the moral collective condition this form of da‘wa addresses, improves and 
transforms.clxxiii  However, da‘wa secularism is geared towards “securing the freedom of 
individuals to pursue their own interests,” a right that activists view as sacred.clxxiv  
In this way da‘wa secularists speak a discourse similar to that of the state in that they 
both project the end of political sectarianism as a temporal figment in the future, which will 
come, when the population is “ready.” However, unlike the discourse of the Council, secular 
activists believe that sectarianism is a barrier to Lebanese citizenship, rather than its quilting 
point. They also see the state as too weak to contend with sectarian or religious forces.  The aim 
of a secular personal status, therefore, or of the removal of one's personal status from census 
registries, is to strengthen and reform the state in order to make it truly “civil” and modern. The 
presence of a secular personal status or a civil marriage law is one aspect of “civilizing” the state 
and making the population ready for the end of political sectarianism. For these da‘wa 
secularists, the end of political sectarianism is essential to the production and sustainability of 
peace in Lebanon.  Kamal Salibi, the prominent historian of Lebanon, put in starker terms the 
difference between those who are activists for a secular, non-sectarian political identity and those 
who are sectarian. “The choice,” he said to me as we stared at a framed photocopy of his identity 
card that lists his personal status as “/,” “is one of civilization versus barbarism.”clxxv 
Many of the activists I have worked with believe that when an optional civil status is in 
place, Lebanese citizens will "choose" en masse to fall under its jurisdiction because it will be 
  126 
secular, progressive, and will guarantee "true" equality between citizens. As such, even if the 
civil/secular personal status is technically optional, it will eventually evolve into the de facto law 
that applies to most citizens because, to put it simply, Lebanese citizens will learn how much 
"better" it is than religious personal status.  A “father figure” in this movement, Jihad once 
patiently explained to me that although they are only pushing for an “optional” secular personal 
status, anyone with even sub-par intelligence would rush to join it if and when it became 
available. For Jihad, the passage of an optional personal status is akin to smuggling a ticking 
bomb into the Lebanese legal system. While it is more likely to pass through Parliament, and 
thus, he believes that the “optional” law is the most pragmatic choice for activists, he also 
believes that once institutionalized, an optional secular personal status would neutralize its 
religious counterparts through its popularity. Jihad, a well-respected public intellectual in 
Lebanon, could not comprehend that someone may choose not to be under the jurisdiction of the 
secular law and/or that there may be other social and economic factors that may make this 
“choice” impossible. In fact, during our final interview, he challenged me (and derided me) for 
not being “secular enough” because I had not yet removed my personal status.  
Jihad: Are you a Lebanese citizen? 
Maya: Yes, of course I am. 
Jihad No, you are not. I am a Lebanese citizen. You are still a Sunni Lebanese 
woman who will inherit half of what your brother will. Doesn’t that bother you? 
Don’t you want to change that?  
Maya: Is that what this about? You defending my rights of inheritance? 
Jihad: How can you stand being worth half of your brother? How can you stand 
the fact that your husband can marry four women? 
Maya:  You and I both know that, at least in a Muslim contract, I could make 
stipulations about not having more than one wife.  But as a female, my biggest 
problem in Lebanon is not the question of my inheritance or divorce or whatever, 
it is the question of my right to pass on my nationality to my husband or my 
children or the fact that my husband can legally rape me at will. These are secular 
and civil laws put in place by secular patriarchal authorities. Do you want me to 
trust these institutions with making a feminist personal status law?  
Jihad: What will you do if when you get married and have children, you have only 
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daughters? 
Maya: I will do what everyone else does, become a Shi‘i. 
Jihad: If you wanted to be a true citizen, you would refuse to play that game. You 
would remove your personal status and demand to belong to the state, only.clxxvi  
 
For Jihad and many other da‘wa secularists, a civil personal status law would foreclose the 
possibility of, as they see it, of insincere religious conversion because those who want to 
exercise a different (and in their minds, more progressive) set of rights could "choose" that law's 
jurisdiction. For them, the practices of free “choice” can only occur in the secular/civil sphere, 
whereas in the current personal status system, one is compelled to convert because they have no 
other choice. Thus for Jihad, I would have to covert to Shi‘ism if I have only daughters, but had I 
chosen to marry under the still non-existent secular personal status law the gender of my progeny 
would have no bearing on their inheritance. Activists such as Jihad do not entertain the idea that 
the content of a secular personal status is could be just as, if not more, patriarchal than some of 
the current religious personal status laws. 
Secular activists who are working to add a secular personal status to the Lebanese 
personal status system want to create a legal infrastructure that invites the practice of free choice.  
Any citizen could “choose” to belong to this law no matter what personal status she inherited 
from her father. For these same activists, religious personal status is the space where people 
operate due to a lack of “true” choices. Religious personal status is an inheritance not only from 
the biological father but also from a broken and dangerous history riddled with sectarian 
violence.  In the eyes of these men and women the inheritance of religious personal status 
oppresses one’s ability to choose their faith, their community, and to “truly” practice the freedom 
of religion that is enshrined in the Lebanese Constitution. While these activists view religious 
conversion (faith-based conversion) as an exercise of the freedom of religion, they read practices 
of possibly insincere conversion differently because in their view, it perverts religion by turning 
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it into a bureaucratic and legal terrain.  In addition, they express pity for those who have 
converted in order to make use of different aspects of personal status law, imagining that such 
acts damage a citizen’s dignity because they have to change their religion in order to live better 
lives. In their, religious conversion done for any reason other than a change in faith is the 
antithesis to the freedom of religion because people are forced to change their religion in order to 
maximize their legal rights. They thus understand what they consider “insincere” conversion as 
an injury to both religious/sectarian subjectivity and an erosion of the freedom of religion 
promised to every Lebanese citizen. Their marking of “insincere” conversion points to their 
understanding of religion as an internal belief system, as a faith that requires the continuous 
consent and commitment of the believer.  
This understanding puts them at odds with the legal record of the Council, which 
consistently cites the fact that the state allows for the free practice of conversion and does not 
interrogate the intentions behind it as proof that 1) the Lebanese state is secular and 2) the 
Lebanese state ensures that all citizens can practice the freedom of religion.  In addition, the 
understanding of religious conversion by many secular activists often puts these activists at odds 
with religious converts themselves-many of whom believe that the process of conversion has no 
bearing at all on their “true” sense of self and, in fact, says nothing about their religious beliefs 
and practices. These converts mimic the court’s understanding that personal status and religion 
are different, while secular activists insist that if one changes their personal status, they are 
somehow damaging not only their religion, but also the ideological promise of the Lebanese 
state.  Indeed, many of the converts I have interviewed have pointed out that there is a productive 
tension between what they are "recognized as" by the state, and what they actually are, or may 
be, “inside.” For many, this tension represents the possibility of maneuvering within a public 
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space that often collapses governmental categorization (the personal status on your ID), sectarian 
(political) affiliation, and religious identity and practice. The stories of Su‘ad, a sixty-something 
divorced Lebanese woman, and Hussein, a twenty-eight year old recently married Lebanese man, 
highlight how the impasses between religion, personal status, and sect make possible a practice 
of religious conversion that is socially and personally understood as not about faith or 
community. The story of Hussein, however, also draws out the differences between how one 
person understands his religious conversion and the removal of his personal status. 
Conversion as a Piece of Paper 
At the beginning of our first and only meeting, Su‘ad quickly ascertained that we were 
both “real Beirutis” and from “good” and “old” Sunni families. Seemingly comforted by that 
fact, she proceeded to unpack her memories of a wartime marriage, divorce, and conversion. She 
had married a Shi‘i Muslim under the Ja`fari personal status in the 1970s and had two children, a 
girl and a boy. Her husband used to gamble and was physically abusive towards her. Beginning 
in 1980, they were divorced twice (talaq rija`i), and twice he convinced her that he would 
change and that she should return to him. When Su‘ad would escape to her mother’s house after 
violent confrontations with her husband, her mother would mutter to herself in anger: “wallah ta 
nasrinha” (I swear to God I will make her a Christian).  Hearing this often-repeated sentence, 
Su‘ad thought that if she became a Christian, she could escape her marriage for good. Years 
later, Su‘ad wanted to divorce her husband a third time, which according to the Ja‘fari personal 
status law would have been the “final divorce” after which they could not remarry unless she 
married another man in the interim.  Her husband refused to divorce her for the third time, and 
because he, as a man, had the sole right to initiate divorce proceedings, he believed that she was 
out of choices.  Su‘ad, fuming at his desire to keep her locked in what she now calls “a bad 
marriage,” swore to him (and to herself) that she would show him who the real man (meaning the 
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real decision maker) was in their marriage. She would divorce him whether he accepted it or not. 
At the beginning of the divorce process Su‘ad went to a Ja'fari shari‘a court and then told her 
lawyer that she would never return because “people like her” (“and you,” she added to me) did 
not belong in such a place. She finally received that divorce in 1990, the year of the end of the 
Lebanese civil war and ten years after the first of her three divorces. In order to explain why it 
took almost six years to obtain her final divorce, she said that “ time takes its time during wars.”  
After informing her husband that she was going to divorce him, whether he liked it or 
not, Su‘ad hired a lawyer and, remembering her mother’s angry mutterings, asked him if she 
could obtain a divorce if she converted to Christianity. Her lawyer told her that in such a case she 
could be considered an apostate and “outside” of Islam, a circumstance under which the judge 
could grant a divorce.  Her lawyer hired two other lawyers from the Beirut’s “East side” (the 
implication is that this second set of lawyers were Christian) to help obtain her conversion. Every 
week, Su‘ad would meet both her “East Beirut” and her “West Beirut” lawyers under the shade 
of pine trees near the Ministry of Justice, which used to denote a quadrant of the civil war-era 
“green line” which at the time divided warring East and West Beirut.  Her high heels would sink 
in the dirt under those pine trees on the green line as they discussed her legal options. Once, 
during such a meeting, an RPG missile landed close by. Neither she nor her lawyers moved 
because they were so engrossed in conversation and so used to the war. But at the time of the 
interview, sitting at a chic Beirut cafe with a view of the sea twenty years later, Su‘ad 
remembered the smell of explosion.   
In 1984, the only church that would accept her was the Greek Orthodox Church. She 
refused to be baptized and refused to say that she had accepted Jesus Christ as her savior—two 
requirements of conversion to Christianity. According to Su‘ad, she was “just signing papers and 
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paying money.” Finally, she and her lawyers met a Greek Orthodox priest on the roof of the 
now-defunct al-Hayat hospital (also on the green line) in order to finalize the paperwork. Every 
time the priest would ask her a question about her religious beliefs and practices her East Beirut 
lawyer would change the subject as her West Beirut lawyer looked on. After more than an hour, 
the priest gave her the signed certificate confirming that she had become a Greek Orthodox. I 
told Su‘ad skeptically that it was rare for a conversion to take place without at least some 
interaction between the priest and the would-be convert, particularly if the convert was a 
Muslim. Su‘ad looked at me, pointed at the sea behind us and asked: 
“See the sea? What color is it?”  
“Blue,” I answered. 
She replied: “If you add enough green [money] to the sea, it will turn red. In Lebanon, we 
do whatever we want.” 
 
As soon as she had the priest’s certificate of conversion in hand, Su‘ad drove to the 
census registry where she resided and registered her change in personal status from “Sunni 
Muslim” to “Greek Orthodox Christian.” Her West Beirut lawyer then took a copy of her 
identification card, which now identified her as a Christian, to the Ja‘fari personal status court in 
one of Beirut’s southern suburbs, where she lived. The lawyer told the Ja‘fari judge that Su‘ad 
had forsaken Islam and should be considered an apostate. As such, she should be thrown out of 
all the rights of Islam, including her Muslim marriage. To the lawyer’s surprise, the judge 
demurred, saying that Muslim men are allowed to marry Christian women, and that Su‘ad 's 
husband did not seem to mind his wife’s conversion. The lawyer then told the judge that his 
client desperately needed a divorce. The judge asked why, and the lawyer said that her husband 
abused her and that he was a gambler and drinker. At this point, the judge said that Su‘ad  was, 
based on these allegations seventy-five percent on the way to a divorce, but that he needed proof 
that the husband was a gambler (and thus a danger to both his wife and children) in order to grant 
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her a final divorce. The judge sent a court employee with Su‘ad  to Beirut’s racetrack. Her 
husband, Su‘ad  confided in me, never actually bet on the horses, but he used to watch the races. 
But “the court employee did not need to know that her husband was actually a poker player with 
no interest in horses,” Su‘ad  said. From across the street, she pointed out her husband’s bald 
spot as he exited the Beirut Hippodrome.  The court employee nodded in acknowledgement, got 
into his car and drove off. Su‘ad then realized that she could have pointed at any random man 
and gotten the same result. 
Once the employee confirmed that Su‘ad 's husband was indeed a gambler to the Ja‘fari 
judge, she got her divorce. She felt victorious. Her next task was to re-convert to Islam, because, 
she said, “that’s who I really am.”  Plus, she knew that there would be legal complications in the 
future if she remained a Christian and her children and parents were Muslim. She went to Dar al-
Fatwa, bought a headscarf (a white one, she remembered) from a store underneath the mosque 
and went into her meeting with a sheikh. Su‘ad  told the sheikh that she wanted to become a 
Muslim again and explained to him that she had only recently become a Christian because she 
believed it would help her obtain a divorce. The sheikh was not amused by her story, and told her 
that he wanted her to take classes in Islam offered at Dar al-Fatwa before he “accepted her” back 
into Islam. This request infuriated an already exhausted Su‘ad, who angrily told the sheikh that 
she knew more about Islam than he did, and that she came from one of the oldest and most 
prestigious Muslim families in Lebanon. She left that office, but told herself that she would not 
leave Dar al-Fatwa without a certificate of (re)conversion to Islam.  
Su`ad returned to the store under the main office building of Dar al-Fatwa, where she 
bought, and changed into, a blue headscarf. She went back into the main building, and ducked 
into the first sheikh’s office that she saw. After entering his office without an appointment, she 
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spoke in more detail to this younger man about her abusive marriage and how she would have 
done anything to leave her marriage, knowing all along that her conversion on paper did not 
change anything “really.” She was still, and always was, a Sunni Muslim, Su‘ad said 
emphatically. The sheikh told her that he understood her problems, asked her to say the two 
shahadas, and welcomed her back to Sunni Islam. Carrying a certificate that confirmed that she 
had converted from Greek Orthodox Christianity to Sunni Islam, Su‘ad left Dar al-Fatwa 
smiling. She took her certificate back to the census registry in order to file the papers that would 
return her to her original personal status. The government employee in charge of such matters 
sternly told her that religion was not a joke, and that it was odd to see someone go from Sunni to 
Orthodox and back to Sunni in less than a week. Su‘ad, frustrated beyond belief by this point, 
shouted at him to stop pontificating and do his job and make sure her registry was “correct.” She 
asked two men who were milling around outside the municipal building to stand as her 
witnesses. She paid each two thousand Lebanese liras, a large sum back then, she reminded me. 
In fact, the price of Su‘ad's “final” divorce is staggering.  Throughout this story Su’ad was 
paying money to her lawyers, to the priests, to the sheikhs, to the witnesses, to court employees, 
to the employees at both the state and personal status institutions. By 1990, she had paid seven 
thousand dollars, an exorbitant amount of money in the 1980s, a decade marked by civil war and 
the rapid devaluation of the Lebanese pound.  
Throughout her recounting of her story, Su‘ad would stop and emphasize that in fact, she 
had always been a Muslim and a practicing one at that. She fasts during Ramadan and prays, she 
said emphatically, and considers her foray into Christianity as nothing but misguided legal 
advice. “It was a paper,” she said, “when I was done with it I threw it away.” When pressed as to 
why, if these changes in religion did nothing to affect who she is “on the inside,” she made sure 
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that she changed her paperwork again to be known as a Muslim, she again spoke of the legal 
problems that could arise if and when she died: she was a Christian and her children were 
Muslim. In addition, she said, while her children were minors it was important for them to be all 
of the same religion for questions of custody. Otherwise, Su‘ad said, they would not be legally 
safe.clxxvii 
Shatb as Announcement 
Citizens who have removed their personal status from government records view their 
action as a "true" expression of choice and intent, as the expression of a "secular" (read: non-
sectarian) identity. This group considers the current government classification system to be an 
act of imprisonment that amalgamates religion, personal status, and sectarian identity.  Being 
categorized as belonging to a particular personal status is, to these activists, a dangerous re-
scaffolding of the "culture of sectarianism" which they view as keeping Lebanon from achieving 
modernity. Converts such as Su‘ad play on the space between personal status and religion, and 
between what they are recognized as versus what they identify themselves as, in order to achieve 
legal maneuverability. Conversely, citizens who have removed their personal status from 
government registries want to erase the gap between the government's recognition of their 
personal status and religions and their own identification of their true self as a “citizen.” In fact, 
they view themselves as having been misrecognized by the state as sectarian citizens.  By 
removing their personal status, they seek, and believe that they achieve, a more sincere form of 
self.  
Hussein is twenty-eight years old and has a PhD in sociology. He is a self-described 
“secularist.” Hussein removed his personal status from his government records as soon as the 
Ministry of the Interior made the necessary paperwork available. He is also someone who had 
previously converted from Shi‘i to Sunni Islam. Three years prior to our interview, Hussein had 
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wanted to move his census registration from Sidon, a city in southern Lebanon, to Beirut, the 
capital. In order to circumvent a decision made by a senior politician barring Lebanese Shi‘a  
from moving their nufus out of the south (a decision that was taken to ensure more favorable 
elections), he had to convert first from Shi‘a to Sunni Islam through a process that he describes 
as “easy.” Once he succeeded in moving his registration to Beirut, he went back to the Shi‘i  
Higher Councilclxxviii and converted back, a process that he says was more difficult and costly due 
to the fact that he was viewed negatively as someone who had “left” the community.  When I 
asked him why, if he truly is not sectarian, it was important for him to re-convert, Hussein 
responded that had he remained a Sunni, it would have been a “choice.” Returning to Shi‘ism, 
however, was merely the return of an inheritance which had been imposed on him. “I didn’t want 
to be Sunni, and I didn’t want to be Shi‘i. But I never had a choice about being a Shi‘i, and I 
didn’t want to choose or have agency [in this system], so I went back. ” 
Hussein describes his act of conversion in markedly different terms than his act of 
removing his personal status altogether (shatb), saying that his conversion was a “necessity,” a 
“strategy” to work within the current political system. His shatb, however, represents a cathartic 
announcement of his “true self,” and is an act of political activism-an act that, in his words, made 
his “outside personal status match his [what was always already] inside: nothing.”clxxix For 
Hussein, both his atheism and his belief that he is not a sectarian citizen (unlike others, he stated 
several times) are reflected by and embodied in his choice to remove his personal status from 
state registries.  
Hussein believes in a clear distinction between "inheriting" a religious personal status 
and/or converting between them, and making a "choice" to opt out of the system of personal 
status as a whole.   This "choice" is productive of the autonomous individual, a project that 
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Hussein believes we should all, as Lebanese citizens, be invested in. The exercise of "choice" 
here, as it is in liberal ideology, is an act that builds the architecture of the self within, and prior 
to, the body.clxxx Despite his emphasis on the importance of personal choice, Hussein does not 
believe that when his future children "inherit" his non-madhhab status (which indexes the 
absence, not presence, of a personal status law) they will experience it as an injury, or as a 
misrecognition, or even as an "inheritance" in his pejorative use of the word. “Why should 
they?” Hussein said during one of our interviews, “It’s not the same thing at all. They won’t be 
born as Shi‘i Lebanese. They will be just Lebanese.”clxxxi In our interview he did not question the 
fact that his children could only inherit his status, and not that of his wife. Khaled, the Harvard-
educated corporate lawyer, also removed his personal status and recently had a daughter. On her 
birth certificate, and on her identification card, her personal status is not listed. I asked her father 
if she was the first Lebanese citizen to be born “sect-less.”  He smiled and corrected me: “My 
daughter is the first Lebanese citizen ever born, period."clxxxii With such a statement, generations 
of Lebanese statecraft and practices of citizenship are erased because they are tied to personal 
status, not “truly” modern and thus not practices of “true citizenship.”  
Both Hussein and Khaled have had to contend with the legal confusion resulting from 
their removal of their personal status.  Prior to removing his personal status Hussein had married 
his fiancé (a practicing Sunni Muslim) at a religious ceremony. The couple had received the 
marriage certificate from Dar al-Fatwa in an attempt to appease the bride’s parents, but they had 
no intent of registering it with the government authorities. Instead, they planned to have a civil 
marriage ceremony in neighboring Cyprus.  However, they soon discovered that, as two 
Muslims, they would automatically fall under the jurisdiction of the husband’s personal status, 
no matter which marriage certificate had been filed with the state. The legal irrelevance of a civil 
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marriage contract between two Muslims is an aftereffect of the exclusion of Lebanese Muslims 
from the jurisdiction of 60LR. By the time Hussein conceded to registering the Muslim marriage 
contract, he had already removed his personal status from his census registry. When they went to 
the civil authorities with the necessary paperwork in hand to become “legally” married, the 
census employee refused their application because Hussein had removed his personal status and 
thus, according to Lebanese law, could not marry a Lebanese Muslim woman under Muslim 
personal status. But because he was no longer considered a Muslim by the Lebanese state once 
he had removed his personal status, he and his fiancé could then travel to Cyprus (and tell her 
parents that they had no choice in the matter) to conduct a civil marriage ceremony and register 
it.   
At first, Khaled also encountered trouble registering his daughter’s birth in the Lebanese 
census registry because he had removed his personal status. However, in his words he, “made a 
few phone calls” and the matter was settled.  Others who have also removed their personal status 
do not have the financial resources or the networks of contacts that both Hussein and Khaled 
mobilized in order to overcome the legal difficulties that ensued. Another man had to convert 
back to his original personal status because the Lebanese Internal Security would not accept his 
application for employment without it. Despite the fact that this refusal is illegal, the man in 
question did not have the resources to afford either to fight the case in court or, more pressingly, 
to be unemployed during that period. Still another Lebanese citizen who had removed his 
personal status ran into bureaucratic hurdles when he tried to register his newborn son. Like 
Khaled, the employees at the census registry refused his application at first.  Unlike Khaled, he 
did not have “people to call” and thus he converted back to his original personal status in order to 
register his son as a Lebanese citizen. Thus, claims that citizenship is achieved only by those 
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who remove their personal status must be read against the reality that the field of “choice” is only 
available to those in Lebanon who can mobilize enough resources to make that “choice” 
intelligible.  
A comparison of Hussein and Su‘ad's stories highlights a tension within what I have so 
far been illustrating as an intersection between liberalism, secularism, and governmentality. If 
one of the core tenets of liberalism is the right to keep your "internal,” distinguishing mark 
protected from the practices of governmentality,clxxxiii  then how shall we read Hussein's sense of 
accomplishment at having his government ID accurately diagnose, represent, and announce his 
"internal" self to the state? In Hussein's mind, by removing his personal status he is breaking out 
of the state’s misrecognition of “who he is” and announcing who he is and wants to be: a “true” 
Lebanese citizen. As critical political theorists have long suggested, the sincerity and publicity of 
nationalism is not a tension within liberalism, it is constitutive.  
Converts such as Su‘ad, and even Hussein when describing his process of moving his 
registration from the south of Lebanon to its capital, have a different reading of the relationship 
between what they are recognized as legally and who they understand themselves to be. Su‘ad, 
for example, emphasizes that her official identity does not map onto her internal private self and 
that in fact, it is not the business of the state or of any authority (such as Dar al-Fatwa) to tell her 
what she can and cannot be. Thus the convert recognizes her personal status as nothing more 
than a bureaucratic category of recognition separated from how she defines herself and how she 
is recognized socially (as a Sunni Beiruti from an old and respected family). However, the 
citizen who has removed his personal status desires the state to recognize him as who is really is: 
a universal and unmarked citizen.   
Activists who have removed their personal status see themselves as having achieved 
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citizenship specifically because they have placed themselves fully, and only, within the 
jurisdiction of the state. Like other religious groups in Lebanon that do not have an officially 
recognized personal status, da‘wa secularists seek recognition of their difference from the state 
and its institutions. However, they view their difference as more modern, more universal, and 
more ideal. In fact, they do not see themselves as representing a minority because they believe 
that in time they will become the normative ideal. 
Conclusion 
In the Lebanese activist context, have secularism and liberalism become interchangeable? 
Has liberalism been politically enfolded into the culture of secularism, where it is being 
expressed as nothing more than “good and modern values”? How does this discourse and 
practice of secularism diverge from that of the Lebanese state and its courts, and in what ways do 
the two converge?  How can we read the relationship between a politics of recognition and 
practices of liberalism and secularism through the stories of Su‘ad and Hussein? How is the fact 
that secularists see themselves as engaged in a political campaign relevant, or in relation, to the 
reason they wish to make a statement via collapsing the space between recognition and what they 
consider to be their internal state?  
Da‘wa secularists see themselves as occupying the “empty center” or the “unmarked 
category” of the non-sectarian citizen, and yet they seek recognition from the state for this 
unmarked category.  Like members of an Islamic da‘wa public, secularists who have removed 
their sectarian affiliation from government census records view their act as a form of 
representational politics that must be public and must circulate. It is one act towards the goal of 
saturating the public sphere in a ‘culture of secularism,’ a process that will prepare the Lebanese 
public for the end of political sectarianism. However, when pressed to define the ’culture of 
secularism’ they list liberal values such as the importance of tolerance, of diversity, of women’s 
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rights, of the freedom of speech and of the freedom to be safely different.  
If da‘wa secularists circulate a discourse of secularism that is an ethical practice of particular 
values and that is, at its heart, anti-sectarian (Secularism 2), then the Council's jurisprudential 
record demonstrates that it practices a secularism that is neither a collection of “good values” or 
anti-sectarian. Secularism, for this court, is the practice of law and the protection of the freedom 
of religion; which is read through the state-protected practice of religious conversion, even when 
such conversion is done for supposedly strategic purposes. For the Council, secularism is 
practiced through their institutional practices that unite the legal system (personal status and 
civil) and have jurisdictions over that unified system. In this way, the Council mimics the 
“universal space” that the Lebanese state is said to occupy as the structure that transcends, and 
arbitrates between, Lebanon’s (pre-existing) different communities. Further, while secular 
activists understand the practices of possibly insincere conversion as a perversion of the freedom 
of religion, the Council argues that its court is protecting the freedom of religion by refusing to 
interrogate whether or not a conversion is “sincere.” For secularists the act of removing one's 
personal status is, at its core, an act that follows an internalized intent or desire. They see it as at 
once an enunciative and performative action that constitutes them as modern and secular 
Lebanese citizens. Thus, while for activists Su ‘ad's story would be understood as indexing the 
problems of the Lebanese legal system, the Council might read her story of conversion and 
reconversion as evidence of Lebanon’s secularity –because religious institutions cannot interfere 
in her civil right to change, and change again, her religion.  
 Secular activists also read practices of Lebanese citizenship differently than the Council.  
Lebanese secularists see the citizen as a category to be achieved once sectarian affiliation has 
been transcended. This transcendence, further, cannot be complete until there is a secular 
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personal status that is “only” under the purview of the state, which eventually will cease to be 
organized under the logic of political sectarianism. The Council, however, understands the 
citizen to be constituted through the knitting together of personal status and civil law. One can 
practice all the rights and duties of citizenship only when both branches of law converge to form 
the juridical body of the citizen. Thus in the eyes of Lebanese courts, citizens who have removed 
their personal status pose a unique challenge: they cannot inherit, may not be able to marry, or 
may not be able to stand for public office. While Hussein and Khaled see themselves as two of 
the very few “real” citizens in Lebanon, the court views them as citizens who are legally 
deficient because they do not fall under the jurisdiction of a particular personal status and are 
thus foreclosed from the practice of various rights. Su‘ad's case is also illustrative of the ways in 
which citizenship is legally practiced across and within both personal status and civil law. Su‘ad 
was able to divorce her abusive husband only because of her ability to speak her claims within a 
particular personal status framework (gambling, drinking), and because she had the financial 
resources and the force of personality to persevere and insist on the fact that her civil right to 
convert is “stronger” than any claims that religious or bureaucratic institutions may lay on her.  
There are also convergences between how the Council and secular activists practice 
discourses of secularism and citizenship. They both stress Article 9 of the Lebanese constitution, 
which reads that: "There shall be absolute freedom of conscience.  The State in rendering 
homage to the Most High shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, under its [the 
state’s] protection, the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not 
disturbed.  It also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to 
whatever religious sect they belong, is respected.” Both the Council and da‘wa secularists 
believe that the state is, and should be, the impartial arbiter between religions and/or sectarian 
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groups and that the state should be committed to tolerance, pluralism, and to the continued 
protection of minorities.  In fact, da‘wa secularists perhaps represent the success of this 
nationalist discourse in that they struggle for their difference to be recognized and protected 
through the presence of a secular personal status.  
In their decisions the Council represents the state as having been built in order to 
incorporate preexisting sectarian groups. The Council stresses that its role is to ensure citizens 
are protected from these groups’ overreaching through the strengthening of civil institutions of 
the state and through its limited jurisdiction over personal status courts. Similarly, da‘wa 
secularists argue that the state must play an active role in weaning citizens away from sectarian 
affiliations and towards national ones. Thus they lobby the state to create a secular personal 
status law, just as they sued the state to gain the right to be without a personal status.  In doing 
so, they reproduce a nationalist framework whereby the state is a remedial structure that will 
modernize its citizenry away from primordial group belongings and toward national ones. Only 
after this process has been completed can the system of political sectarianism be done away with 
“safely” for all of Lebanon’s minorities. In fact, da‘wa secularists are not saying anything that 
the National Pact and the Tai’f Accord have not already said: political sectarianism is a 
“temporary” system put in place until the population is “ready” (read: non-sectarian) for liberal 
democracy.  However, while there has yet to be a concerted effort to implement the de-
sectarianizing aspects of the National Pact or the Ta’if Accord, da‘wa secularists have taken it 
upon themselves to stage public actions meant to educate the Lebanese citizenry about the 
benefits of secularism. Of these, none were perhaps as striking as the Laique Pride marches of 
2010 and 2011, to which we now turn.  
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Chapter Four: 
Are You Going to Pride? Secular Visibility and Controversy in Lebanon 
 
 It began on Facebook. One night in the winter of 2009, five friends traded status 
messages and comments between Paris and Beirut, decrying a recent increase in censorship. That 
year, the Lebanese government banned a Brazilian Carnival troupe from performing in the 
conservative city of Sidon after senior sheikhs scomplained publicly about the scant clothing 
worn by performers. Similarly that same winter, a rock concert was cancelled in Beirut after 
priests issued public statements warning of the dangerous linkages between rock music and devil 
worshipping. For these five friends, four of them professional dancers, actors and artists, the final 
straw came when the Hizballah-owned television station Al-Manar accused Gad Elmalih, a 
Franco-Algerian Jewish comedian, of having served in the Israeli Defense Forces. After Al-
Manar screened images of Elmalih in an Israeli army uniform, the comedian cancelled his sold 
out show in Lebanon out of concerns for his safety. On Facebook, a conversation unfolded about 
the perceived growth of religious conservatism in Lebanon and the danger that religious figures’ 
public statements posed to Lebanon's arts scene. Soon the conversation expanded to a more 
generalized concern with the increasingly public role played by Christian and Muslim religious 
figures and the threat this trend posed to Lebanon's civil society and “the Lebanese way of life.” 
Days later, Laique Pride, a march that from its inception intended to “show others” that secular 
Lebanese existed and proudly so, was born.  
 Four months after that initial Facebook rant, more than three thousand people walked 
from ‘Ayn al-Mraiseh to Parliament—a distance of approximately one kilometer. After having 
refused the many offers of sponsorship from political parties, the number and diversity of the 
people who attended the 2010 Laique Pride march was a great success. Self-proclaimed gay 
rights activists, feminists, and secular activists marched to the tune of short track written and 
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performed by a leading Lebanese rapper that had been, in recent days, regularly featured on the 
radio. People held up their identification papers with “/” as their personal status and/or their 
civil/secular marriage certificates issued in foreign countries. These documents functioned as 
badges of pride. Others stated their intention to marry in Cyprus. Still others demanded a 
Lebanese secular personal status law as part of a broader set of reforms that would ensure 
Lebanon's tolerance and secularity. Young children held signs proclaiming themselves as the 
offspring of a secular union. English language banners reading: “Queers for Secularism,” “Say 
Yes to Civil Marriage and No to Civil War” and “Secularism? I Laique it” were waved in the air.  
Marchers wore t-shirts branded with the Laique Pride logo and carrying messages like “What is 
my sect? None of your business!” and “I want to be President of the Republic. Should I convert 
to Christianity?” Local celebrities-musicians, actors, and public intellectuals came to the march. 
State security officers had placed barriers blocking the marcher's route from downtown Beirut to 
Parliament. As they approached the armed men, the crowd stopped.  Some began to dance the 
dabke–broadly considered to be a quintessentially Lebanese folk dance, to the percussion of their 
fellow marchers’ drums. They set up placards announcing the censorship of art as the “red line.” 
Others sat in front of the officers chanting about women’s rights to pass citizenship to her 
husband and children. At the center of this cavalcade of imagery and sound, billed as a 
manifestation of the ‘culture of secularism,’ two gay male activists staged a “kiss in.” One group 
shouted a chant that had been heard throughout the day: “Neither Turkish nor French secularism, 
a Lebanese secularism!”  
 The months between the initial Facebook conversation and the first annual Laique Pride 
March were full of planning, debate, camaraderie and controversy. Lebanese in the diaspora 
were urged to plan their own Laique Pride marches in coordination with the event in Beirut. 
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Soon local activists had set up Laique Pride Paris and Laique Pride London each complete with 
their own Facebook page. In Beirut, meetings that brought together over thirty activists (many of 
whom appeared in previous chapters) ran for hours, often descending into shouting matches. At 
other times the meetings would move to a bar or an activist’s house where people debated the 
night away. Eventually, a strong network of NGOs and activist groups and individuals, led by the 
five friends who called themselves the “Laique Pride Planning Committee,” developed. While 
the network included individuals and groups that had been working towards reform for years, the 
planning committee described their role as “networkers that could make secularism cool and 
create a buzz for it in Lebanon.”clxxxiv They did not see themselves as activists or as particularly 
knowledgeable about the legal system that they were hoping to change. Instead, they relied on 
others who “have the knowledge and have been doing the work.”clxxxv They believed that Laique 
Pride would help move this important work forward by showing the rest of the country that it 
was possible to identify as secular and to live in a secular way. “The idea,” a member of the 
planning committee said during an interview, “is to remove a fake identity,” by which she meant 
sectarian identities, “and to promote a real one,” by which she meant secular nationalism.clxxxvi   
 This chapter focuses on the most striking public face of da‘wa secularism—the now 
annual Laique Pride March— which brings together a large slice of Lebanon's civil society 
activists. By exploring the planning and execution of the first Laique Pride, this chapter details 
the discussions of and the debates on the nature of sectarianism and secularism in Lebanon. 
Understandings of secularism and sectarianism came into focus partly through debates on what 
platform the march would adopt and demand. The emphasis was always on publicity, on 
showing to others that it was possible to be free from the “chains” of sectarianism and patronage. 
Most importantly, the march was supposed to be a positive experience, about “beautiful people 
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with beautiful ideas”clxxxviitaking to the streets.  During the march, religious conversion done as 
legal strategy was used as an example of the perversity of the Lebanese system. Such framing of 
conversion emerged from particular understandings-touched upon in chapters two and three- of 
the relationships between secularism, sectarianism, citizenship and law. This chapter explores 
Laique Pride by outlining the understandings of citizenship, secularism, and sectarianism that the 
marchers advertised with their banners, bodies and voices. It will attend to the controversies and 
visceral disagreements that unfolded over the course of the march’s planning and execution. It 
will focus in particular on the questions of whether or not political sectarianism should be ended, 
and whether or not to include LGBTQ and feminist demands.  These controversies again 
highlight the categories of sex and sect, as the axis around which Lebanese citizenship revolves.  
Finally, the chapter ends by exploring how understanding secularism as an assemblage helps us 
think through the competing practices of secularity and citizenship engendered by both the 
Lebanese state and the da‘wa secularists. 
The Logic of Pride 
 From the very beginning, the organizers of Laique Pride were adamant that they were not 
planning a demonstration (muthahara), but a procession, a march (masira). In Arabic and in 
French (the five organizers are all French-educated), the distinction between these words is more 
pronounced than in English.clxxxviii  The planning committee’s negative associations of political 
protests in Lebanon also colored the differences between a march and a demonstration. There 
was the emphasis on celebration, festival, and “coolness” in this distinction. Laique Pride was 
intended to show that Lebanese could take part in the performance of a joyful civic, like any 
other secular modern nation.  
 Rima, a twenty-seven year old artist and record label manager and one of the five 
planners explained: “Pride is peaceful, it is positive. It is going to be different. We are not going 
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to burn tires or garbage or shoot anyone.”clxxxix  Here, Rima revealed her belief in the link 
between secularism and non-violence, as well as the deep class biases that undergirded much of 
Laique Pride’s planning. After all, the shabab who block roads with burning tires and garbage 
are assumed to be members of the lower and undereducated classes. In today's Lebanon, it seems 
impossible that an AUB student might burn garbage to block the road facing the American 
University (Bliss Street) or that a young man born and bred in the wealthy neighborhoods of 
Beirut might form a “gang” to protect his neighborhood from sectarian and class intruders. Yet 
these are regular occurrences across middle and working class neighborhoods in Beirut.cxc  The 
organizers, all of whom are college-educated and employed in managerial positions or work as 
artists, are from Lebanon's middle and upper-middle classes. Two live in Paris year-round and 
the other three in Beirut. They know each other through Lebanon's extensive network of artists 
and from the country's LGBTQ scene. Four are somewhat established members of that 
burgeoning community. In fact the sexuality of the planners became a flashpoint among civil 
society groups that formed the Laique Pride network. While some groups such as the tayyar—
whom we met in Chapter Three—were suspicious that the planners were going to “smuggle” a 
gay agenda into Laique Pride (interview with BA), LGBTQ groups such as Helem and Meem, 
emboldened by the planners' open sexuality, demanded that gay rights be included in the public 
platform of Laique Pride. The organizers themselves were divided over the extent to which gay 
rights should be included in the demands of the march, but they were very clear about the 
association of secularism with tolerance towards homosexuality. They all believed that if a 
‘culture of secularism’ could prevail in the hearts and minds of Lebanese citizens, the state 
would eventually grant homosexual and female citizens rights equal to those of heterosexual 
men.   
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 The association of tolerance of homosexuality with secularism has been tackled in 
previous chapters and should not be surprising at this point. Religious leaders have long argued 
that a civil marriage law will lead to gay marriage.cxci Da‘wa secularists, in response, have 
maintained a clear and vocalized distance from LGBTQ groups. Both homophobia and political 
expediency inform this position. Rima distanced herself from the association between Laique 
Pride and gay rights, arguing that her female sex and gender (aligned accordingly) motivated her 
desire to live in a tolerant and secular country more than her sexuality. Her co-planner, Jean, 
emphatically stated the symbiotic nature of a “gay pride” event and Laique Pride. “Of course” 
Jean said, “Laique Pride” is inspired by the San Francisco gay pride marches of the 1970s, which 
were all about the announcement of presence.” Jean continued, “Our pride is about the declaring 
our presence and about telling everyone that secular people exist in Lebanon and their needs are 
not being met. We are proud of who we are, of our secular identity. We are not going to 
hide.”cxcii  
The Laique Pride march was in effect a public and mass coming out party—not of 
LGBTQ members of the initiative—but rather for a community of people who identify as 
members of a secular counter-public. The fact that this was an act of da‘wa secularism was 
clarified by the planners' insistence that the primary goal of the march was to give others the 
confidence to come out as seculars and as “true citizens” who did not want their citizenship 
mediated through sectarianism. In fact, Rima encouraged marchers to “shed all identities other 
than the secular one” while marching. In public statements, she equated the rainbow flag with 
that of Hizballah, saying that they were both banned at the march because too many identities 
would “end up being provocative.” Of course gay people and members of Hizballah or the 
Phalange party could attend, but only if they agreed to circulate publicly as “seculars” and forego 
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the signs and symbols of their divisive politics.cxciii  
  “We want to brand secularism,” said Nadya, who does modern dance and lives between 
Paris and Beirut.cxciv Musicians, local celebrities, and graphic designers were enlisted to help in 
this process. A logo, a viral video campaign, a jingle, and a radio spot soon followed.  The aims 
were to associate secularism with positivity and “good feeling” as well as show others 
unrepresented in a sectarian system that there is an alternative and that they are not alone. This 
position is not the same as advocating for the end of political sectarianism, as we have seen in 
chapter two.  Finally, the organizers wanted to educate the masses about how secularism could 
improve their lives. At the very least, they wanted to show spectators that there was a group of 
Lebanese citizens who felt threatened by what they called the “culture of sectarianism.”  The 
ultimate goal, projected into the distant future, is the end of political sectarianism and eventually, 
a unitary and compulsory secular personal status law (see Chapter Three). The immediate goals 
of Laique Pride, however, were to saturate Beirut with a “culture of secularism” for one day and 
to pressure the government into a series of reforms. These reforms included the right for women 
to grant citizenship to their spouses and children and an optional secular personal status law. The 
march was an opportunity for those who identify as “secular” to be proud of whom they are, and 
to show their secular pride publicly.   
As Charles Hirschkind has written in the context of Cairo, “the practice of da‘wa does 
not map onto the constitutionally demarcated separation of public and private but rather traverses 
this distinction in a way that is sometimes uncomfortable to those with secular liberal 
sensibilities.”cxcv  Da‘wa secularists in Lebanon are the ones with comfortable liberal secular 
sensibilities; they are the ones undertaking “da‘wa on the streets.”cxcvi They see themselves as 
belonging to a minority community that identifies as secular/liberals, which is disrupting 
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normative sectarian space.  They constitute a counter-public to what they see as a hegemonic 
sectarian public. Da‘wa secularists simultaneously demanded protection from the state as a 
minority community and sought to expand the existing community of secular liberals through 
acts of da‘wa such as Laique Pride or, as we saw in previous chapters, acts such removing one’s 
personal status from census records. This vision of secular sincerity is mediated through calls 
that urge others to identify with the Lebanese state above all other identifications, warning of 
dire consequences (sectarian civil war) if people continue not to do so. Talal Asad has written 
that citizenship is the medium of secularism in an era of nation states.cxcvii For da‘wa secularists, 
citizenship and secularism mediate each other-one can only be a “sincere citizen” if she are 
secular. “True secularism” can only flourish when citizens become sincere in their singular 
attachment to the state and forgo all other socio-political attachments. Thus Laique Pride is open 
to the participation of everyone as long as they demonstrate that they identify, or desire to 
identify, as secular citizens, an identification that supersedes all other political identifications.  
 The framework of da‘wa secularism does not shun religious identification or practice. 
Rather, it relegates religion to the (fantasy of the) private sphere, away from politics and away 
from law. Da‘wa secularism is also tolerant of sectarianism, as long as sectarianism is confined 
to its proper place and stops perverting both religion and secularism. For the planners of Laique 
Pride, nowhere was sectarianism's perverse potential more evident than in practices of religious 
conversion that are done for reasons other than what da’wa secularists would consider 
“religious.” To understand why these practices of possibly insincere conversion was highlighted 
as an example of all that is wrong in Lebanon, we must first turn our attention to what 
constellations of meaning and affect da‘wa secularists gesture towards when they use the words 
“secularism” and “sectarianism.”  
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Sectarianism  
 
 For da‘wa secularists, sectarianism must not be confused with religion. Some, like the 
Harvard-educated corporate lawyer we met in a previous chapter, believe that sectarian groups 
have ceased to rely on religious faith or ritual for a common identity and instead have become 
“cultural groups” that may retain particular religious practices, but are emptied of their religious 
content.cxcviii  For these activists, political sectarianism is a mode of multi-cultural politics that 
must be reformed, but not abolished. Sectarian groups must be “freed” from their religious 
leadership and from religious personal status law and institutions. Once this happens, religion 
will be relegated to the private sphere and “sect” will remain as a secular political category, one 
that an individual can “opt out” of by removing their personal status from the census registry. In 
particular, if the sectarian is to be trusted as “cultural” it must be completely disentangled from 
the potential excesses and irrationalities of religion, and ideally (and eventually) also 
disentangled from personal status law. Others, such as Akram –the young founder of a group of 
AUB-educated activists called The Nineteenth Sect—invert this statement. They believe that 
religion must be saved from the “poison” of sectarianism.  
During an interview Akram stated that “sectarianism is political, it has nothing to do with 
religion and in fact it damages religion. A truly religious person would not be sectarian.”cxcix 
Akram and other members of The Nineteenth Sect believe that a secular state that is not 
organized by political sectarianism would protect religion from the corrosive nature of sectarian 
rivalry and discrimination. Another group, the AUB Secular Club, agrees. Rola, one of the 
leaders of that group, put it succinctly: “We have nothing against religion, but we do [have a lot] 
against sectarianism.”cc These two different positions and understandings of political 
sectarianism can be summarized as follows: The first position maintains that sectarianism and 
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sectarian identity must be freed from religion and become “culture,” with the caveat that all 
cultures must be tolerated and represented equally in a newly secular Lebanon. The second 
position, maintained by Akram and the AUB Secular Club, is that religion must be freed from 
sectarianism so that religion can be a private and individual choice that preserves the essence of 
faith without the polluting influences of sectarianism. Both positions, however, maintain that 
political sectarianism cannot be ended until the population has ceased being sectarian.  
 In planning meetings for Laique Pride almost all participants (save for a small group of 
Marxists) agreed that religion and sectarianism are understood as separate.  However, the 
question was how to go about removing political sectarianism proved too controversial to 
discuss, as referred to below. Instead, after participating in hundreds of hours of discussions with 
the network of groups organizing the march in addition to the smaller planning committee, a 
picture of sectarianism began to emerge: Sectarianism is an impediment to achieving “true” and 
“full” citizenship, an identity perennially locked in a rivalry with national identity. Further, 
sectarianism is the main vehicle of the corruption, intolerance, and ineptitude of the Lebanese 
state. For Laique Pride organizers, sectarianism was understood to be separate from, and have a 
negative impact on, religion. For these activists, religion had to be protected from sectarianism. 
The best way to do that was to embark on a campaign to change people's allegiances towards to 
the state through sustained secular and nationalist da‘wa. As a short-term goal, Laique Pride 
pushed for an optional secular personal status. Members of the planning committee believed that 
once Lebanese citizens were educated enough to demand their rights, most would choose the 
“optional” secular personal status, which would subsequently become normative.  
 An important aspect of Laique Pride's agenda was developing and promoting a sense of 
“karama” (dignity) among Lebanese citizens. Perhaps foreshadowing a political emotion that 
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would, two years later, ignite the Arab uprisings, Lebanese da‘wa secularists believed that the 
corruption engendered by sectarianism kept Lebanese citizens subservient to their sectarian 
leaders. However, while the Arab uprisings would focus on how authoritarian leaders robbed 
their citizens of dignity by denying them basic human and bodily rights, Laique Pride organizers 
stressed that citizens had to abandon their sectarian leaders and turn to the state, where they 
could find dignity in “true” citizenship. Despite the fact that Lebanon is a country where thirty 
percent of the population is classified as “poor” or “in poverty,”cci and that people are tied to 
networks out of patronage due to diverse considerations, organizers still insisted that if citizens 
had dignity, they could choose to not be corrupted.  
Rima likened sectarian identification to gender identification and misidentification, 
clarifying that if she had been identified as a Shi‘a and as a girl at birth, such an identification 
didn't make either “true.” It was her choice to refuse the misrecognition of her identity as “Shi‘i,” 
and if she could do it, others could, and should, make the same choice. If they did not make that 
choice, they were sectarian and had not yet become “true” citizens. “People who engage in 
networks of patronage are sectarian. Maybe they are unknowing, but they are sectarian,” she 
emphasized. One of the goals of Laique Pride was to educate people as to their rights according 
to Lebanese law, to empower them to make choices and, importantly, to show others that there 
were some Lebanese citizens who had made the choice to be non-sectarian, and that thus it was 
possible. During the march, people distributed copies of the constitution to fellow marchers and 
passers-by. Constitutional articles, particularly Articles 7 and 9, were printed on banners so that 
marchers and spectators could read and learn about the rights they were guaranteed as citizens.  
  Article 7. All the Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal 
  civil and political rights and are equally subjected to public charges 
  duties, without any distinction whatever.  
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  Article 9. Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to 
  Almighty, the State respects all creeds and guarantees and protects the 
  free exercise, on condition that they do not interfere with public order 
  It also guarantees to individuals, whatever their religious allegiance 
  respect of their personal status and their religious interests. 
 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, these two constitutional articles are the most cited in the 
jurisprudence of the Council. Recently, feminists and LBGTQ activists, in addition to activist 
judges, have highlighted Article Seven of the Constitution to argue that all gender-based 
discrimination in law must end.  Da‘wa secularists, for their part, have highlighted Article Nine 
in arguments for the right to not have a personal status and in their campaign for an optional 
secular personal status law. As we have seen in previous chapters, conversion cases adjudicated 
at the Council hinge on both of these articles. Justices weigh the individual rights to due process 
and to exercise religion freely alongside the state's duty to regulate and determine what 
constitutes the “public good.” As argued in chapters two and three, these cases dealing with 
conversion, in part, the disarticulation of personal status, sect, and religion. The Council 
maintains this disarticulation by insisting that the evidentiary terrain for judging whether or not a 
conversion has violated public order is the bureaucratic paper trail, and not a citizen’s interiority 
or subjectivity. Using this logic, the court argues that the public face of a person's identity (their 
personal status) is what matters; what a citizen truly believes is not the state's business. The court 
maintains this logic even when, as in the example below, it rules against a convert. 
Sincere Conversion, Insincere Conversion 
In 1989 the Council reached a decision in a case concerning a man who had converted 
from Armenian Catholicism to Sunni Islam in order to marry. Unfortunately, he was already 
married to a woman and had children, all of whom were Armenian Orthodox. In a ruling from 
the Armenian Orthodox Court of First Instance, the court ruled in favor of the wife, granting her 
a divorce on the grounds of abandonment, custody over their children, and ordering the man to 
  155 
pay a generousccii alimony to his now ex-wife. The man refused to comply with the ruling. The 
Sunni Personal Status Court of First Instance issued a different divorce ruling in favor of the 
husband. In response, the Armenian Orthodox High Court issued another stern ruling, which was 
even more generous to the woman. Exasperated, the man appealed to the Council, stating that as 
a Muslim the Armenian Orthodox Court has no jurisdiction over him, his marriages, and his 
children. In a brief filed to the Council, lawyers for the Orthodox court highlighted that the 
plaintiff still attended church services and insisted that his children attend bible school. 
Therefore, the brief argued, the man’s conversion to Islam was not “sincere” and should be 
revoked. Upholding this conversion, clearly performed solely for legal expediency, the brief 
warned, would damage the “public good.” The Council refused to accept these allegations, even 
if they were true, as evidence, and responded that interrogating a citizen's faith could itself be an 
injury to the public good. The Council looked instead to the dates of the marriage, the 
conversion, and its registration with the census registry. Based on this paper trail alone, the 
Council ruled in favor of the ex-wife and the Armenian Orthodox court. The deciding factor was 
that the man had converted to Islam alone, which according to state law does not alter the 
jurisdiction of the court that issued the initial marriage contract. In their decision they careful 
stated that they did not have the right to question a person’s faith, and that if the court began to, 
the damage to the public good and to citizens' rights would be irreparable.cciii  
 Decisions such as this highlight the divergences between the secularity of the state and 
what da‘wa secularists mean when they use the word “secularism.” For the jurists who sit on the 
Council, itself a civil/secular body, requiring citizens to “prove” that their faith and conversion 
are sincere is an infringement on both the right to privacy and the right to freely practice (or not) 
religion. They consistently wrote that it was not for the courts to look into a citizen's conscious, a 
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logic that is reminiscent of Muslim jurists' assertion that it is not their job to question a would be 
convert's soul (see previous chapter). By contrast, according to archival research, Christian 
jurists placed heavy importance on “proving” a sincere change of faith prior to the act of 
conversion. Webb Keane has pointed to sincerity, predicated on the idea that acts in the world 
are accurate translations of internalized states and an interior will, as a critical aspect of what he 
names the “Christian modern.”cciv Keane's insights on colonial Indonesia help us understand the 
logic used in Lebanese briefs by Christian personal status courts to the (secular) Council in order 
to overturn conversions they argue are not “sincere.”ccv Keane's work also reveals another more 
startling point—da‘wa secularists’ views on religious conversion that are open to the charge of 
insincerity are more similar to those of the Maronite Church, for example, than they are to those 
of Lebanese courts. Da‘wa secularists emphasize the importance of sincerity and of an 
internalized will, but the passionate attachment they seek is to the secular state.  Highlighting the 
examples of what they consider insincere conversion, they accuse the current political and legal 
system of allowing the categories of religion and sectarianism to pollute one another. Da‘wa 
secularists understand the fact that personal status courts and civil procedures allow people to 
convert into a community without “proving” their sincerity as evidence that personal status 
institutions and personalities confuse religious tenets of belonging with sectarian rivalry and 
sectarian-engendered corruption.  
In fact, Lebanese personal status courts do disarticulate religion, sect, and personal status 
in their rulings concerning conversions that may turn out to be “insincere,” as is evident in a 
court case from Beirut’s Sunni Court in 1995, described below. This ruling, and others like it, 
culled from Christian and Muslim personal status court records, demonstrates that:  1) Despite 
what da‘wa secularists posit, the legal epistemology of personal status law and in the practices of 
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personal status courts disarticulate religion and sectarianism. 2) At several moments of this court 
decision the secular practices of the state are referred to and articulated clearly. Such rulings 
allow us to think (again) on how a practice of conversion engenders particular legal practices that 
draw and redraw lines between religion as a category of practice/faith, personal status law, and 
civil law–but this time from the vantage point of a personal status court.  
The 1995 case takes up a 1989 caseccvi that concerns a Sunni Muslim who converted to 
Chaldean Christianity sometime in the 1980s. The court documents do not reveal or speculate on 
the reason for conversion. In 1995 he converts “back” to Islam. Again, the court decision did not 
speculate as to the reason for conversion. However, his father died before he could finish the 
bureaucratic steps to “complete” his return to Islam and thus satisfy the legal requirements of the 
Lebanese state. At the time of his father’s death his identification papers had not yet been 
changed. According to the transcript of the court decision, at this stage “he has no religion” –but 
he does have a personal status. In this case, at the time of his father’s death the man’s personal 
status was still listed as Chaldean Christian.  Despite this fact, he was recognized as one of his 
father’s heirs during the initial drawing up of the estate.  
The court decision refers to the convert’s aunt as the claimant and the convert himself as 
the defendant. The aunt argued that at the time of her brother’s death her nephew was not a 
Muslim according to the personal status registries. As such he was disqualified from inheriting 
from his father, a Sunni Muslim. Following a long and detailed explanation of the laws 
governing conversion the court ruled that because at the time of his father’s death the 
bureaucratic procedures required for conversion had not been completed, and thus his 
identification card had not been changed, he was not allowed to inherit. The aunt won the case 
and was bequeathed half of his inheritance share. The defendant's sister, the aunt’s niece, 
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received the second half. 
This case, and several like it, demonstrates how, even in personal status law, we might 
begin to disentangle “religion” and “sectarianism” as categories of analysis. In much academic 
literature there is an implicit, and sometimes explicit, conflation of religion and sectarianism.ccvii 
Such a conflation is also evident in the discourse of secular groups, particularly when they equate 
sectarian violence with what they consider the irrationality and excessive nature of religion. It is 
only through making such an equivalence that activism for a secular personal status can be 
understood as activism for peace in a perennially at-war Lebanon. In the transcript of the court 
decision I have summarized, at several points a careful disarticulation is made between the 
demands of religion regarding conversion and the demands of the state, which all personal status 
judges and courts must uphold and apply. The court decision opens with a review of the law 
governing conversion.  
 
Pursuant to Article 41 of the 12/07/1951 law, which states: 
 
Each petition concerning changing religion or madhhab must be sent to the office of 
personal status for correcting the identification registration record, and this petition must 
be supported by the testimony of the leader of the madhhab or religion that he [the 
petitioner] wishes to embrace and is contingent upon the signature of the petitioner after 
which an employee of the personal status [division of government] sends for him and 
asks him in the presence of two witnesses if he insists on his petition and in the case that 
he does an official report stating that is written up on the petition itself and the 
identification record is corrected. 
 
This passage is referred to throughout the remainder of the Sunni court decision. It explains in 
detail the bureaucratic procedures required for a change in identification papers and thus the 
completion of an act of conversion. The state demands the same procedures from all citizens 
regardless of sect. Further, the requirements of conversion within religions (from Maronite to 
Greek Orthodox or from Sunni to Shi‘i) are the same as those governing conversion between 
religions. In the court decision, the demands of religion regarding conversion are not described in 
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full other than to say the defendant has completed them.  
As such, according to Lebanese law, which is the sovereign law, the proclamation of 
Islam alone is not sufficient to effect a change in religion from a non-Muslim to a Muslim 
and [he] thus remains a Christian according to Lebanese law even if Islamic principles 
considers any person who professes the two proclamations a Muslim. 
 
And since it is not permissible to legally recognize documents pertaining to a 
proclamation of Islam unless they are accompanied by a change in the official 
identification registries that are the primary reference for giving the Islam of this person 
all of the legal rights [pursuant to that religion].ccviii 
 
These passages perform a discursive separation between “religious” and “state” 
requirements concerning conversion. They simultaneously elevate the arena of the state as 
sovereign. While the court recognizes that the defendant completed the religious requirements of 
conversion to Islam, he has not completed the state’s legal and bureaucratic requirements. 
Therefore, according to personal status law, which the court adjudicates, he cannot have the legal 
rights of Sunni Islam bestowed upon him. He remained a member of the Chaldean personal 
status, despite the fact that he satisfied the “Islamic principles [that] consider any person who 
professes the two proclamations a Muslim.”  He was, at the moment of his father’s death, a 
Muslim according to Islamic principles, and a Chaldean Christian according to the Lebanese 
state and, it turns out, according to Sunni personal status law. Here, personal status is separated 
from religion and rendered a codified body of state law. In the text of the court decision, three 
categories of identification are referred to repeatedly; religion, personal status, and state [ie: 
citizenship].  They are disaggregated as categories of reference and identification. Religion, 
personal status and citizenship, as categories of practice, are always referred to by the Sunni 
judges adjudicating this case as separate from “the state” or “the law” that inflects these 
categories with meaning and legal force. As argued in Chapter Two, the demarcation, separation, 
and organization of discursive space is the work of politics and is productive of what Tim 
Mitchell calls the “state effect.” Through such effects the state emerges as a bounded, rational, 
  160 
and sovereign actor.ccix  
The legal practices displayed in this personal status court decision also articulate a 
practice of secularism. The decision highlights the fact that personal status law is state law and 
has a different set of procedures for determining religious conversion than religious institutions. 
Furthermore, civil law, as that which governs the procedures of conversion, is consistently 
referred to as the only basis upon which personal status judges are allowed to adjudicate a case. 
Not only is personal status itself rendered a body of secular state law, but the sovereignty and 
unity of the Lebanese state is presented and performed in this court decision and others like it.   
Acts of conversion are an instantiation of the power of the Lebanese state to transcend the 
particularity of any one community and authorize movement to another. At the precise moment 
when the rights of one personal status are deemed unacceptable, the aporia of the state is opened 
as that which sanctions the possibility of changing one’s horizon of rights through an act of 
conversion. The Muslim jurists deciding this case, importantly, know that a civil and secular 
state body, The Council, has the power to reverse and/or nullify their decision. the Council and 
the jurists who serve on it are the unaddressed yet present audience of all personal status court 
decisions concerning or resulting from acts of conversion. 
Moreover, the impasses between religious requirements for conversion and state 
requirements represent a generative moment of Lebanese nationalism, following Wedeen,ccx and 
state power, following Mitchell.ccxi In the passage I am referring to, the state is characterized as 
the arbiter of sectarian disputes and as invested in keeping a peaceful coexistence between 
sectarian communities.  
[T]he jurisdiction [of the courts] cannot transgress obligatory texts that were founded by 
the Lebanese legislature in order to avert disputes between the sects. They did this by 
making the legality of conversion contingent upon the change of official identification 
registration.ccxii 
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Here, a clear hierarchy between personal status law and civil law is established. This statement 
also performs an important tenet of national ideology. It reproduces an image of the Lebanese 
state as a zone of “compromise” between sectarian communities that pre-date it. Read through 
the ideological grid of Lebanese nationalism, the rationale of state formation and practices was, 
and is, the peaceful management of these communities.   
Importantly, da‘wa secularists also believe, as argued in Chapter Three, that sectarianism 
is a historical problem that pre-dates the Lebanese state. This is part of the reason why, for them, 
the possibility of a legally recognized and bounded secular community has radical implications. 
Such a law, in da‘wa logic, will enable the birth of the first Lebanese community that can truly 
claim to belong to the state.  Da‘wa secularists argue that current forms of citizenship are 
deficient because they are tied to modes of community and belonging that pre-exist and rival the 
state for loyalty and affection.  This is despite the fact that sectarian groups are a historical 
phenomenonccxiii that was transformed in the state era.ccxiv Da‘wa secularists point to the 
dialogical and productive relationship between the state and sectarian groups as evidence that the 
state is insufficiently sovereign and secular.  However, the 1995 case decision and others like it, 
allude to a more complicated and regulative relationship between the state and all sectarian 
communities, a relationship that is productive of state sovereignty.  
And before this conversion is completed at all the official authorities his original personal 
status or religion remains and does not change i.e.: the Christian remains a Christian as 
long as his Identification Card indicates that he still is the son of his original sect and one 
of its followers in the view of Lebanese law.ccxv 
 
The above passage highlights the “double bind” of the Lebanese citizen.  She is produced 
as a citizen through practices that blur boundaries between “religion” and “state law.” The 
traversal of these boundaries—through both personal status and civil law— is necessary to marry 
and divorce, inherit and bequeath, to be issued a birth certificate and a burial plot, and countless 
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other quotidian practices. Throughout, “sex” remains an unspoken but potent category of 
practice, one whose identification affects citizens across the legal system. The totalizing reality 
of personal status and civil law is what Jean is referring to when he speaks of the need for an 
optional secular personal status, “we need a law that will govern us from birth to death if we are 
really going to be seculars.”ccxvi For Jean, to be a sincere secularist is equivalent to being a good 
citizen.  
 During the Laique Pride March, insincere religious conversion was highlighted as a 
practice that encapsulated the absurdity of the Lebanese state. While the courts consider their 
sovereignty over religious conversion to be a testament to the state's secularity, da‘wa secularists 
such as Rima believe that religious conversion done for “the wrong reasons” highlights how 
Lebanon is anything but secular. “Lebanese law is secular, but Lebanon is not secular,” Rima 
once said in response to my use of conversion to highlight the way the legal system functions. 
All five members of the Pride planning committee are in their late twenties and early thirties, and 
as such know many couples who have travelled abroad to marry in a civil ceremony or someone 
who, in order to marry someone of another sect in Lebanon, has had to change their religion. 
They chose to highlight conversion that they consider “strategic” rather than faith-based during 
the march because, as Jean said, the idea that “sect and faith are separate is so absurd. It is an 
absurd idea that twists religion.”ccxvii  Rima was more blunt: “This kind of conversion is a farce. 
Religion is something that you really believe in, it is so important. So you have to change it to 
get married? And this is secularism? What a joke.”ccxviii  
 While da‘wa secularists do not equate sectarianism and religion, they believe that the 
separation between them is incomplete. The ultimate goal of their activism is to disarticulate 
them completely, so that sectarianism (and political sectarianism) can be reformed and ended 
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without causing harm or offense to religion. In their vision of a secular Lebanon, the Mufti 
should not speak on behalf of Sunnis, or the Patriarch on behalf of Maronites. No religious head 
should have the right to anoint political leaders or ban rock concerts, and they should have no 
voice when it comes to legal reform. These “establishment” religious leaders are not really 
religious leaders; they are corrupt politicians. They do not know their proper place in a truly 
secular, liberal, and multicultural society. Secularists believe that once the majority of citizens 
understand that religion and sect are distinct, and that the secularism they advocate for is posed 
as a counter to sectarianism, not religion, their da‘wa will be successful in enlisting more and 
more adherents.  
 As is, sectarian and religious leaders—united in corruption and networks of patronage—
together denounce secularists as anti-religious and as atheists. Being associated with atheism is 
“a position that will get you nowhere in a Muslim country like Lebanon,” said Akram, the 
founder of The Nineteenth Sect, demonstrating the danger of such an association. In fact, 
informal and structural ties blur the lines of establishment religion and politics in Lebanon.  The 
personal status system, itself perhaps the best example of “establishment religion,” is by 
definition a blurred line. Muslim personal status institutions are regulated by civil law, judges are 
paid by the state, and representatives of the attorney general's office must be present during 
divorce hearings. While the entanglement of Christian personal status institutions with the state 
is far less institutionalized, political leaders still court the blessings of religious leaders, and vice 
versa, in order to maintain power and legitimacy. For example, the Maronite Patriarch plays an 
informal role in the election of the country's President, as does the Sunni Mufti in the selection of 
the Prime Minister. The difference is that once elected, the Prime Minister can appoint the Mufti, 
whereas the Patriarch is appointed by the Vatican in Rome. In interviews with priest-judges, this 
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difference was explained by the fact that Christianity was more “secular” than Islam. In 
interviews with sheikhs, however, the difference was explained historically, by reference to the 
office of the Mufti under the Ottoman Empire. Harkening back to the Keane's notion of a 
“Christian modern,” a highly respected Maronite priest who was formerly the dean of a respected 
law school in Lebanon said: “Islam has never been able to make a proper distinction between 
politics and religion.” Quoting scripture, Pere Paul continued “we have always been more 
secular, Christ himself said render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the 
things that are God's. Islam is almost the opposite, it is both worlds.”ccxix 
Sincere Religion, Sincere Secularism  
 
 
From Left to Right1) Fatima (a name that is read as Muslim) and Tony (a name that is read as Christian) want to get 
married. A problem? 2) I want to marry you. Should I change my sect? 3) I want to be President of the Republic. 
Should I become a Maronite? This sign is supposed to highlight the fact that women and non-Maronites are 
excluded from holding the office of the president. 
 
The planners of Laique Pride considered non-faith based practices of conversion absurd because 
they did not conform to their understanding of religion, secularism, and how these categories 
map onto notions of private and public space. In their view, these practices of conversion are an 
abuse of religion because they are only possible due to the corrupting influences of sectarianism. 
They accuse whom they consider to be insincere converts, and those that point to this practice as 
evidence of the Lebanese state's secularity (such as myself) of misrecognizing agency, and 
misrecognizing true secularism.  In this logic, even if the person strategically converting is not 
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religious, his actions are disrespectful and harmful to religion. This type of (as opposed to “true” 
or “sincere”) conversion is an example of one of the ways that sectarianism perverts religion by 
bringing it into the public sphere and allowing for its regulation by the state. Because of this, 
actions such as baptism or the recital of witnessing, two actions integral to conversion into 
Catholicism or Islam- have ceased being “rituals [that] are always a sincere sign of what should 
be interior: faith.”ccxx Instead, every time a religious conversion takes place in Lebanon, there is a 
possibility that it is insincere, and for da‘wa secularists, this possibility is partly due to the 
absence of a secular personal status law. While the state refuses to interrogate whether or not a 
convert has truly experienced a change of faith, da‘wa secularists would make such interrogation 
of intention and sincerity routine. They believe that once religion is returned to the private sphere 
and is once again easily recognizable as faith, Lebanon will become a “truly” secular state. It is 
at that point that sectarianism can be reformed and, in the short term, professionalized (read: 
meritocratized) without offending anyone's religious sensibilities.  
Once a secular personal status law exists, it will be clear that those who continue to be 
under the jurisdiction of religious personal status laws are clearly doing so out of religious belief 
and not because they were born into it. In this framework, the presence of a secular personal 
status law will enable citizens to have choice and free will over the most intimate areas of their 
life.  A secular law will purify what da‘wa secularists see as the fuzzy borders between the 
secular, the sectarian, and the religious in Lebanon. This claim runs counter to the Council, 
which practices Lebanese sovereignty and secularity precisely by continuously drawing and 
redrawing the lines between these three categories.ccxxi   
 Da‘wa secularists frame secularism in contrast to sectarianism, not in contrast to religion. 
In fact, da‘wa secularists seek to save religion from sectarianism, which they understand to be a 
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purely political, and cynical, practice of politics that functions mainly though practices of 
corruption and discourses of discrimination. Because sectarianism is very much in the public 
sphere, “true” religion must be put safely in the private sphere. In Talal Asad's words, 
“liberalism insists that religion has an autonomous essence not to be confused with the essence 
of science, or politics, or of common sense . . . liberalism invites us to define religion as a 
transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon.”ccxxii Because sectarianism is understood to be a 
particularly Lebanese mode of politics, the secularism that da‘wa secularists wish to instate, and 
that is defined in contrast to sectarianism, is also understood as particular. In fact, out of the sect-
religion-secular trifecta, da’wa secularists consider only religion to be trans-historical and 
transcultural.  In part, Laique Pride was about showing others that sectarianism is something that 
one can “choose” to be liberated from without violating the essence of religion. As Rima stated, 
“I think there are many people who are liberated from their sectarian belongings, and here we are 
showing them that they have an option, that here we are. We are people who have a belonging 
that is not sectarian.”ccxxiii  One can choose to be non-sectarian, and thus being sectarian 
“becomes that which is ‘unacceptable’ and ‘individually culpable’ rather than that which 
symptomizes deep political distress in a culture,” in the words of Wendy Brown.ccxxiv However, 
because involvement in economic networks of patronage is considered a sectarian activity, the 
planners of Laique Pride were unknowingly perpetuating the idea that only those with economic 
means could be non-sectarian, because it is only they that can “choose” to be completely 
economically independent of sectarian leaders with minimal personal costs.   
 Because Lebanese secularism understood as the foil to Lebanese sectarianism, da‘wa 
secularists argue that secularism in Lebanon will be different than secularism anywhere else. The 
week before the march, Akram explained that, “what we need is pragmatic secularism, not 
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dogmatic secularism; you have to mold the secular to fit the society.” This sentiment was 
expressed by a chant during the march, “[we want] a Lebanese secularism, neither French nor 
Turkish secularism.” However, when asked to explain what exactly they meant when they used 
the word “secularism,” the planners of Laique Pride were evasive. In part, this evasiveness was 
due to a tacit understating that political sectarianism is itself a historical, political, and thus 
secular phenomenon. Da‘wa secularists acknowledge the secular nature of sectarianism, arguing 
that their struggle is to move Lebanon away from the incomplete secularism of political 
sectarianism towards “true secularism.” “True secularism” is more than the separation of religion 
and state and it is more than the establishment of juridical and epistemological boundaries.  
For da‘wa secularists, secularism is a cultural form, it is a way of life, and it is a way of 
viewing the world and the people within it.  The reforms that da‘wa secularists advocate for are 
directed towards fostering a culture of secularism and institutionalizing it. The presence of a 
secular personal status law is understood as both enabling this culture to flourish and as creating 
the infrastructure for a life-world to flourish.  This culture of secularism is defined by tolerance, 
open-mindedness, and freedom. Thus reforms such as the decriminalization of homosexual acts, 
changing the nationality law, and promoting the freedom of artistic expression are all associated 
with secularism. In fact, all of the legal reforms that da‘wa secularists work towards are reforms 
of secular laws. In this way, da‘wa secularism is less about changing the nature of the Lebanese 
state from religious to secular, and more about transforming the type of secularism that the state 
practices. This transition is one from secularism as political and legal praxis to a secularism that 
is formed through the joining of disparate practices, dispositions, values, embodiments, and 
affect. While the secularism of the state can be understood as classically liberal, the secularism 
envisioned by da‘wa secularists uses the word liberal not as an ideology or epistemic space, but 
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rather in its pedestrian understanding as progressive values. 
 Marie Rose Zalzal, a respected lawyer and public intellectual who has been a leading 
force in the reform of personal status law and the legislation of a secular personal status, is one 
of the “elders” that the Laique Pride planning committee sought out for advice. After meeting 
and speaking with them about the future they wanted for Lebanon, Marie Rose told me that they 
are “liberals more than anything else. The Lebanese state is secular, but they want something 
else.” She reached this conclusion after understanding that they did not want to end political 
sectarianism and that choice, tolerance, difference and identity were the most important values in 
their campaign. As such, they were advocating for an optional personal status law rather than for 
a mandatory one, a position that Marie Rose believes is misguided due to the fact that until there 
is one unitary law for all Lebanese citizens, men and women will be differentiated to the 
detriment of women. “Sexism should not be a choice, nor should feminism be only for a few 
people. They should be clear,” Marie Rose said between sips of coffee at the cafe in the lawyers 
syndicate: “If they want liberalism, if they want secularism and liberalism, that is what they 
should say.”ccxxv  
 If, as Saba Mahmood argues, secularism functions through a series of binaries,ccxxvi the 
secularism gestured towards by the planners of Laique Pride could perhaps be better 
characterized as functioning through word association. Just as secularism connotes liberal values 
and practices, for da‘wa secularists, sectarianism connotes repressive and negative practices.  
Through a comparison of the attributes associated with secularism and with sectarianism, we can 
learn, as Asad argues, “how people live the secular . . . how they vindicate the essential freedom 
and responsibility of the sovereign in opposition to the constraints of that self by religious [in 
Lebanon: sectarian] discourses.”ccxxvii  The picture below, of a child holding a placard announcing 
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her availability for marriage, is an illustration of this insight. By drawing on discourses linking 
Islamic marriage precepts with child abuse, the protestors insinuate that a secular personal status 





“Girl for marriage. 11 years old. Sweet girl, knows how to boil an egg. Vote yes for a Lebanese personal status law.” 
 
 In this photo, we are invited to associate practices such as child abuse with religious 
personal status, and simultaneously invited to associate the banning of such practices under a 
secular personal status.ccxxviii  The words, values, and principles associated with secularism and 
sectarianism form, in part, what da‘wa secularists mean when they refer to a “culture of 
secularism” and a “culture of sectarianism” (see Chapter Two).  
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Secular   /     Sectarian  
Progressive        Restrictive 
Modern        Traditional 
Tolerant         Intolerant 
Freedom        Censorship 
Choice         Inheritance 
Reformist        Conservative 
Meritocratic        Corrupt 
Freedom of Religion       Establishment Religion  
Individuality        Group Identity 
Citizenship        Subject 
Sincerity        Insincerity  
Love         Fear  
Peace         War 
Security        Danger 




 While the first column represents the values and practices that will saturate the public 
sphere once the culture of secularism replaces the culture of sectarianism, in the short term 
da‘wa secularists want to provide for citizens who already identify as “seculars.” When 
characterizing the marchers of Laique Pride, Rima said, “This is not a political party; this is a 
group of people whose needs are not being met.”ccxxix In the discourse of da‘wa secularists, the 
right to be secular is one articulation of the freedom of religion, a principle that both the 
Lebanese constitution and Lebanese courts uphold. In order to practice secularism, these citizens 
need a secular personal status and a new category of non-sectarian affiliation. As stated earlier, 
these are seen as short-term measures, because da‘wa secularism is predicated on the idea that 
eventually their values (they are emphatic that this is not an ideology) will become hegemonic. 
As Saba Mahmood has written, “the right to religious freedom is widely regarded as a crowning 
achievement of secular-liberal democracies, one that guarantees the peaceful co-existence of 
religiously diverse populations. . . [and] promises to ensure two stable goods: 1) the ability to 
choose one's religion freely without coercion by the state, church or other institutions; and 2) the 
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creation of a polity in which one's economic, civil, legal or political status is unaffected by one's 
religious beliefs.”ccxxx The fact that thus far, the Lebanese state has resisted legislating a secular 
personal status law and has made the removal of one's personal status a bureaucratic nightmare 
are understood by secularists as injuries to the freedom of religion. 
 
 
1) Official Laique Pride poster. 2) A husband and wife who were married under Cypriot law, and their daughter: all 
Laique Pride participants. 
  
Da‘wa secularists believe that as long as citizens cannot choose to be secular (and be 
within a legal framework that allows such a life world to flourish), there is no freedom of 
religion in Lebanon. The state cannot be considered “truly” secular. The regulatory work of the 
Council, and its emphasis on the freedom of religion, is rendered incomplete in da‘wa discourse 
because freedom of religion will not be realized until the choice to be “secular” is made possible 
through a secular personal status law. Presumably, at that point the Council will regulate this 
personal status alongside the fifteen religious personal status laws currently practiced in 
Lebanon.  Once the majority of Lebanon's citizens are sincere, liberal, and tolerant, a 
transformation will occur simultaneously with the ascendance of a culture of secularism, then 
political sectarianism itself can be reformed and perhaps removed.  
  172 
“If we remove political sectarianism today,” Rima (herself Shi‘i) said, “then everyone [in 
the government] will be Shi‘i, and nobody wants that. We need to spread awareness first.”ccxxxi  
Because da‘wa secularists believe that the “freedom of religious practices is a critical marker of 
a tolerant and civilized polity,”ccxxxii  they link advocacy for a secular personal status with being a 
liberal and tolerant citizen. To identify as a “secular” meant, for Laique Pride planners, that one 
embodied and practiced, or at least desired to embody, values that were linked to secularism by 
association. As the date of the march approached, planners were surprised that two issues they 
believed were centrally associated with secularism—LGBTQ rights and the eventual reform of 
political sectarianism—proved controversial among the participants. It is to these controversies 
that we now turn.  
Controversy: Christians, Gays, and the Question of Minorities.  
 
“I will leave the country if the President stops being Christian. I wouldn't feel safe here” 
-Joanna, LGBTQ activist and Laique Pride Participant 
 
  
Weeks before the March 2009 Laique Pride, Nabih Berri, the Speaker of the 
House/President of Parliament, leader of the political party and ex-civil war militia Amal, 
announced that he supported the end of political sectarianism. To be more precise, Berri 
suggested that the time was right to satisfy one of the conditions of the 1989 Ta'if Accord: the 
formation of a committee to study the end of political sectarianism. Berri's statement was met 
with both support and distrust. It was understood by many to be a veiled threat aimed at Berri's 
political rivals, the March 14 coalition. This is because the Shi‘a sect, whom Berri had made a 
career out of claiming to represent, would most singularly benefit from the end of political 
sectarianism. Thus, rather than being lauded for offering a plan to fully implement the now 
twenty-one year old peace agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war, Berri was accused of 
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inciting sectarianism. The logic of da‘wa was evident in politicians’ statements, op-ed columns, 
and newscasts critiquing Berri: political sectarianism cannot be removed until sectarianism is 
ended. Ending political sectarianism before the citizenry is reformed is a sectarian power grab 
cloaked in the logic of democratization. 
 Berri's statement surprised and disturbed the Laique Pride planners. Not wanting to be 
associated with the notoriously corrupt and sectarian political leader, the planners distanced 
themselves from his statements in public meetings and press interviews. However, Laique Pride 
could not avoid the subject and the controversy that Berri's statement engendered. Planning 
meetings soon became tense when the location of the end of political sectarianism in the Laique 
Pride platform came up. The activists were divided on the issue. Some argued that the political 
system had to be removed immediately and replaced with direct liberal democracy. Others 
argued that this would clear the way for the tyranny of the (Muslim) majority. Even the 
insistence that a woman's right to grant citizenship to her children and spouse, long agreed as 
crucial to the platform, became a source of contention. During one meeting, a trio of college 
students representing a secular club at Université Saint Joseph (USJ) suggested that granting 
such rights to female citizens could function to alter the already fragile sectarian demographics 
of the country. Immediately, accusations were made of anti-Palestinian bigotry, sympathy with 
Hizballah, sexism, chauvinism, and anti-Christian discrimination. The meeting was almost halted 
due to heightened emotions. An appeal to the common desire for a secular personal status law 
was all that ensured that the meeting continued.  
 In discussing how affect and disposition must be understood in order to be part of the 
realm of politics, Charles Hirshkind writes that, “political judgments are not the product of 
rational argumentation alone but also of the way we come to care deeply about certain issues, 
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feel passionately attached to certain traditions.”ccxxxiii  Political debate is both affective and 
rational,ccxxxiv  particularly when discussing controversial questions such as the end of political 
sectarianism or, we shall soon see, LGBTQ rights in Lebanon. The emotions engendered by 
debates on political sectarianism were evident during conversations with planners and 
participants of Laique Pride. Some, like Akram, argue that secularism will produce a “buffer 
between us and war,” a position that draws explicitly on the memory traces and inherited traumas 
of sectarian civil war. For others, the end of political sectarianism is another word for the further 
marginalization of Christians in the Middle East. Jean, a member of the Laique Pride planning 
committee, said that instead of ending political sectarianism, the focus of activism should be on 
developing a meritocracy. Discussing the 2009 parliamentary elections, Jean stated that the 
problem with the current political regime is that “I don't want to vote for him [a presidential 
candidate] just because he is a Christian, I want to vote for him because he is a good candidate 
who is also a Christian.”ccxxxv At a meeting of LGBTQ activists who planned to attend Laique 
Pride, Joanna said that as a Christian, she would be afraid if Maronite Christians were no longer 
guaranteed the post of President of the Republic. When challenged by another participant, who 
asked her how she could march in Laique Pride but be against the end of political sectarianism, 
she said that she was just saying out loud what many people felt: “Muslims can't be trusted with 
a totally secular system.”ccxxxvi  
 While Joanna's statement may seem extreme, many citizens, both Christian and Muslim, 
agree that the prospect of a majority Muslim Lebanese government would be dangerous to 
Lebanese diversity. Another leading da‘wa secularist and member of the tayyar, Ghinwa, said 
during an interview that, “Christians will never agree to the end of political sectarianism until 
they are sure that their Muslim brothers and sisters have become secular.”ccxxxvii  Such statements 
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illustrate Asad's argument that while Islam is generally assumed to be incompatible with secular 
liberalism, the same assumptions are not associated with Christians . . . “That policy seeks to 
encourage a place for a secular religion in the Islamic world on the grounds that Islam would 
then be safer for democracy (i.e. Western countries). Religion is okay, according to this 
worldview, but only if it recognizes its limits and adapts itself to liberal values.”ccxxxviii   
The fact that people assume that a government dominated by Muslims will be less secular 
than today's political configuration should not be surprising given the narratives highlighted in 
Lebanese nationalism and in international discourses about Islam, democracy, and secularism. It 
is not surprising that during one Laique Pride meeting an activist stated that if political 
sectarianism was ended, “They [Muslims] will make us wear chadors, like in Iran.” In Lebanon, 
a country built in part on the logic that Christians in the Middle East needed to be protected from 
the encroachment and discrimination of larger Muslim communities,ccxxxix Asad's words take on 
a particular valence.  People who consider themselves anti-sectarian, such as members of the 
Laique Pride organizing committee, agree that a Muslim majority is potentially dangerous to the 
religious and cultural “mosaic” of Lebanon.  Even Lebanon's answer to the Arab uprisings of 
2011, the youth-driven “we want the fall of the sectarian regime” movement, split following 
acrimonious arguments about establishing direct liberal democracy in Lebanon.  
 In fact, much of the controversy provoked by the question of ending political 
sectarianism is mediated through claims of multi-communalism. As stated in Chapter Three, 
political sectarianism is a system that ensures the proliferation of minorities, and in fact its 
genesis can be partly explained by a desire to prevent a political system that would allow a 
Muslim majority government in Lebanon.ccxl The Lebanese constitution, the 1943 National Pact 
and the 1989 Ta'if Accord all characterize political sectarianism as a temporary solution, one that 
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will be forgone once a solid national identity is built. In national ideology and narrative, Lebanon 
is a country of minorities, and the work of the state is to ensure the protection of these minority 
communities.ccxli Da‘wa secularists re-articulate this logic but with a strategic, and critical, 
difference; they want to be recognized as one of those minorities that deserves and needs the 
state's protection and tolerance. Writing on the genealogy of the concept of “religious minority,” 
Saba Mahmood writes that since 1919, minority has come to connote an “internationally 
sanctioned and politically consolidated category whose primary reference is to the nation state in 
which the minority [holds] citizenship, rather than the [group] to whom he/she is 'racially' [or 
denominationally] belonged.”ccxlii The shared logic of the Lebanese state and of da‘wa 
secularists, which emphasizes that Lebanese citizens are not yet “ready” for the end of political 
sectarianism, suggests that there is doubt around the success of the project to produce Lebanese 
citizens.  
 To be more precise, there is doubt– internally, regionally, and trans-regionally–that the 
project to discipline Muslim minority communities, who place their affiliation to the Lebanese 
state above those of their co-religionists, will succeed. In 1936 the Mufti of Lebanon refused the 
concept that Sunni Muslims were one minority among others,ccxliii arguing that Muslims had 
always been a majority in both in the region and in the territory of the new state. Upon 
independence, a compromise was needed between Arab and Lebanese nationalism. The 1943 
National Pact was meant to ensure that Sunni Muslims “accepted” the independent state of 
Lebanonccxliv and their place as one community among others. Current debates about ending 
political sectarianism reveal similar doubts as to whether Lebanese citizens identify “first” as a 
citizen, a member of a sect, or a member of a competing nationalism (Arab nationalism, Syrian 
nationalism).   
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 This distrust is unevenly distributed because without a Lebanese state and/or a radically 
altered political system, Lebanese Christians would constitute a minority within a Muslim 
majority. For many, this prospect would seal the decline of Christian communities in the Middle 
East. In fact, since the invasion and occupation of Iraq and its negative aftereffects on Iraqi 
Christian communities, and since increasing anti-Coptic agitation in Egypt and the uprising in 
Syria and its effects on Syrian Christians, Lebanese Christian political leaders have spoken 
publicly about the role that Lebanon plays in a region where Christian communities are under 
increasing pressures. Da‘wa secularists defer to and share the political emotions and 
vulnerabilities of Lebanese Christians, seeing their own presence as a secular minority 
vulnerable in a Muslim majority state. Because of these concerns, which are again, unevenly 
distributed among Christians and Muslims, they argue that preserving Lebanon's diversity and 
balance of power is imperative until a majority of Lebanese is not sectarian.    
Secularism: A Homosexual Agenda? 
 
 The most challenging controversy during the planning and execution of the first Laique 
Pride march was the place of LGBTQ activists and rights in the culture of secularism. As stated 
earlier, the five members of the planning committee had different opinions on the subject.  Rima 
explained this divergence openly; “Jean says it openly, that he is a homo and that this is an 
important part of our work. But I don't agree, I don't think it’s a priority. We have so many 
bigger issues than gay rights right now.” The fact that Jean was an effeminate and openly gay 
man caused some controversy in and of itself. Once, while he was chairing a meeting of over 
thirty activists, he moved his body too effeminately for some of his comrades. Afterwards, as I 
was picking up papers from their offices, the head of the tayyar asked me to speak to the Laique 
Pride planning committee about Jean. Bassem was blunt: “A faggot [wahad luti] should not be 
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the public face of our movement, it sends the wrong message. Only the girls [Rima and Nadya] 
should be on TV and giving interviews. That would be much better for all of us.”ccxlv   
For their part, LGBTQ activists were furious that the rainbow flag was not welcome at 
the march. One leader of the Lebanese LGBTQ community demanded that Laique Pride include 
in their platform the repeal of Article 534, which criminalizes unnatural sexual acts, in order to 
prove their secularity. The night before the march the youth leader of Chaml—a prominent NGO 
that submitted a draft secular personal status law to parliament in 2010— called Rima as she and 
I were leaving a meeting dedicated to making banners for the next day. The Chaml representative 
was frantic, saying that she had heard some of the banners might include allusions to LGBTQ 
rights. Chaml could not be publicly associated with that issue while they were lobbying 
parliamentarians to vote in favor of their draft personal status law, she said. She had called Jean 
and demanded information, and he had assured her that everyone who had attended the planning 
meetings knew that such associations were not welcome. But, he added, he could not control 
what people who came to the march would bring with them. She did not believe Jean. Rima 
listened to the Chaml representative and assured her that we had just left the banner-making 
meeting and that no one had written anything about LGBTQ rights. Clearly disturbed, she told 
Rima that Chaml just “couldn't take the risk” and that the organization would be withdrawing 
officially from the next day's march. She clarified that this position did not could come from any 
“personal issues” with gay people, and that members of Chaml were still attending the march as 
individuals. As an organization, Chaml could not take the risk of being publicly associated with 
LGBTQ activism, because the larger population's homophobia would taint Chaml's credibility.  
 As discussed in Chapter Two, da‘wa secularists have taken measures to ensure that their 
cause is not explicitly associated with that of same-sex marriage, an association that religious 
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figures have promoted in order to discredit projects to pass a secular personal status.  The logic 
of this disassociation is an articulation of da‘wa logic: that they, personally, are not homophobic 
but that they need to cater to the larger population's homophobia until that larger population 
becomes secular enough to extend tolerance towards Lebanon's LGBTQ community. By and 
large, da‘wa secularists use the same arguments to explain their positions on women’s rights. 
When writing a draft personal status law, members of the tayyar struggled with many issues 
pertaining to women's rights.  In the draft law the principle of different ages of consent for men 
and women was upheld, and the question of inheritance was left to sectarian personal status law. 
Because a secular law in matters of inheritance already governs non-Muslims, the concession to 
not include inheritance issues was being made to Muslim personal status laws. During the 
meeting, I stated that if this law was an opportunity to imagine the type of Lebanon we would 
like to create, we should take into account gender justice. While other members of the meeting 
agreed with me, in the end they decided that Lebanese Muslims were not “ready” for a secular 
inheritance law, and that once a secular personal status was passed we could alter it to promote 
gender equality.  Just as in the cases of homophobia, these activists displaced sexism and 
patriarchy onto others who needed to be taught tolerance.  The temporality of da‘wa is that of the 
future, and thus the logic is that once a secular personal status exists in Lebanon, it will be much 
easier to immerse a larger group of people in the culture of secularism, which of course is 
inclusive of gay and women's rights.   However, while the idyllic temporality is the future, that 
future is an ever delayed (im)possibility.  
 Tolerance is a central aspect of the culture of secularism. Beginning with the principle 
that a secular Lebanese is one that tolerates all other sects and does not differentiate between 
citizens on the basis of their sectarian or religious affiliations, da‘wa secularism extends this 
  180 
imperative to groups that are assumed to be intolerable in a culture of sectarianism. For their 
part, LGBTQ activists have also used a sectarian-based “diversity” framework in their activism. 
Examples of this include an online video that portrays lesbian and bisexual Lebanese as just one 
more identity among others such as “Sunni,” “Druze,” and “Maronite.” In an interview, the 
former director of Helem half-jokingly hypothesized that if ten percent of the Lebanese 
population were gay, than perhaps they should be given ten percent of the seats of parliament. 
“That means,” he said seriously, “that there are more gay Lebanese than there are Druze, Greek 
Orthodox, or Armenian Lebanese.”ccxlvi Wendy Brown has written that “the cultivation of 
tolerance as a political end implicitly constitutes a rejection of politics as a domain in which 
conflict can be productively articulated and addressed.”ccxlvii  In a country where sectarian 
violence is always feared to be around the corner, tolerance of difference is preferable in the 
short term than to bringing sectarian difference into political discourse. Not until the country is 
ready for it, at least.  
The denial of homophobia and sexism by da‘wa secularists, even as they were being 
sexist and homophobic, is perhaps evidence that they know they are acting in future-oriented 
liberal time, under the sign: “we will have been wrong.”ccxlviii  In this framework, they know that 
even if they find LGBTQ people intolerable, they should tolerate them in order to be good and 
liberal citizens of a newly secular Lebanese state and in order to claim association with 
internationally articulated secular modernity. 
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LGBTQ markers that were smuggled into the Laique Pride march by participants. 
 
For their part, LGBTQ activists chafed under what they perceived to be the homophobia 
of the first Laique Pride march. Because three four out of five of Laique Pride's planning 
committee was known to be gay, at first the LGBTQ community did not take seriously requests 
to come to the march without openly displaying divisive identities. When it became clear that the 
planning committee was insisting that all potentially divisive politicsccxlix were unwelcome at the 
march, LGBTQ activists insisted that sexual rights and secularism were not separable.  Many 
activists did smuggle markers of a queer identity to the march, markers that proved to be the 
most photographed by the press. In fact, Chaml's representative called me after the march and 
said that she felt vindicated by her decision to withdraw. By and far, however, the most shocking 
moment was a “gay kiss in” by two Lebanese men. When critiqued for their actions, the men in 
question argued that they were acting in the spirit of Laique Pride and were taking over space 
with their identities, identities that could only be truly expressed in a culture of secularism. It is 
perhaps significant that the march so successfully took over Beirut’s streets to the extent that 
when two men kissed in public, soldiers and internal security officers looked away rather than 
arrest or harass them.   
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Two Laique Pride participants kiss in the middle of the street that leads to parliamentary buildings in Beirut. 
 
Permanence 
2013 marked the fourth annual Laique Pride march. Many of the same questions and 
controversies surrounded the march, and the planning committee has contracted, but the 
philosophy of the event has remained consistent. Laique Pride remains primarily invested in 
taking over public space to display and promote both personal identification with secularism and 
a ‘culture of secularism.’ Secularism here is not defined though a series of binaries, but rather 
through a process of word association. Secularism is associated with tolerance, meritocracy, 
openness, modernity, sincerity, freedom, rights, and with good and true citizenship. It is 
sincerity, it is freedom, and it is rights. Secularism is promoted as the antonym of the negatives 
that are associated with sectarianism: cronyism, corruption, violence, traditionalism, illiberalism, 
insincerity, and repression. The aims continue to show that being secular is possible, and to 
promote an association between secularism and positivity, secularism as a way of life that 
affords citizens’ dignity.  
In order to create and maintain a good “buzz” around secularism, it was important not to 
offer firm positions on controversial issues such as the end of political sectarianism or LGBTQ 
rights.  Rima succinctly summarized the strategy: “The wider you make your platform the more 
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people you will bring together.” Using this strategy, the Laique Pride planning committee 
knowingly promoted a lowest common denominator politics: a politics that seeks to cast as wide 
a net as possible to mobilize the largest number of supporters possible. Thus while sectarianism, 
understood as prejudice and as moral- and financial-corruption, can be loudly denounced, the 
question of political sectarianism was tabled. In fact, da‘wa secularists share a central tenet of 
state ideology that legitimates political sectarianism: Lebanon is a country made up of minorities 
that must be protected. While the state understands these minorities as religious, historical, legal, 
and cultural groups; da‘wa secularists argue that these minorities must become only historical 
and cultural if political sectarianism is to function as a secular system of rule. Thus the only path 
towards ending political sectarianism is to ensure that it operates well enough to allow its 
citizens to transcend sectarianism.  Because the topic of ending political sectarianism is too 
controversial to bring into the public sphere without the attendant accusation of particular 
Muslim political interests, da‘wa secularists instead place an emphasis on tolerance as a political 
principle one must develop in order to be a good citizen in a diverse state.ccl  
  Da‘wa secularists tie citizenship, the state, and secularism closely together in their vision 
for the future of Lebanon. The legal records of the Council reveal the same knot between 
citizenship, the state, and secularism. The discourses of da‘wa secularists and the state, seen 
through the court records of the Council, could not be more different, even when they are both 
repeating central tenets of national ideology. In the next chapter, the conclusion to this 
dissertation, I suggest that one way to think about this difference is to conceptualize da‘wa 
secularism as a practice that brings together both the particularities of Lebanon and international 
understandings and practices of religion (particularly, Islam) and secularism. Thinking of da‘wa 
secularism (Secularism 2) as a practice also allows us to think how political emotions, 
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dispositions, and affect are inseparable from law and from political reform. Secularism 1, that of 
the Lebanese state, does not draw heavily on these affective registers and instead performs its 
secularity through drawing, redrawing, and transgressing the epistemological borders of religion, 
sect, and the civil law. In both, the category of sex, so central to citizenship and to legal practice 
in Lebanon, is left uninterrupted and uninterrogated.  
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Conclusion 
Is Lebanon Secular? And Why Does It Matter? 
 
In 2010 I visited Dar al Fatwa with my mother and father. Forty-one years earlier, they 
had gotten married at a Justice of the Peace in Ypsilanti, Michigan. They had met in college, a 
Lebanese non-practicing Muslim and an American non-practicing Methodist.  They moved to 
Lebanon almost ten years later, with two children and a third (me) on the way. Now, after living 
in Lebanon for the past thirty years, my mother was going to convert to Sunni Islam. As long as 
she was recognized as a Christian by the Lebanese state, she could not inherit from her Muslim 
husband or children, or they from her.  
Outside the complex, my mother and I loosely covered our hair with scarves we had 
brought from home. My father rolled down his sleeves. The three of us entered the office of the 
sheikh s with whom we had made an appointment. My parents were nervous, my father because 
he is always distrustful of clergy and my mother because she just wanted this whole affair to be 
over. Earlier, my parents and I had argued after I told them that since my mother was becoming a 
Muslim after having been married, the standard Sunni marriage contract would now apply to 
their marriage. This contract, I had explained, would mean that my father could divorce my 
mother at will and could marry up to three other women. They were furious at me for bringing 
up these facts as possibilities in their relationship, but I was, at that time, one year into my 
fieldwork and obsessed with legal facts and processes. I had mistakenly assumed that everyone 
would find this information as compelling as I did.  
My father explained to the sheikh that they had been married decades ago and that now 
my mother wanted to legally become a Muslim and was ready to say the two shahadas –the 
testimony that that there is no God other than God and the Mohammad is his Prophet. Although 
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we had practiced this speech at home, the sheikh was not convinced and wanted to know why 
she had not converted earlier. He ignored my father and asked my mother (whose Arabic is 
adequate for maneuvering the city at best) if she wanted to become a Muslim. After my mother 
had said yes, he asked her if she knew that “Muslims also believe that Mary was a virgin.” My 
mother, who does not consider herself religious and is certainly not Catholic, managed a polite 
(and in English), “Oh really? That’s interesting.” The sheikh, clearly believing that he had just 
convinced my mother to convert, asked her if she would be willing to attend Islamic classes, held 
at Dar al- Fatwa. I could tell that my father was growing increasingly frustrated with the sheikh 
for dragging out the process and asking us questions about our family life. He was also 
convinced that the sheikh was intentionally drawing out the conversion process in order to 
extract a “donation” to Dar al -Fatwa. My father had warned us of this prospect in the car. Before 
my father could step in and, I feared, disrespect the sheikh, I interjected. “Sheikh,” I said to him, 
“we are a Muslim family and my mother has said the two shahadas and is ready to say them now 
in front of you.” When he began to respond I cut him off, “We also know what the law is, and 
that as long as she says the shahadas before you she has become a Muslim.” At this, the sheikh 
laughed and asked if I was a lawyer. My mother answered, “Almost.”  
We were sent to a different office with a signed paper, which a different sheikh told us to 
file with the census registry of Beirut. After we had paid the fees and tips associated with 
conversions (no more than $40) we drove back home and had lunch.  
This ethnographic vignette illustrates much of what this dissertation has argued on the 
legal entanglement of personal status, gender, and secularism in contemporary Lebanon. A 
couple marries in the United States and registers this marriage with Lebanese authorities. They 
have three children, who are all identified as Sunni Muslim by the Lebanese state following a 
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patrilineal system of religious and sectarian registration. Later in life, they realize that the 
cheapest and most efficient way to protect their assets and those of their children is to be of the 
same religion. Due to the fact that the children are the same religion as their father, it is 
incumbent on the wife to convert to be recognized as following the same religion. When the 
Lebanese state changes her census registration to reflect her conversion, the Michigan marriage 
certificate is automatically voided in the eyes of the Lebanese state and the Muslim courts and a 
“standard” Lebanese Sunni marriage contract comes into force.ccli A new set of laws now governs 
the physical, emotional, and financial relationship between wife and husband and wife and 
children. What enables this process are a set of secular and patriarchal laws that regulate the 
relationship between the Lebanese state, its religious and personal status institutions, and its 
citizens. Moreover, these legal practices and positions re-affirm the state's sovereignty at each 
iteration. As Jacqueline Stevens has suggested. “As much as legal marriage does not exist 
without being authorized by the state, one of the principal means that the state can use to prove 
its existence—to announce its sovereignty and its hold on the populace—is its authority over 
marriage.”cclii 
Law is not the only factor at play in this vignette. My parents are upper middle class and 
my father is a well-respected university dean with a broad social network. They are not religious 
and have no great deference to sheikhs or priests. Their daughter had been studying these laws 
and knows what their rights are in relation to both Dar al-Fatwa and the state. Throughout my 
fieldwork, many informants told me of encounters with the same sheikh at Dar al-Fatwa that 
unfolded very differently. In one case, a European man needed to convert to Islam to placate his 
fiancée’s wealthy and socially powerful Sunni family. He (and his fiancée) did not know what 
the civil laws are governing religious conversion. In fact, they had assumed that there were no 
  188 
civil laws that regulated or legislated conversion. He paid for religious classes at Dar al-Fatwa 
for months before being given his certificate of conversion and could then marry. Until our 
interview he had believed that this was standard procedure. 
In some cases, the price of not having legal information available is much higher. 
Throughout the course of my fieldwork a friend of mine went through an acrimonious divorce. 
She is a European citizen who met her husband, a human rights worker, in the United States. The 
couple had two daughters and decided to convert to Shi‘a Islam together (he was Sunni, she 
Christian) in order to protect their inheritance. At the time of their conversion, neither knew that 
the standard Shi’a marriage contract could now apply in case of divorce or marital discord. When 
they separated, the wife found that she could not lobby for divorce under Shi’a law, and that only 
her husband could “decide” that the marriage was over. When the husband finally agreed to 
divorce her it was only after she had agreed to a financial and custody arrangement that greatly 
favored him. She called this “buying her divorce” but really, it was in line with well-known 
practices whereby the wife gives up many of her rights in order to “convince” her husband to 
divorce her. I asked her why she had not researched the legal implications of her conversion 
before becoming Shi‘i along with her husband. She replied that she had thought that they were 
protecting their daughters, and that she had never imagined that she would be locked in a bitter 
divorce with a man intent on utilizing all the patriarchal advantages enshrined in personal status 
law against her. This sentiment—that one does not enter a marriage thinking of a divorce—was 
one that I heard often while conducting fieldwork. “People who are in love,” one informant told 
me, “aren't going to think about things like law when all they want to do is get married.”ccliii  
In 2009 two close friends of mine, Nadine and Ziad, got married. They had been dating 
for four years. He is a well-regarded artist; she works at a prominent Lebanese NGO involved in 
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civil society and legal reform for communities at risk (such as drug addicts and homosexuals). 
He is an atheist, but technically he is a Maronite Christian. Nadine is Sunni Muslim, but does not 
practice. Ziad offered to convert to Islam in order to marry in Lebanon, but she was adamant on 
marrying him in Cyprus under that country’s civil marriage law. Over dinner, I asked Nadine 
why she was so committed to being married in Cyprus when that law only covers marriage and 
divorce, leaving custody, inheritance and guardianship under the man's personal status (in this 
case Maronite Christianity). Eventually, she may have to convert to Maronite Christianity in 
order to ensure her and her children's inheritance, and in order to make sure that in case of 
accident or divorce, she could maintain guardianship over her Maronite children. If they were 
married under Sunni law, I suggested, they could add stipulations to the marriage contract to 
make it more equitable and reflective of their relationship—amendments that are impossible in a 
Maronite marriage contract. While Ziad agreed that this made sense (it also made more financial 
sense than a wedding trip to Cyprus) Nadine was adamant that they not marry under any 
religious law. She argued that marrying under a civil law was an important symbolic gesture and 
that she did not want to violate her principles—no matter what were the content of the laws. She 
stated that if people in their social circle knew that her fiancée had converted to Islam to marry 
her, they would be disappointed. Finally, she argued, people do not marry with the intention to 
divorce and have arguments over custody and money. They both hoped that by the time they 
were elderly a civil personal status law would exist in Lebanon, and thus not only could they 
inherit from each other, but they could also be buried in the same cemetery. At the very least, 
Nadine said, we should be working towards that—not just playing the corrupt system to make it 
work for us. 
These stories of marriage and divorce are important avenues into what I have been 
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describing as two different practices of secularism in Lebanon, that of the state (Secularism 1) 
and that of da‘wa secularists (Secularism 2). Both are informed by the historical contexts of 
Lebanon, and both operate on and are directed towards the terrain of law—its reform, promises, 
and problems. The secularism practiced by the Lebanese state, as demonstrated in part through 
the record of the Council, is primarily concerned with protecting the public good and mediating 
between what are understood as inevitable religious and sectarian conflict. As Connolly has 
written, “the strategy of secularism was an effort to avoid conflict by retreating to an ever more 
rarified conception of the public good.”ccliv As we have seen, this is precisely the logic that the 
Council uses in adjudicating cases between personal status courts. Additionally, it is also the 
logic used by citizens and personal status courts who seek the intervention of the Council to 
“protect the public good” by making sure that potential religious and sectarian conflict produced 
by practices of (allegedly) insincere conversion is mitigated. As Connolly has argued, secularism 
produces itself, “as the single, authoritative source to adjudicate the differences among the 
others.”cclv Secularism 1, mediated through citizenship and state practices, is the sociopolitical 
space in which this transcendence is possible and protected. However, secularism as a state 
practice produces its own limitations and may “intensify the very forms of sectarian conflict it 
was intended to overcome.”cclvi It may even, in the case of Lebanon, produce a form of politics 
where a secular sect is the vehicle through which the rights of secularists will be ensured and 
protected by the state. The transcendence of the Lebanese secular state and its promise of 
pluralism and religious freedom are precisely what allow for secularism as a form of identity 
politics.  
Lebanese jurisprudence, read through the archives of the Council, demonstrates the 
primacy of two categories that together form the citizen; sect and sex. Here, sect is separate and 
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separable from religion, and is legally read through the determination of patrilineally inherited 
personal status. Yet even sect and personal status may be disarticulated, as personal status is a 
strictly legal determination while sect is a denser category of identification that contains within it 
historical and social markers. The jurisprudence of the highest civil court in Lebanon 
demonstrates the primacy of the secular citizen endowed with inviolable rights. This citizen has 
the right to not be identified religiously, and to not have either his religious or sectarian 
belonging be questioned. This argument consistently wins against citizens' and personal 
status/religious authorities desire to know the internal state of any individual.  
While the Lebanese state is the transcendent space within which Lebanese citizens are all 
equally protected from the overreach of religious personal status institutions, the very 
transcendence of the secular state is in large part staged upon the regulation of sexual difference. 
As I have shown, all bodies of Lebanese law discriminate on the basis of sex, from the ability to 
open a bank account in the name of your child to the ability to grant citizenship to a child—these 
are abilities (enshrined in civil/secular law) determined by the sex of the citizen. Just as in civil 
law, sex determines what rights and duties will apply to the citizen in the realm of personal 
status. This has led many progressive Lebanese feminists to argue that the struggle against sex-
based discrimination in law cannot be separated from the struggle to remove sect-based 
discrimination in law. A conservative patriarchal ideology undergirds both.cclvii Indeed, if the 
regulation of sexual difference is a distinctive mark of Secularism 1 in Lebanon, it is also a 
characteristic of Secularism 2, or what I have been calling da‘wa secularism—a pedagogical 
form of activism “for secularism” that entails ethical and embodied practices, affective and 
demonstrative registers, and is motored by a temporality of the future. The future is either the 
redemption of the secular state and the promise of peace, or a catastrophe of never ending 
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sectarian violence.  
  Da‘wa secularists argue that once Lebanese citizens become more secular they will also 
become more concerned with ensuring gender parity. However, when it comes to publicly stating 
the links between the struggle for a secular personal status law and the struggle to criminalize 
domestic violence or marital rape, for example, da‘wa secularists often demure. Many prominent 
da‘wa secularists are quick to distance themselves from feminist (or LGBTQ) campaigns, 
reasoning that they cannot present themselves to a patriarchal culture as “radicals.” They suggest 
that the very presence of a secular personal status law, even one that discriminates between the 
sexes, will in and of itself begin to erode the patriarchal norms and values that today dominate in 
a culture of sectarianism. This is an illustration of how da‘wa secularism is articulated through 
word associations, whereby secularism is inherently linked to feminism, tolerance, and 
progressiveness and religion/sectarianism is inherently linked to patriarchy, intolerance, and 
backwardness. Throughout my fieldwork it was obvious that debates on gender often 
precipitated discussions of secularism and religion, and vice versa. In fact, it became clear that 
gender and war were the preferred grounds for staging of the secular and of the religious by both 
the Lebanese state and da‘wa secularists.  
Secularism 1 and Secularism 2 are locked in a dynamic relationship, and in fact da‘wa 
secularism explicitly presents itself as a reform of state secularism. Secularism 1 does not require 
conscious participation or consent, as it is the legal framework for all Lebanese citizens 
regardless of sect, sex, age, or region of origin. In this way Secularism 1 is “blind to the visceral 
register of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.”cclviii Like citizenship itself, one is born into it. It 
does not require or expect ideological consent or passionate attachment. Da‘wa secularism, on 
the other hand, is predicated on sincerity, interiority, and inter-subjectivity. Indeed, these two 
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practices of secularism in Lebanon have stated differences in the primary locations of their 
interventions; one is the “public sphere” (shared life) and the maintenance of civil peace; the 
other aims to intervene in both the interior and exterior spaces of the individual citizen, with the 
aim of aligning them. However, the efforts of da‘wa secularists have sometimes backfired, as 
with the unexpected state response to citizens who had removed their personal status from census 
registries. As stated in chapter two, these citizens now had to receive certifications of belonging 
from religious figures in order to access personal status law, a development that has put them in a 
structurally unprecedented position vis-a-vis religious and personal status institutions. Having 
removed themselves from the complex rules and regulations that govern personal status 
institutions and their relationship to citizens and to the state, they can only re-enter that system 
under the auspices of religious authorities. Many of these citizens have subsequently re-
converted to their original sect, telling me that reconversion was less harmful to their sense of 
self than having to “beg some man in a beard and recite Qur'an to him.”cclix  
  For da‘wa secularists, a citizen should only be under the jurisdiction of Maronite personal 
status law, for example, because they believe that it is an integral part of their identity. Similarly, 
secular citizens should be given the option to have their own personal status law, one that is true 
to their identity and way of life. This is secularism as identity politics, but with a caveat—that 
their status as a minority group needing state protection is only temporary and that eventually the 
majority of citizens will join them. The larger aim of da‘wa secularism is to reform Lebanese 
sectarian citizens into non-sectarian, “secular” and liberal citizens of an eventually secular, 
liberal, and strong state. This project, as we have seen previously, is predicated on defining 
secularism in opposition to sectarianism, an opposition not present in Secularism 1. Da‘wa 
secularism aims to police the boundaries between sect, religion, and personal status. In this 
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framework conversion is understood as a violation of secularism and of religion precisely 
because it does not produce a sincere alignment between the interior and exterior spaces of the 
citizen. The fact that one may identify as an atheist Sunni, or as a Christian who is legally 
Muslim or vice versa, is anathema to da‘wa secularists. Not only do da‘wa secularists equate 
secularism with anti-sectarianism, but they also believe that this form of secularism will allow a 
strong state and nation to flourish. The public and pedagogical nature of da‘wa secularism 
campaigns (such as Laique Pride or the removal of one's personal status from census records) 
aims to show and educate others that they too can put their country and their fellow citizens 
above and beyond primordial attachments such as (extended) family, clan, or sect.  
The nationalism that undergirds da‘wa secularism is informed by a reading of violence in 
Lebanon, dominant in both public narrations of war and the historiography of Lebanon, that 
stresses above all else violence's sectarian nature. Sectarianism is inherently anti-national and 
prone to violence, and “true” secularism is posited as what will save Lebanese from themselves. 
Thus a discourse on the reparative, peaceful, and tolerant nature of secularism intersects with a 
history of sectarian civil war in Lebanon. In this way da‘wa secularism re-iterates a tenet of 
earlier forms of Lebanese nationalism that stressed the reformatory nature of the Lebanese state 
towards its citizens. The mandate government, and the first (post independence) and second (post 
civil war) Lebanese republics all legislated and legitimized political sectarianism as a temporary 
solution to a seemingly intractable problem: the sectarianism of Lebanese citizens. The 
ostensibly “temporary” character of the political sectarian proposal parallels in some ways the 
temporary character of da‘wa secularists having their own “sect” before everyone becomes 
secular. The investment in the temporary enables the everlasting delay of arrival to the better 
self, the better state. However, da‘wa secularism departs from these earlier forms of nationalism 
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in a critical way. It stresses that it is also the duty of da‘wa secularists themselves, and not just 
the state, to help their co-citizens become less sectarian and thus better citizens. The term “better 
citizens” encompasses many of the features that da‘wa secularists believe are part of the culture 
of secularism; nationalist, open minded, tolerant, progressive, and civically engaged. Secularism 
2 is not only an episteme or a political practice, but is also a way of life, a set of historically 
contingent beliefs and values, a subject with ethical practices that are to produce a peaceful, 
tolerant, and “Lebanese” affect. If nothing else, the presence of two forms of secularism in 
contemporary Lebanon demonstrates that when writing about secularism as an embodied and 
structural set of practices, it is more accurate to use the plural tense.  
It is not a coincidence that da‘wa secularism has emerged in the context of the global war 
on terror. Since the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq there has been growing concern over 
Sunni-Shi‘i violence regionally, and Lebanon has been no exception. When da‘wa secularists 
speak of the war that they hope to avoid in Lebanon through preaching secular tolerance, they 
mean the coming (or perhaps now already here) Sunni-Shi‘a war. Beginning in 2005, Lebanese 
politicians have paraphrased Thomas Friedman and named the political landscape in their 
country a war between the “culture of life” and the “culture of death.”cclx The country was 
divided into those that “love life” and those that do not. Rival political camps also reinvigorated 
a discourse of “tolerance” in an attempt to divide the country between those that are moderate 
and radical, modern and traditional, and those that are secular and those that are religious. This 
division fits neatly into a war on terror vision of the world, where religion (read: Islam) is 
inherently dangerous and must be “tamed” by secular modernity.  
Within this framework, culturalist discourses have become new ways to talk about 
supposedly immutable differences. Economic and political struggles are transformed into attacks 
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on identity and “ways of life.” Liberty and the freedom of choice are always at risk from those 
that would sacrifice these tenets of liberalism and modernity at the altar of political 
intransigence, fundamentalism, and in the case of da‘wa secularists, sectarianism. When da‘wa 
secularists frame their struggle as one between a culture of secularism and a culture of 
sectarianism, they are in part using a war on terror grammar. This is not surprising, given that in 
the war on terror secular states and people who are assumed to be “modern” and “progressive” 
are also assumed to be peaceful while Islamists are seen as not modern and potentially 
dangerous. At this historical moment, “far from being a measure of a culture's tolerance towards 
its others, religious freedom has been tied from its very inception to the existence of sovereign 
power, regional and national security, and the inequality of geopolitical power relations.”cclxi 
Moreover, the geopolitical stakes of being framed as “secular,” “tolerant,” “intolerant” or 
“religious” are amplified in the war on terror, despite the fact that states with similar legal 
systems and/or ideological foundations (Saudi Arabia and Iran for example) may find themselves 
on different sides of that war. Israel and Lebanon, in fact, are perhaps the most structurally 
similar states in the Middle East, yet Lebanon has been framed in the war on terror as sectarian, 
intolerant, and dangerous, while Israel continues to enjoy the capital accumulated through 
supposedly being the only secular democracy in the Middle East.cclxii 
 *** 
In January 2013 the civil marriage campaign was greatly reinvigorated when Khuloud 
Sukkarieh and Nidal Darwish became the first Lebanese citizens to marry each other in Lebanon 
under a civil marriage law. Both are activists and members of The Civic Center for the National 
Initiative, the architects of the campaign to remove their personal status from government census 
records. Following the logic of that campaign, Talal Husseini, the head of the Civic Center and a 
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longtime activist we met in earlier chapters, argued that because mandate-era law 60LR states 
that if people do not belong to a particular sect, then they are subject to an undefined civil law—
and because there is no Lebanese civil personal status law—then citizens must be allowed to 
marry in Lebanon under a different country's civil marriage law. As I previously argued, 60LR is 
the legal basis for much of da‘wa secularist activism because it provides for a civil personal 
status and makes mention of a community without a sect—a stipulation that became the grounds 
upon which activists won the right to remove their personal status from state registries. The 
problem with 60LR, however, is that it does not apply to Muslim citizens. Thus activists have 
been put in the awkward position of advocating for legal reform on the basis of a law that does 
not apply to the majority of the population. 
To get around this legal exclusion, Nidal and Khuloud—both Muslims—first removed 
their personal status from census registries—just as Hussein did (in Chapter Three) in order to 
register his civil marriage to his Muslim girlfriend in Lebanon. Once Nidal and Khuloud were 
both “sect-less” they signed a French marriage contract in the offices of a legal notary and in the 
pretense of witnesses. When they tried to register their marriage with the census authorities, 
however, they were refused. After a series of appeals, an advisory panel at the Ministry of Justice 
and the Minister of the Interior announced that the fact that because there is no Lebanese law that 
legislates this marriage, it could not be registered. Finally, a higher advisory body at the Ministry 
of Justice issued an opinion stating that the marriage could be registered, a decision that the 
Minister of the Interior (who considers himself a reformer) quickly implemented. By this time, 
Khuloud was pregnant and visibly showing, a fact that was often cited by da‘wa secularists in 
order to put pressure on the state to register their marriage before the child was born. 
When the news broke that Nidal and Khuloud were able to register their marriage, da‘wa 
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secularists and other activists concerned with civil marriage celebrated—despite the fact that the 
opinion allowing the registration mentioned that this was an exemption and not to be considered 
legal precedent. It was believed that the Lebanese government would now have to legislate an 
optional civil marriage law and that the promises of both the civil marriage campaign and the 
campaign to remove personal status identification from census registries were finally coming 
true. This was a victory, and da‘wa secularists were sure that the culture of secularism was on 
the march in Lebanon. There was hope that the government, fearing another sectarian civil war 
in Lebanon, would work to ameliorate sectarian tensions and promote tolerance and national 
unity. Many da‘wa secularists believed that this meant that a Lebanese civil marriage law was 
around the corner.  
At the same time as Nidal and Khuloud were lobbying to declare their marriage legal, 
Parliament was debating a new electoral law that aimed at a different yet co-constitutive aspect 
of political sectarianism. The electoral law—known as the Orthodox Law— would ensure that 
for the first time Lebanese citizens would vote for elections according to their sect, meaning that 
they would only be able to vote for politicians who represent their sect in parliament. When 
lobbying for this proposed change to the electoral system, supporters stated that this was the only 
way to ensure that Lebanese Christians are represented in the political system. They argued that 
Christians had had their electoral voice “hijacked” by Muslims living in historically Christian 
areas in Lebanon who were voting for who they believed should be the Christian MPs from their 
district. At a time when Christians across the Middle East were under threat, political leaders 
stated using events in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt as examples; Lebanon had to ensure that it 
maintained its pluralistic and democratic nature. To do so, it was imperative that Christians be 
allowed to elect their leaders and not have their MPs decided for them by their Muslim co-
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citizens. The Orthodox law was to ensure that Sunnis voted for Sunnis, Shi‘is for Shi‘is, Greek 
Orthodox for Greek Orthodox, Maronites for Maronites, and so on. Using discourse similar to 
that of da‘wa secularists, supporters of the Orthodox Law argued that they were protecting 
Lebanese minorities and making sure their political choices have structural viability. They 
wanted to align Christian bodies with “sincere” Christian political representation. They repeated 
a central tenet of Lebanese nationalism that da‘wa secularists also rely on: Lebanon is composed 
of minorities who deserve legal recognition and protection by the state.  
Currently, Lebanon has no elected government. The debate over the Orthodox law grew 
so acrimonious in Parliament, the press, and among the public, that elections were postponed 
altogether. It was the first time an election has been postponed since the civil war ended in 1990. 
The tensions brought forth through a debate on political sectarianism, its merits and the need to 
protect Lebanese minorities from Muslim encroachment were simply too explosive to be 
resolved, just as they were in crucial instances of da‘wa secular activism. 
Today's Lebanon is one where protesters clash daily with riot police in Beirut over what 
they claim is the illegal extension of Parliament. Employees, both government and private sector, 
are not being paid. Unemployment and underemployment is chronic. People plan their days 
around water and electricity cuts.  Inflation is high. Infrastructure is eroding. Government 
agencies and institutions are corrupt and failing. Across the country hundreds of thousands of 
newly arrived Syrian refugees have fled violence, and continue to flee violence, in their cities 
and villages. They have found themselves unwelcome and unwanted in a country that has 
become accustomed to sending their citizens and residents to Syria during their wars, and now 
finds itself in the awkward and unwanted position of having to return the favor. 
In 2013 in Sidon, Lebanon’s third largest city, a man in a beard who no one had heard of 
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three years ago decided to restore the honor of Lebanese Sunnis by killing Lebanese Shi‘a. In 
Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city, hundreds have died and been wounded over the past two 
years, they are civilians, and soldiers, and armed men. Every day the Syrian army and Syrian 
rebels shell different Lebanese border towns and villages. Lebanese from rival camps are killing 
each other in Syria just as Syrians are. The sporadic violence, shootings, car bombs, and deaths 
in Beirut seem luxurious when compared to Tripoli, and even more so when compared to Syria. 
There is speculation that sectarian and political leaders can no longer control, or no longer wish 
to control, “their base”— that armed men and boys are too frustrated, and too enflamed, to listen 
to those that purport to lead them. Israeli war planes illegally fly over the country daily, low 
enough to taunt people with their own helplessness. The sonic booms, a staple of Lebanon’s 
soundscape, are a clear message that the country is at the mercy of Israel’s brutal war machine. 
This message vibrates in the bones of those that have lived and died under countless Israeli raids 
over civilian villages, towns, and cities. Measured against the civil war of 1975-1990, the 
occupations of South Lebanon, the Israeli bombings of Beirut in the 1980s, and the 2006 war, 
today’s violence seems tame, almost safe. Later, historians might one day write that we were 
living through our “ahdath,” the events, a slow avalanche of violence that culminates in that 
deceptive word, “war.” Increasingly, Lebanese citizens and residents are asking themselves if 
this is how people felt in 1973 or in 1957, consumed by the futility of living in war’s yawning 
mouth.    
Against this backdrop, a study of practices of secularism in Lebanon may feel out of 
place or irrelevant. However, these practices of secularism are practices of citizenship (da‘wa 
secularism) and practices of state sovereignty (Secularism 1); two arenas said to be lacking in the 
failed state of Lebanon. Furthermore, these practices are refracted through discourses on 
  201 
sectarianism, on sexual difference and the family, on the public good, and on violence. These 
discourses must be read against the archival and historical record of Lebanon and against the 
grammar of a war on terror era Middle East. This backdrop helps us understand how and why the 
Lebanese state carefully and judiciously produces itself as secular. This backdrop also helps us 
understand how to claim sincerity in one’s belief in secularism, a secularism that is a public 
announcement of being secular on the inside has become a revolutionary act for many in 
Lebanon. It is why da‘wa secularists consider the non-aligned legal and personal identities of 
supposedly “insincere” converts dangerous, because they believe such non-alignments to be 
practices of religious and civic insincerity. It is also why da‘wa secularists want to save these 
converts, sectarian citizens, and themselves from another civil war.  
Secularism is not (only) an epistemic and an embodied position, it is also increasingly an 
attribute that says something about who you are and who you want to be. It is an identity. It is an 
attribute that can make the difference between a democratically elected Islamist state or 
government, with all the affective registers such a determination calls on, and a secular military 
coup. Secularism is a way of distinguishing modern, enlightened and progressive citizens from 
their traditional, backwards, oppressive and oppressed brothers and sisters. Through practices of 
secularism, the state also articulates and adjudicates its sovereignty, its regulation of public good, 
and its determination of ideal male and female citizenship. In Lebanon, secularism is the 
fulfillment of what Lebanon is and what it is meant to be—but in Lebanon is secularism also a 
redemptive culture of openness that will finally fulfill the promise of a pluralistic, progressive, 
tolerant, and at peace nation state? It is the language through which both the state and da‘wa 
secularists articulate the stakes of war and peace, men and women, normativity and perversion, 
and life and death. 
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